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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
PUTTING GENEALOGY INTO PERSPECTIVE:  
FOR A GENEALOGICAL CRITIQUE OF DESIGN AND DESIGNERS 
 
 
Aren Emre Kurtgözü 
PhD in Graphic Design 
Supervisor: Asst.Prof.Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
August, 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
In this work, genealogy, as a form of historical critique inaugurated by Friedrich 
Nietzsche and later taken up, refined and consolidated by Michel Foucault, has been 
extensively studied. Since Foucault was responsible for the refinement and application 
of genealogical techniques of analysis in the field of modern disciplines, Foucault's 
corpus on the subject has been painstakingly analyzed in order to develop a 
genealogical method for the analysis and critique of design discipline. To reveal the 
origins of design and its relations to diverse networks of power, the discourse of design 
throughout history has been studied in order to compile an inventory of design concepts, 
statements, definitions, etc. Definitions of design has been isolated from this inventory 
on the assumption that they are most susceptible to genealogical analysis. Then, through 
an analysis of design definitions, the specific mechanisms of design discourse through 
which designers responded to diverse networks of power has been revealed.     
 
Keywords: Industrial design, Genealogy, History, Power, Design discourse, Definition. 
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
 
SOYKÜTÜK BİLİMİNE YENİ BİR PERSPEKTİFLE BAKIŞ:  
TASARIM VE TASARIMCILARIN SOYKÜTÜKSEL BİR ELEŞTİRİSİNE 
DOĞRU 
 
 
Aren Emre Kurtgözü 
Grafik Tasarım Bölümü 
Doktora 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard.Doç.Dr. Mahmut Mutman 
Ağustos 2001 
 
 
 
 
Bu çalışmada ilk olarak Friedrich Nietzsche tarafından ortaya konulmuş olup daha sonra 
Michel Foucault tarafından ele alınarak rafine edilen ve geliştirilen soykütük yöntemi 
etraflı bir şekilde incelenmiştir. Bir analiz yöntemi olarak soykütük ilk kez Foucault 
tarafından modern disiplinlerin incelenmesi için uyarlandığından, özellikle Foucault'un 
tüm çalışmaları titiz bir incelemeye alınmıştır. Bunda amaç tasarım disiplininin analiz 
ve eleştirisi için yeni bir soykütüksel metod geliştirmektir. Tasarımın kökenini ve çeşitli 
iktidar ağları ile bağlantılarını açığa çıkarabilmek için tarih boyunca tasarım söylemi 
incelenmiş, tasarım kavramları, savları ve tanımlarından oluşan bir envanter orataya 
çıkarılmıştır. Soykütüksel analize en uygun olduğu hipotezine dayanarak, tasarım 
tanımları bu envanterden ayrıştırılmıştır. Bu tanımların soykütüksel analizi, çeşitli 
iktidar ağları içinde ve bunlara yanıt olarak tasarım söyleminin kullandığı özel 
mekanizmaları ortaya koymuştur.      
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Endüstriyel tasarım, Soykütük, Tarih, İktidar, Tasarım Söylemi, 
Tanım. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Only that which has no history is definable. 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
In this study, we ask genealogical questions to the field of design. Genealogy is a 
form of historical critique inaugurated by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and later 
taken up, refined and consolidated by Michel Foucault (1926-1984). In a 1977 
interview with Bernard-Henri Lévy, Foucault described the genealogist as a 
"historian of the present" (Merquior 161, 16-20). Indeed, genealogy can best be 
understood as the history of the present since it starts with questions posed in and 
about the present. It is an attempt to undercut our self-evident values and truths and 
our inherited notions of who we are by revealing "the contingent, practical, and 
historical conditions of our existence" (Mahon 2). It is an attempt to reveal the moral 
will that undergirds our unquestioned truths. It is an attempt to demonstrate the 
multiplicity of the relations of forces at the origin of what we tend to think as always 
unified and identical with itself. Finally, genealogy is an attempt to reveal the 
'intentionality' beneath that which pass as 'neutral' or which we tend to think as 
immune from the operations of power. Therefore, genealogy attempts to cast doubt 
on the legitimacy of the present by severing its causal and teleological connections 
with the past. It accomplishes this by conjuring up images of the past so unfamiliar 
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and radically different that, when confronted with the knowledge of our present, it 
undermines and relativizes the validity and authority of what appears natural and 
necessary in our present. Therefore, genealogy is a critique of the present, aiming to 
open possibilities for the enhancement of life and creative activity.  
 
In this study, we explore the possibility of questioning the field of design as to its 
self-evident values and truths, its unquestioned assumptions on which design 
statements are based, its inherited notions of what design is and who the designer is, 
its historical conditions of existence, its morality that gives design discourse the 
visage of its identity, its anthropologism ('all men are designers') and its essentialism 
('the essential nature of design'), its multi-faceted relations to power, its governing 
epistemologies, its monuments, the ruptures that break its historical continuity, and 
its discursive mechanisms through which the identity of design is fabricated.  
 
Yet, such a study should not comprise an 'application' of a method called genealogy, 
which was developed elsewhere, to an analysis performed in the field of design. This 
is because, as I will demonstrate as we proceed, when problematized in terms of the 
unquestioned, metaphysical assumptions that undergird them, any field of human 
activity, whether it is morals, arts, philosophy, clinical medicine, human sciences, 
knowledge, disciplinary practices and penal codes, or industrial design, demands and 
calls forth a genealogical approach that is specifically geared to its own historical, 
practical and discursive constitution. In a sense, there is not a singular and unified 
method of genealogy that would be adopted when dealing with a diversity of 
problems; rather, 'problematizations' call forth their genealogies.  
 
 3 
Having voiced this demand, the study ventures into devising a number of 
genealogical modes of analysis that may answer the problems detected in the field of 
design. Before this, however, it is necessary to achieve a mature understanding of 
genealogy as it was practiced by such prominent figures as Friedrich Nietzsche and 
Michel Foucault. Since genealogy is not a homogeneous theory that descends upon 
its objects in order to impose a unifying principle upon them, it would be a 
misguided attempt to lay down, point by point, the fundamentals of genealogical 
procedure on the assumption that it can be understood in this way. To understand 
genealogy, rather, is to locate it in its proper context, to establish its regularities as 
well as ruptures, and to isolate different moments where it assumed different roles. 
This task entails establishing the lineage that connects and disconnects Nietzsche and 
Foucault at the same time. That is, similarities as well as discrepancies between the 
genealogical projects of Nietzsche and Foucault should be considered and allowed to 
appear. What's more, since Nietzsche raised his genealogical arguments within and 
against the background of a culture that is under the sway of Hegelian philosophy, to 
provide an account of Hegelian dialectic and history becomes necessary.  
 
Therefore, the first half of this study is devoted to a long and laborious spadework 
that attempts to establish the lineage of genealogy from Nietzsche and Foucault. 
Moreover, since genealogy is an attempt to reveal the historical and practical 
conditions of existence of an entity, it would be very illuminating to undertake a 
genealogy of genealogy. Therefore, we will try to reveal the conditions of existence 
of genealogy itself through an analysis of Hegelian philosophy. As we shall see, 
Nietzsche's objections to the historical cultivation of his age were fundamentally 
attacks on the Hegelian worldview.       
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In the second half of the study, we shall be asking genealogical questions to the field 
of design. This will comprise basically three levels of analyses. First, we attempt to 
develop a mode of analysis and critique of such design values as the 'unity of form' 
and 'functional identity'. The objects of this analysis would be individual designed 
products. Second, we shall be engaged in a genealogical inquiry into the historical 
conditions that were responsible for the emergence of design profession. This will be 
done under the heading of the 'origins of design' and prepare the ground for our third 
level of analysis. Third, we will undertake a genealogical critique of design 
discourse. Yet, this final task requires a great deal of analyses and discussions in 
order to set apart the proper units of analysis. Based upon this preliminary 
characterization of design discourse, we have chosen the 'definitions of design' as the 
units of analysis. Accordingly, an inventory of more than 30 design definitions are 
compiled and analyzed in order to reveal the mechanisms that are responsible for 
their simultaneous dispersion and connection. Throughout this second half of the 
study, there will also be sustained reflections and discussions on the relation between 
design and power. Since the study is written in a tone of dialogue with the reader, it 
is mostly self-explanatory. Each chapter as well as each individual section within 
these chapters prepares the ground for the following one. Therefore, let me end this 
introduction and venture into the tasks that await us.   
 5 
 
 
 
2 HEGEL AND HISTORY 
 
 
 
 
As an introduction to our genealogical problematization of design, we should, first of 
all, provide a context for such a genealogical study. First developed by Friedrich 
Nietzsche as a historical method of analysis, genealogy tries to realize a critique of 
the present by dissociating it from the past. Apart from its generally acknowledged 
anti-Cartesian stance toward the theory of knowledge, genealogy was also, and most 
importantly, directed against previously established forms of historical understanding 
and their degenerating and stagnating effects on the present. The most prominent 
among these earlier forms of history to which Nietzschean genealogy opposed itself 
were Hegelian conception of history and its evolutionist version developed 
thereafter. As will be demonstrated in a later chapter, design history and the very 
idea of designing has been, to a large extent, under the sway of Hegelian thought. In 
the subsequent chapter, we will examine the state of design history and 
understanding in order to locate the defects in design discourse and practice resulted 
from an unacknowledged indebtedness to Hegelian thought and an evolutionist habit 
of mind.    
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Therefore, I propose, any study informed by Nietzschean genealogy should start with 
a detour through Hegel's philosophy. Such a confrontation with Hegel is necessary 
before we commence our inquiry since as Michel Foucault quite correctly observed, 
"whether through logic or epistemology, whether through Marx or Nietzsche, our 
entire epoch struggles to disengage itself from Hegel" (The Order of Discourse 74). 
 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) was the most prominent thinker of the 
philosophical movement known as German Idealism. Even after his death, his 
thought continued to exert such a powerful, lasting, and pervasive influence on 
Western intellectual tradition that it has become difficult to confine Hegelianism 
solely to the field of philosophy.  
 
In philosophy and political theory, the major and well-known inheritor of Hegelian 
thought was Karl Marx, especially the early Marx as one of the Young or Left 
Hegelians, who appropriated the dialectical method and the view of alienation from 
Hegel while trying to abolish the latter's idealism and conservative content by 
articulating the material laws of historical development. Yet, in the field of human 
sciences, the theory of evolution, advanced by Charles Darwin in 1858, was also 
indebted to Hegelian thought for its premises. Moreover, the concern with history, 
which is currently taken for granted, has been the legacy of Hegel with whom "we 
have the historical process elevated to the rank of a goddess" (Bronowski and 
Mazlish xvii). In this regard, some commentators of Hegel even claimed that his 
conception of history represents Hegel's entire philosophical system (Soykan 47). It 
was probably because he thought only a philosophy of history could genuinely reveal 
the dialectic process of change.  
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2.1 Hegel's Dialectic Method and its Premises 
 
Without qualification or reservation, Hegel's philosophy can be regarded as a fully-
fledged outgrowth of the idealist tradition of Western metaphysics, since what 
initially prompted Hegel to philosophize were the premises that (1) ideas underlie all 
of reality and that (2) all forms of reality should be systematically explained by a 
unified theory that would be predicated upon a single idea or a principle. By 'forms 
of reality' Hegel meant not only physical occurrences of organic life but also, and 
most importantly, "psychic phenomena, social and political forms of organization as 
well as artistic creations and cultural achievements such as religion and philosophy" 
(Horstmann 336). Therefore, with his all-inclusive definition of reality, the task of 
philosophy became for Hegel a systematic explanation of these diverse forms of 
reality all at once, at a single stroke. Hegel ventured into such an enterprise because 
he was convinced that only a systematic theory governed by a single, essential law 
would allow knowledge to supersede faith (Horstmann 336). It appears that for Hegel 
the valid opposition between knowledge and faith were the one prevailing between 
the necessity of laws and the providence of God.   
 
Hegel begins his philosophical project with the question that had formerly engaged 
Kant and Cartesians alike. This question was related to the theory of knowledge and 
concerned the relation between the knower and what he knows: "What is the accord 
between the mind and the world outside it? How is it that the one naturally 
understands the other? (Bronowski and Mazlish 481)."  
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Begging the question, Cartesians held that in order for knowledge to be true it should 
"correspond to a fixed reality" (Mahon 10). Kant, on the other hand, claimed that "we 
can postulate the real world only because we know it," that is, the knower actively 
and creatively imposes his personal ego on what is to be known (Bronowski and 
Mazlish 483). However, this personal ego should not be construed as an expression 
of an independent subjectivity or a perspective since, for Kant, the a priori concepts 
of a personal ego is common to all others. Therefore, a self is nothing but one of the 
numerous manifestations of a universal subjectivity with a transcendental ego. 
Similarly, reality has a twofold character: on the one hand, it has a facet dependent 
on the knower and available to his personal ego, on the other hand, beneath the thing 
as one knows it, reality independently exists as the "thing-in-itself" (Bronowski and 
Mazlish 483).  
 
Hegel believed that in order for knowledge to be possible there must be an identity 
between the knower and what he knows, that is, between reason and reality. This 
postulate of Hegel was based on his epistemological convictions as well as his 
theological persuasion concerning the explanation of reality in line with the basic 
assumptions of Christianity. Underlying Hegel's identification of reason with reality 
were the epistemological assumptions that "knowledge of reality is only possible if 
reality is reasonable, because it would not otherwise be accessible to cognition, and 
that we can only know that which is real" (Horstmann 337). This couplet of 
statements had enormous consequences concerning the nature of reality –namely that 
things exist inasmuch as mind thinks of them. The existence of the mind was also 
due to thinking (Hegel followed Descartes in this). Therefore, by virtue of thinking 
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reason proved and created both the existence of itself and that of reality. 
Consequently, this meant that reason and reality were strictly identical. Hence, the 
famous slogan of Hegel, "only reason is real and only reality is reasonable" 
(Horstmann 337; Soykan 48). However, by virtue of being equated with reality, 
reason ceases to be the faculty attributed to any one human subject and becomes 
elevated to the status of a "fundamental principle" explaining all reality in Hegel's 
philosophy (Horstmann 337). Hence, we can deduce that reason, according to this 
transcendental conception, amounted to the sum of all reality. With this move, Hegel 
claimed to abolish the opposition between thought and being and corresponding 
antagonisms existing between subject and object, between the knower and what he 
knows, or, to put it briefly, between the 'thesis' and 'antithesis', by positing their 
eventual fusion in a 'synthesis' of experience. 
 
 
2.2 Dialectic and Negativity 
 
These were the basic assumptions underlying Hegel's dialectic thought and his 
formulation of dialectic method thereof. Let us now focus more closely on the nuts 
and bolts of this dialectic machine and its progressive move towards an ideal. 
Dialectic process starts with negativity, that is a negating action applied to the given 
reality. One way or another, all human action is negating some one given. This 
negating action is creative in a peculiar sense in that the 'given' reality is negated not 
to replace it with an alternative, already existing reality, but to 'overcome' it for the 
sake of what does not yet exist (Sarup 19). Hegel described this process in a 
condensed form with the famous formula known as the series of thesis-antithesis-
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synthesis. To Hegel, every thesis, by way of being negated by its antithesis, generates 
a synthesis. Definition of this triad supplied by Sarup is worth quoting here at some 
length: 
 
The thesis describes the given material to which the action is 
going to be applied, the antithesis reveals this action itself as 
well as the thought which animates it ('the project'), while the 
synthesis shows the result of that action, that is, the completed 
and objectively real product. The new product is also given and 
can provoke other negating actions (19). 
 
According to the logic of this process, we can observe that any given reality, that is, 
any thesis, might have already been a synthesis that subsequently presents itself to 
the intellect as a thesis to be overcome. Therefore, identity and negativity denote the 
complementary aspects of one and the same given reality that is perceived as a 
totality. With this inference, we come to the crux of the matter in dialectic thought: 
 
1- If any synthesis might reveal itself simultaneously to be a thesis that would 
function as a 'given' for subsequent negations, then we can deduce the dialectic 
process to be a progression in time. What's more, since through each synthesis any 
thetical given and its antithesis fuse to engender a higher form, any change taking 
place in the world is for the better, that is, the dialectic process always moves in the 
direction of more perfection, integration, or fullness of the being. Therefore history 
of humanity is not simply a "progression"; since it proceeds through the dialectic 
process, it is a "progress" (Bronowski and Mazlish 485). History, for Hegel, has a 
'direction' for the better. 
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2- However, for Hegel, this historical progress is not endless, that is, it would not last 
indefinitely. Since behind each synthesis there is the fusion of identity and 
negativity, dialectic process, in essence, realizes the unity of opposites, that is, 
opposites are being united through each successive stage in human progress. At first, 
human beings are in a state of alienation. Through dialectics, consciousness 
discovers the 'other' to be the 'same' as itself. By way of this recognition of himself in 
that which he had so far reckoned to be the other, man puts an end to "alienation" 
(Descombes 29). Therefore, the end of alienation, which is also the end of history, 
would be nothing but the identity of the subject and the object, or rather –to be more 
faithful to Hegel- "the recognition of reason through itself" (Horstmann 337). And, in 
such a scheme, each one of the successive steps in the historical progress of 
humanity is merely an approximation to an ideal. 
  
Dialectic, as a procedure, was not invented by Hegel; it was known to earlier 
philosophers as well. However, before Hegel, it was applied to the activities of the 
mind, especially with an emphasis on the relation between the reason and the 
intellect. Hegel gave a novel interpretation to dialectic so that it became the driving 
force of the concrete realities of everyday life in his philosophy. The basis of this 
extended application of dialectic by Hegel can be best understood with the aid of a 
lengthy quotation from Bronowski and Mazlish: 
 
It is not only in our thoughts, said Hegel, that thesis and 
antithesis have to be synthesized to give a higher understanding. 
Every process in life calls out its contradictory process –and life 
takes its important steps only when it synthesizes these two into 
a higher form. Life is not merely being, and death is not merely 
nonbeing; the essential step of progress is the synthesis of the 
two –is, becoming (emphasis added) (482). 
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However, this Hegelian sense of 'becoming' should not be construed as having 
anything to do with the Nietzschean version: While, for Hegel, becoming signified 
the successive syntheses of being and nonbeing within the progress of humanity, for 
Nietzsche, who considered dialectic as a symptom of decadence, becoming was the 
active and creative power of the will to life which continually undermined the notion 
of a uniform and fixed being (Ecce Homo 81). In Nietzsche, the direction of 
becoming was not predestined; it was, rather, contingent upon the deeds of an 
affirmative, yes-saying power of a will to life; it even found joy in destroying as long 
as destruction served life. In Hegel's sense, on the other hand, becoming of life does 
not take place contingently or haphazardly, but rather it unfolds according to a 
definite plan, towards a definite goal, that is the absolute knowledge. Therefore, one 
should ask: 'what governs this definite progress towards the absolute, that is, the end 
of history? What is the prime mover of this plan behind the stage of human history?' 
With this conundrum, we have reached the point in Hegel where the Achilles heel of 
his philosophy manifests itself most visibly for the attacks of Nietzscheans and 
Marxists alike. The prime mover of the history of humanity is Spirit (Geist), and at 
last we should elaborate on this. 
 
 
2.3 History-Progress-Spirit 
 
We have examined Hegel's conception of reason and reality above. The conclusion 
he had drawn from his previous conjectures was that owing to thinking reason 
proved and created both the existence of itself and that of reality. However, if the 
external world attains its reality since the mind thinks of it, then not only the 
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materiality of the world but also that of man's body and senses wither away and 
become rather illusory, or unreal. Since, in this case, anything in this world, 
including the world itself, might be a construct of the mind, then we are left with "no 
center and no anchor other than an intangible spirit" in this world of precarious 
existence (Bronowski and Mazlish 484). Interchangeably referred to as the "world 
spirit" or "universal spirit", spirit is reason on its way towards self-realization 
through dialectic process as the great mover of history. In other words, history, for 
Hegel, is the working of the universal spirit through dialectic process.  
 
Where, then, does this working of the spirit lead the history of humanity towards? 
What is the ultimate purpose of the workings of the spirit? The telos of history is the 
self-realization of the spirit, and this self-realization should be understood in both 
senses of the term: while historically the spirit gradually realizes itself in the sense of 
becoming conscious of itself, it also realizes itself in the sense of progressively 
actualizing itself through its concrete manifestations in the world or bringing its 
realm into existence in the world. To put it briefly, through each successive age the 
spirit realizes itself more fully until it recognizes itself as total reality (Horstmann 
337; Fernie 14, 354). This ultimate recognition is the absolute knowledge, that is the 
identity of the subject and object, and signals the end of history (Descombes 28). 
Considered less spiritually, Hegel's 'spirit' might as well be construed as the 
collective consciousness of man which was elevated to the status of an 'absolute' and 
which is historically destined to reach maturity through the contradictions it 
encounters within the becoming of its life.  
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The spirit, for Hegel, is the "inner architect of history" towards the fulfillment of 
which each age in history is merely "a step up the ladder" (Fernie 342, 15). In other 
words, ages are so many successive moments in the becoming of the spirit. We can 
derive Hegel's major point of historical method from this: namely, that each age in 
the history of man was governed by a particular spirit that singly characterizes it and 
can be deduced by the historian from the expression of the certain exemplars of that 
period such as the arts, the state, or the individual consciousness of world historical 
individuals. As Sarup perceptively remarks, "this is why political institutions, works 
of art and social customs so often appear as the varied expression of a single inner 
essence" (92). 
 
The universal spirit manifests itself historically in two different ways: "It expresses 
itself as the spirit of the nation (the Volksgeist) and of the age or period (the 
Zeitgeist), which two together constitute the pageant of history unfolding and moving 
forward in continuous development (Fernie 342)." The usual clichés employed in 
many history books such as "defining characteristics of an age", "sensibility of an 
age", "certain individuals as the living embodiment of the thought of an age", or 
"certain man as the conscience of their age" are all versions of this Hegelian 
inheritance in historiography. Bronowski and Mazlish, for instance, adopt such an 
outlook in their work of history titled as The Western Intellectual Tradition. In the 
introductory pages devoted to methodological remarks, they state that "the style of a 
period is a vivid expression of its totality, in which we read, as it were, the 
thumbprint of history –or, to change the metaphor, we discover the character of an 
age from its handwriting" (xv). 
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From this perspective, a work of art, for instance, would be deemed to be the 
manifestation of the spirit of a particular age (Fernie 14). Moreover, in a historical 
study informed by Hegelianism the past is divided up into great totalities referred to 
as ages, and a multiplicity of individual and dispersed elements of the past such as 
events, personalities, pieces, or works are brought together by the historian so that 
they begin to look as if they were various manifestations of the spirit of that age. 
Accordingly, historians not only divide the past with such umbrella concepts as the 
'Renaissance' and 'modernity' but also regard the latter age as being more developed 
than the former. 
 
If, for Hegel, history unfolds as the spirit moves through dialectic towards the 
absolute, then each novel age in history would be higher, better, more reasonable, 
that is, more close to the ideal than the preceding one. Therefore, history is given 
meaning with the idea of progress. Since Hegel we have been accustomed to think of 
history as an unfolding and historical process as a rational, causal and necessary 
development.  
 
 
2.4 Truth and History / Truth in History 
 
Where exactly shall we find the locus of truth in this dialectic process of history? 
What shall be the criterion of truth in this story of progress? To which side of the 
dialectic (say, for instance the thesis of Mastery and the antithesis of Slavery) should 
we assign the truth of history? If we accept 'being' as the law of truth, then, we can 
arguably assume that truth lies at the end of history, at the point where the spirit fully 
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attains self-knowledge. However, in a history whose motive principle is continual 
transformation by way of conflict or negating action, that which determines the true 
and false cannot be the timeless notion of being. In Hegelian history, it is rather 
'action', not being, that supplies the principle of truth (Descombes 29). And, if we 
remember Hegel's concise remark that 'man is his history', then it becomes clear how 
there can be no truth which is not at the same time historical: 
 
There is no truth except in history. There are therefore no eternal 
truths, since the world undergoes continual modification in the 
course of history. But there are errors which have the 
provisional appearance of truth, and those which, dialectically 
become truths (Descombes 28). 
 
Since the dialectic process consists in the "development of true into false, and false 
into true", it becomes impossible to posit an eternal truth outside history (Descombes 
29). However, it is also true that, for Hegel, history has a direction (for the better) 
and an end (self-realization of spirit). Therefore, we can deduce that although there is 
not an 'eternal' truth in Hegelian history, there is, nevertheless, a 'final' one, that is, 
the absolute knowledge attained by the recognition of spirit through itself. Let me 
elaborate on this point further: The final term of dialectic process (i.e. the synthesis) 
cannot be the locus of truth since it may in turn become the first term (i.e. the thesis) 
of a subsequent negation. That is to say, we have the true and the false as so many 
episodes succeeding one another in this 'drama' called history. Yet, to qualify this 
figure of speech a little more, we can add that because Hegelian history is a story of 
progress, in each of its episodes greater truth and falsehood will be involved until 
absolute truth is attained so that it cannot be negated any more. Dialectic machine, 
therefore, is the relay of history; it does not bring about the historical truth itself; it is, 
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rather, the guarantee of truth. It is the working of the spirit. All in all, dialectic is, so 
to speak, the promise of truth. 
 
Until the judgment day comes, therefore, 'action' will continue to be the criterion of 
truth in Hegelian history. Hegel really spoke of the "judgment of history" to 
designate the time when the universal spirit reveals itself: 
 
Out of this dialectic rises the universal spirit, the unlimited 
world-spirit, pronouncing its judgment–and its judgment is the 
highest–upon the finite nations of the world's history; for the 
history of the world is the world's court of justice (Bronowski 
and Mazlish 484). 
 
Dialectic process will carry us toward the judgment day; and in the meanwhile 
dialectical action will supply us with the law of truth: "That which succeeds is true, 
that which fails is false (Descombes 29)." Along with its central idea of progress, this 
emphasis on the 'success' of the action as the sole measure of truth in history made 
Hegel's philosophy a source of inspiration for the theory of evolution.  
 
 
2.5 Hegelian History and the Theory of Evolution 
 
Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, for example, echoed Hegel in explaining the 
origin of species by "natural selection" and describing their development in terms of 
a change "which moves from simple to complex or from lower to higher, and which 
does so towards a discernible goal, involving the idea of progress" (Fernie 336). 
Under different guises, the struggle for survival was one of the decisive factors in 
both Hegel's account of historical development and Darwinian theory of the 
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evolution of man (Bronowski and Mazlish 487). The affinity of evolutionary theory 
with Hegelian thought becomes all the more clear if we are reminded of Hegel's 
frequent references to the model of organic development in the life of plants as an 
analogy for explaining his idea of progress through dialectical action. According to 
this conception, historical process (that is, the working of the spirit) resembles the 
developmental process of a living organism and has to be interpreted accordingly. In 
his model, Hegel conceived a living organism as "an entity which represents the 
successful realization of a plan in which all individual characteristics of this entity 
are contained" (Horstmann 337). According to Horstmann, Hegel calls this plan "the 
concept of an entity" (337); and in the course of the development of the living 
organism, each one of the individual characteristics contained in this plan 
successively realizes itself by negating and overcoming the one prior to it. Now, it is 
worth quoting Hegel's description, as it was also quoted by Bronowski and Mazlish, 
at some length here: 
 
The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we 
might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same 
way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a 
false form of the plant's existence, for the fruit appears as its true 
nature in place of the blossom. These stages are not merely 
differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible 
with one another. But the ceaseless activity of their own inherent 
nature makes them at the same time moments of an organic 
unity, where they not merely do not contradict one another, but 
where one is necessary as the other; and this equal necessity of 
all moments constitutes from the outset the life of the whole 
(482). 
 
Hegel adopted this model in order to explain the dialectic process of change in the 
history of humanity. He changed the orientation of this model so that, with an 
increase of scale and a change in the field of application, it began to embrace the 
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entire history of humanity. Indeed, if one reads this example carefully, one will 
certainly come upon the fundamentals of dialectic thought: identity in opposition, 
continuity in change, the idea of progress and the gradual unfolding of a plan towards 
a goal, that is, a telos.  
 
 
2.6 Hegel's Teleological Account of History 
 
With the idea of telos, we have come to the final point in this rather lengthy 
explication of Hegel's philosophy of history. The notion of a certain goal, or an end 
to give meaning and direction to history, the idea of a path followed by the course of 
events towards an already known aim, that is, the self-knowledge of spirit, are all 
characteristic manifestations of the teleological assumptions that undergird Hegel's 
thought. Since Kant, teleology has been known to be the study of finitude and 
finality. In an account governed by teleological lines of reasoning, "the end of a 
sequence is presumed to be implicit in its beginning" (Fernie 366). And the Hegelian 
stages of linear progress towards the absolute was an epitome of teleological 
thinking.  
 
At any rate, we should take a little more time to take stock of the notion of teleology 
in order not to jump to conclusions about the nature of Hegelian history. Let us start 
with qualifying our definition of teleological reasoning. As Andrew Woodfield notes, 
a teleological explanation is the one that seeks "to explain X by saying that X exists 
or occurs for the sake of Y" (879). However, the finality denoted by Y in this 
proposition can be construed either as a goal to be achieved or a function to be 
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served or fulfilled. In other words, the finality of the situation can be intrinsic or 
extrinsic respectively. Accordingly, states Woodfield, "intrinsic or immanent 
teleology is concerned with cases of aiming or striving towards goals; extrinsic 
teleology covers cases where an object, event or characteristic serves a function for 
something" (879). It is now time to ask: Which one of these types of teleological 
explanation accords best with the case in Hegel's conception of history?  
 
Firstly, the spirit for Hegel is "what expresses itself in the concrete world" (emphasis 
added) (Bronowski and Mazlish 484). Secondly, the dialectical action is the 
guarantor and motive power of the progression of history towards its telos, that is, 
the absolute knowledge. If taken together, these two premises will lead us to think 
that the finality of history resides within history. Since spirit can be construed as the 
collective reason of humanity elevated to the rank of an absolute, we cannot conceive 
the finality of history as motivated or determined by the providence of a God-like 
principle or entity exterior to the historical situatedness of humanity. To call a spade 
a spade, I assert that we cannot replace Hegel's spirit with the Christian God. Its 
principle of finality is interior to Hegelian history. It is governed by an immanent 
type of teleological explanation which, nevertheless, cannot prevent his philosophy 
from being an idealist and metaphysical one. Since, neither the God nor people 
themselves decide on the goals to be pursued, all we are left with is a self-
engendering telos which fully represents the ambivalence in Hegel's thought. As 
Stern and Walker remarked, we can detect many tendencies of thought or 
weltanschauung brought together in an uneasy relationship within Hegel's frame of 
mind (338). For example, many different or opposing tendencies such as "historicism 
and absolutism", "Christianity and humanism", etc., were able to find their way into 
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Hegel's philosophy (Stern and Walker 338). Just as Leibniz had ventured into a 
philosophical enterprise full of extravagance in order to prove the existence of God 
and ended up with the differential calculus full of logical intricacies a hundred years 
before him, Hegel wanted to set down "a comprehensive, integrative philosophy" 
that can "do justice to all realms of experience and . . . preserve the Christian 
heritage in a modern and progressive form" (emphasis added) (Stern and Walker 
338). The result was dialectic-progress-spirit and has shaped the contours of the 
identikit of the Western man's preoccupation with history since then.  
 
 
2.7 Hegel and the Emerging Preoccupation with History 
 
Hegel's conception of reason as a 'process' went against the grain because, at that 
time, the majority of the thinkers were following Spinoza in regarding reason as a 
'substance'. This allowed Hegel to change the orientation of philosophy into a newly-
emerging preoccupation with history. It seems that by elevating history to the status 
of an absolute value and, thereby, for the first time initiating a concern with history, 
Hegel paved the way for the emergence of an outlook that looks into the past in order 
to understand the present state of affairs. In other words, together with the idea of 
evolution, the conceptual schemata of Hegelian history gave rise to the assumption 
that there must be a causal and necessary continuity between the past and the present. 
That is to say, since Hegel history has been understood as an 'unfolding' and our 
present as the end point of a long thread. Hence the maxim: 'You shall better 
understand your present if you learn how it originated and developed from the past'. 
The quotation below contains the gist of what we have been thus far discussing: 
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Is there a lesson to be learned from history? The question has 
much the same force as if we were to ask: Is there a lesson to be 
learned from evolution? The study of evolution tells us that, as 
men, we stand at the end of a long development, which has 
endowed us with physical and mental gifts that mean more to us 
as we understand them better. The study of history makes us 
equally the heirs of a long development, and elucidates for us 
the cultural gifts which we owe to those who lived and struggled 
and thought before us. The past, then, has not simply 
disappeared in the wastes of time. The ideas which the past has 
evolved are alive: the empirical way to truth, the insistence on 
reasoned explanations, the conviction that men have a claim to 
liberty and justice. Ideas have their roots in the minds of men, 
have developed out of their conflicts, and have shown their 
strength by survival (Bronowski and Mazlish 491). 
 
 
Since then it has come to be regarded as axiomatic that history is the site of the truth 
about ourselves. It has been thought that history is the storehouse in whose corners 
we seek to recognize ourselves. To find the origin and the truth of our present 
subjectivity, we have come to direct our attention to history. As will be shown, this 
strongly entrenched understanding of history has been the front line of conventional 
history to which Nietzschean genealogy directs its attacks.  
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3 NIETZSCHE CONTRA HEGEL 
 
 
 
 
We have seen that the arrival of Hegelian philosophy of history marked the 
beginning of a new era in which western people became obsessed with the sense and 
knowledge of history. Following the promulgation of Hegelian thought we saw 
history entering the outlook and the work of many intellectual and literary idols of 
the age. No sooner had this historical sensibility become widely spread among literati 
and intellectuals than history entered into the curriculum of public education as the 
primary course that were supposed to infuse the mind of the would-be citizen with 
culture and understanding. 
 
Precisely at this point and against this state of affairs did Nietzsche voice his critics 
and protests. Nietzsche mounted his attacks on two grounds that were closely 
interrelated: While, as Deleuze claimed, he was the first real critic of Hegel and 
dialectical thought, he was also critical of, indeed hostile to, the prevailing historical 
orientation (whether Hegelian or not, it did not matter) of the time. His sustained 
reflections on the dangers and benefits of history in respect of his decisive criteria of 
life, activity, and creativity led him to condemn the excessive preoccupation with 
history as a hindrance to the realization of the potential creativity of man and 
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therefore as harmful to life. He argued against the oft-celebrated historical cultivation 
of the time and denounced the kind of historical practice to which people appeal 
solely for the sake of knowledge. He called for putting history to the service of life 
and wrote a treatise totally devoted to his diagnosis of the historical sickness of the 
time and the antidotes he formulated as the cure for that illness. This critical 
engagement with history at the end of the day led Nietzsche to confront Hegelian 
philosophy of history.  
 
In this chapter, we will, first of all, present a brief outline of Nietzsche's thoughts on 
history, then we will continue by qualifying this introduction with Nietzsche's harsh 
critique of Hegelian philosophy of history until at last we examine, in great detail, his 
reflections on the uses of history, expressed comprehensively in the second essay of 
his Untimely Meditations titled "The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life". 
For the sake of accuracy, however, we will consult three different translations of this 
work and indicate the proper citations when necessary. 
 
 
3.1 Nietzsche and the Dangers of History 
 
"Furthermore, I hate everything that merely instructs me without increasing or 
directly conferring life on my activity." With this quotation from Goethe, Nietzsche 
begins his reflections on the utility and drawback of history for life (Unmodern 87). 
To him, what distinguished modernity from the previous ages were an excessive 
consciousness and preoccupation with history. He saw in this the greatest defect of 
the age since, according to him, a certain excess of history made human beings 
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passive and retrospective and, therefore, proved hostile to life. He spoke 
disparagingly of anything that did not serve life, because the pivotal themes of his 
philosophy consisted of an affirmative stance towards life, a joy in becoming and a 
celebration of creativity. In his philosophy he placed a strong emphasis on creativity, 
especially in the sense of creating "new values and norms" (Sarup 90). In this sense, 
Nietzsche brought forward some very cogent arguments against that which proved 
detrimental to the furtherance of life, that which was able to discourage man from 
acting creatively, whether it be science, wisdom or history.     
 
Nietzsche's reflections started with a description of the life of animals, who have no 
faculty of memory and, therefore, no natural inclination to remember what happened 
in the past. They live happily in a perpetual 'present' without feeling the burden of a 
memory that continually weighs upon them. Nietzsche regards their life in this state 
of limbo as "ahistorical" (Unfashionable 88). That is to say, their 'inability to 
remember' confers happiness upon the life of animals. Quite the contrary, human 
beings have both a faculty of memory and a culture which highly values and 
regularly records its past. Therefore, human beings inevitably remember the past, 
indeed they are taught to remember a great deal of things, and cannot escape from it. 
In other words, they lead a life that is ad nauseam haunted by a historical 
consciousness. Hence, inasmuch as human beings take their bearings in view of that 
historical awareness, contrary to animals, they can be said to live "historically" 
(Unfashionable 88).  
 
What is wrong with this predicate according to Nietzsche? A great deal of things, 
that is. Nietzsche maintained that human beings constantly suffered from "the 
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awareness of the past and the passage of time" (Dannhauser 77). In other words, the 
memory of past events and the knowledge of history continually exert their pressure 
on the life of human beings so that they prevent human beings from attending to, 
indeed even from imagining, creative and future-oriented deeds. This is because 
Nietzsche thinks that every human being needs an atmosphere that is not polluted 
with the heavy air of the past in order to create anything novel, great and human, that 
is, life-enhancing. Human beings need attentive involvement in their present; and, as 
it instills passivity into their lives, a certain excess of historical awareness may prove 
harmful at any time for both the activity and happiness of human beings.   
 
However, Nietzsche was fully aware that although at times it may prove harmful to 
life, nevertheless, the historical awareness of human beings is also that which makes 
them superior to animals. As Dannhauser remarked, "only by developing a historical 
sense and turning the past to the uses of the present does man rise above other 
animals and become truly man" (77). Indeed, with their 'inability to forget', human 
beings differ toto caelo from animals, who are 'unable to remember'. Therefore, 
Nietzsche concludes, the problem of humanity lies in achieving the reconciliation 
between remembering and forgetting, for "the ahistorical and the historical are 
equally necessary for the health of an individual, a people, and a culture" 
(Unfashionable 90).  
 
Human beings, then, need to acquire the skill of 'active forgetting' if they are to live 
happily and continue creating at all. By way of this newly-acquired ability of active 
forgetting, man can create a limited horizon around himself. This horizon is the line 
that separates what we can remember from what we no longer need to remember. It 
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is the dividing line between the historical and the ahistorical. Man should better 
adopt this limited horizon rather than his indefinite memory, since, as Nietzsche 
concludes, the universal law is that "every living thing can become healthy, strong, 
and fruitful only within a defined horizon" (Unfashionable 90). History should, 
therefore, be put in the service of life by creating a complete and closed horizon in 
which we should only selectively and sparingly allow the memory of the past to 
enter. The breadth of this horizon is determined by the extent to which man can 
assimilate his past without getting too exhausted to live actively and creatively.  
 
Even when his reflections in his later period of maturity tended towards a reappraisal 
of historical understanding and led him to the formulation of his genealogies, 
Nietzsche did never abandon his position as regards active forgetfulness and 
happiness. As he states most eloquently in On the Genealogy of Morals: 
 
Forgetting is no mere vis inertiae as the superficial imagine; it is 
rather an active and in the strictest sense positive faculty of 
repression, that is responsible for the fact that what we 
experience and absorb enters our consciousness as little while 
we are digesting it (one might call the process "inpsychation") as 
does the thousandfold process, involved in physical 
nourishment–so-called "incorporation." (57) 
 
Nietzsche continued to argue for active forgetting on the grounds that it kept our 
consciousness intact from the disturbances of the process of "inpsychation", that is, 
the assimilation of past experience in psychic order, and cleared our consciousness so 
that we could allow new experiences to enter it. He, then, directly connected this 
"tabula rasa" of consciousness effected by active forgetting to the happiness of man: 
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…so that it will be immediately obvious how there could be no 
happiness, no cheerfulness, no hope, no pride, no present, 
without forgetfulness. The man in whom this apparatus of 
repression is damaged and ceases to function properly may be 
compared (and more than merely compared) with a dyspeptic –
he cannot "have done" with anything (Genealogy 58).   
 
In brief, Nietzsche conceived forgetting as an acquired ability, which is the 
precondition of genuine happiness and action. One should train his faculty of 
forgetting to such an extent that one would be able to feel "ahistorically" during the 
course of an action in which one is involved (Unfashionable 89). Only when man is 
liberated from the burden of his memory that he can act happily, creatively and 
towards the future.  
 
 
3.2 History in the Service of Hegel 
 
Nietzsche's thought displayed a deep sense of discontent with modernity and a 
growing disdain for German culture. He scorned Germans as being idealists and 
German intellectual atmosphere as being dominated by "false-coiners" or 
"veilmakers" (Ecce Homo 122). Among these counterfeiters or forgers, Nietzsche 
identified such names as Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Schleiermacher, 
and even Kant and Leibniz. He denounced these names as lacking in honesty and 
depth as compared to Descartes, for instance, who was "a hundred times superior in 
integrity to the leading Germans" (Ecce Homo 122). Nietzsche claimed that Hegel 
was a counterfeiter since he designed his philosophy of history with such a sleight of 
hand that the "culmination of the world process", that is, the end of history, 
"coincided with his own existence in Berlin" (Unfashionable 143). Furthermore, 
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maintained Nietzsche, the idealism that held sway in German culture found its most 
popular expression with the sense Hegel and Schelling gave to it: 'men who seek 
syntheses of opposites' through dialectic. In the second essay of Untimely 
Meditations he spoke disparagingly and derisively of Hegel and Hegelian philosophy 
of history as a disguised theology. In all these senses, Nietzsche proclaimed that 
"there has not been a dangerous turn or crisis in German culture in this century which 
has not become more dangerous because of the enormous, and still spreading, 
influence of this Hegelian philosophy" (Unmodern 127).   
 
Nietzsche argued against Hegelian philosophy of history on two interrelated fronts. 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, Hegel conceived history as a 'rational 
progress'. Now, Nietzsche voices strong arguments against both predicates of this 
proposition: history is neither 'rational' nor 'progress'.  
 
Nietzsche's first critique of Hegelianism focused on history as progress. This 
conception of history posed the greatest danger to humanity since the 'faith' in the 
historical progress can easily lead people to think that they are historically situated at 
the point where the 'world process' reached its culmination or apex with them. As 
Nietzsche illustrates, this belief finds its most clear-cut expression in the statement 
that reads, "Our race has now reached its apex, for only now has it attained 
knowledge of itself and been revealed to itself" (Unfashionable 142). Consequently, 
the belief that one is a "latecomer" or "epigone" may prove hostile to life, if such a 
belief is put to the service of justifying and deifying one's present existence "as the 
true meaning and purpose of all previous historical events" and, therefore, allowed to 
instill passivity into one's life (Nietzsche, Unfashionable 140, 143). As the most 
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probable consequence of Hegel's doctrine, this manner of viewing history may give 
rise to a feeling of content with one's existence and, therefore, effect a general 
paralysis and degeneration of the age, since people would begin to think that their 
age is the best of all possible ages and be deprived of their 'aspirations' to achieve a 
better world in the future. In other words, for the latecomers, "nothing whatever 
remains to be done" (Dannhauser 80).  
 
In sum, Nietzsche regarded Hegelian conception of history as life-inimical, leading 
man to degeneration and possibly to his death. Nietzsche was the first to see an 
impending danger of death for the man in Hegelian history, as Alexandre Kojeve 
remarked, "The end of history is the death of Man as such" (Descombes 31). Since 
Nietzsche considers man as the one who acts and changes the course of events, who 
fights against the stream of history in order to create new values and horizons, then, 
the consummation of history, regarded as the perfection that man has reached, 
signifies nothing but the death of man. Therefore, the completion of history was not 
only impossible but also undesirable for Nietzsche. As Kojeve notes:           
 
If history is at an end, nothing remains to be done. But an idle 
man is no longer a man. As the threshold of post-history is 
crossed, humanity disappears while at the same time the reign of 
frivolity begins, the reign of play, of derision (for henceforth 
nothing that might be done would have the slightest meaning) 
(Descombes 31). 
 
Another facet of Nietzsche's critique of Hegel consisted in his refutation of history as 
a 'rational' process. According to Nietzsche, neither history unfolds rationally nor the 
present age is a rational and necessary result of the dialectic progress of history, or, 
the so-called "world process". Remember that, for Hegel, the 'success' of an action 
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was the sole measure of truth in history. In other words, Hegel deemed all successful 
actions as the expression of the 'rational' workings of the spirit. Success must have 
been rational, reasonable; it can't have been the result of an injustice. Nietzsche, on 
the other hand, regards this tenet of Hegel's thought as a "naked admiration of 
success," which leads to "the idolatry of the factual" (Unfashionable 143). This 
idolatry of the success and the factual is a natural outcome of Hegel's exaltation of 
history as the 'absolute value'. As can be expected from him, Nietzsche regarded this 
tenet of Hegelian conception of history as being all the more harmful to life, since 
the unconditional respect for the 'power of history' can easily turn people into 
submissive adherents of the powers-that-be, regardless of whoever they may be. 
Nietzsche's eloquent depiction of this idolatry is worth quoting here at some length: 
 
But those who first learned to kneel down and bow their heads 
before the "power of history" eventually nod their "yes" as 
mechanically as a Chinese puppet to every power–regardless of 
whether it is a government, a public opinion, or a numerical 
majority–and move their limbs in precisely that tempo with 
which whatever power pulls the strings. If every success 
contains within itself a reasonable necessity, if every occurrence 
represents the victory of what is logical or of the "Idea"–then 
fall to your knees at once and genuflect on every rung of the 
stepladder of "success"! (Unfashionable 143-144).    
 
In brief, Hegelian attitude towards the events of history is characterized by the 
disinterested acceptance of everything as objective and rational; and this outlook is 
quite unacceptable to Nietzsche, who "already substituted affect for judgement" 
(Deleuze 141). If history is ever put into the service of life, it should first be molded 
into "a work of art," since, only in this manner it can arouse the creative instincts of 
man (Unfashionable 132). Otherwise, says Nietzsche, there is nothing just and 
rational in history that can be restored to the service of life. History is full of 
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violence, chance, blindness, madness, and injustice, since, according to Nietzsche, 
"living and being unjust are one and the same thing" (Unfashionable 107). Any 
activity whatever involves a certain kind and amount of injustice, if it is to be an 
action at all. He even went so far as to claim that "blindness and injustice dwelling in 
the soul of those who act" constitutes the "single condition of all events" 
(Unfashionable 93). The quest for truth and reason in history turned out to be an 
'opium' in Hegel's hands. There is not any law, goal or reason to give meaning to 
history. The last word was Nietzsche's: "The goal of humanity cannot lie at the end 
of time but only in its highest specimens (Untimely 92)." 
 
We have seen, in a very Nietzschean fashion, how history in the idiom of Hegel 
turned out to be harmful to the life of a culture. Nietzsche rejected history unless it 
rendered a service to life by encouraging man to act creatively. He, then, formulated 
his versions of history under such titles as "monumental history", "antiquarian 
history", and "critical history". Any of these types of history can prove either harmful 
or beneficial depending on how they are understood and used. In the next chapter, we 
will examine the literature of design in order to identify the possible defects in design 
understanding caused first by the unacknowledged predominance of Hegelian 
conception of history in design theory and history and, second, by the presence in 
design discourse of these three types of Nietzschean histories in their life-destroying, 
degenerate mode. Therefore, before venturing into our examination, we need to make 
a final detour: we should examine those specifically Nietzschean types of history and 
their potential outcomes.    
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4 HISTORY AND AMNESIA 
 
 
 
 
Nietzsche undermines the prevalent notion of history as the truthful account of past 
events. Nothing could be further from what Nietzsche meant by history, if, by 
history, one understands a 'memory' in fidelity to that which had actually happened. 
In his notion of history Nietzsche accomplished a strange merger of two apparently 
antipodal notions: memory and amnesia. In this merger, however, both of these 
concepts lose their previous identities. While, the memory is liberated from the 
dictates of remaining faithful to the reality of events and gains the plastic power of 
actively interpreting the past, amnesia, the partial or total loss of one's memory, 
renounces its passive character in order to become "active forgetting" in the service 
of life. 
 
Nietzsche's interest in history is conditioned by the criteria of happiness. History is 
approved of insofar as it serves life by facilitating creative deeds of a people. If, on 
the other hand, the force of history prevents life from overflowing and "becoming" 
by instilling passivity into the life of a people through its overwhelming presence or 
causes feelings of ressentiment in people who are so faced with a memory of a past 
that is full of injustice done to them, then, for Nietzsche, history becomes life-
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destroying. Both forgetting and remembering should exist in certain amounts within 
the same history in order for it to serve and enhance life. Therefore, for Nietzsche, 
history is a 'counterpoint' in which two distinct faculties of remembering and 
forgetting are activated together at the same time. Nevertheless, if one is to weigh up 
the respective values of these two faculties for life, forgetting, says Nietzsche, should 
be considered as more vital than remembering. Since, for him, while "it is possible to 
live almost without memory, and to live happily moreover, as the animal 
demonstrates; . . . it is altogether impossible to live at all without forgetting" 
(Untimely 62). In other words, "there is a degree of sleeplessness, of rumination, of 
the historical sense, which is harmful and ultimately fatal to the living thing, whether 
this living thing be a man or a people or a culture" (Untimely 62).       
 
According to Nietzsche, history is the "plastic power" of a civilization, culture, or 
people. What Nietzsche conceives as history here is not the equivalent of the German 
term Geschichte, that is the full inventory of events chronologically ordered in time. 
Both the 'plasticity' and the 'power' of history stem from its narrative aspect. History, 
understood as the narrative account of what happened in the past, is an active and 
creative interpretation performed by a culture concerning its past. Nietzsche defines 
this "plastic power" or "shaping power" as "that power to develop its own singular 
character out of itself, to shape and assimilate what is past and alien, to heal wounds, 
to replace what has been lost, to recreate broken forms out of itself alone" 
(Unfashionable 89). 
 
It becomes clear that the activity of moulding the past into a plastic form requires 
both an "active forgetting" and an "active remembering." Accordingly, by means of 
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its plastic power, a culture establishes a "horizon" around itself. This horizon is "a 
limited, actively invented perspective on the world" and history is of paramount 
importance for the proper establishment of this horizon (Mahon 97). In order for this 
horizon to cater for the "life, health, and activity" of a people, it should be both a 
'limited' one and a 'proper' one in the sense of making possible active, creative deeds 
of a people oriented towards future (Mahon 96). This is perfectly consistent with the 
Nietzschean perspectivalism, since the quest for enlarging a horizon so as to cover all 
possible perspectives on the past is both a metaphysical pursuit characterized by a 
will to dominate and a condition impossible to live with.  
 
In sum, Nietzsche sees history as being necessarily an interpretation; and, what is 
more, it is not a matter of more or less faithfully interpreting an earlier 'fact'. What is 
being interpreted is already an interpretation. What a historian interprets is an 
interpretation without a substratum, since not only the historical records but also, and 
most importantly, the events took place in time are themselves interpretations. What 
makes possible any activity and any change in the course of events is a new 
interpretation brought to bear upon a previous activity by a group of people. Life, 
throughout time, is a chain of interpretations and the writing of history and 
harnessing it as a 'source' is always conditioned by the present needs, not the other 
way around. In other words, rather than being an attempt to compose a 
comprehensive record of past activities of a civilization for the sake of knowledge, 
history is 'itself' an activity undertaken by that civilization in the service of its present 
needs and conditions. And, 'forgetting' must necessarily exist in this interpretative 
activity since, as Mahon quite perceptively elucidates Nietzsche, "there can be no 
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new interpretation without a rejection, an active forgetting, of previous 
interpretations" (97). 
 
What Nietzsche accomplishes here concerning the problem of history is to 
undermine any possibility of a history as an objective, truthful record of the past. As 
Nietzsche demonstrates, one is bound by one's own perspective in the 'present'; and 
the quest for rising above the present and assuming a proper position outside history 
in order to view the past events objectively is itself a metaphysical fiction.     
 
Therefore, when design critic and historian Clive Dilnot voices an urgent call for the 
establishment of design history as an academic discipline operating in a field of 
scientificity by complaining that "in current design debates, most positions are 
informed by notions of history", we should not construe the founding assumptions of 
these design practical and theoretical "positions" as ill-informed like Dilnot does 
(213). Quite the contrary, in design field, present design positions get exactly what 
they need from their histories, that is an authorization and a qualification to do what 
they want to do or to continue what they have been doing. Nothing can be further 
from wrong in the enterprise of a group of practitioners in a discipline to interpret 
and appropriate suitable histories in order to establish a horizon for their present and 
future activities.     
 
In Nietzsche's theory of history there are two major types of history, which result 
from the plastic, interpretative activity of a community: "monumental" and 
"antiquarian" histories. Both of these histories have the capacity to prove life-
enhancing as well as life-destroying depending upon the quality of the will of the 
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people who make use of them. In addition, Nietzsche proposes a third type of history, 
which is devised to circumvent the destructive potential or the stifling effects of the 
former two on creative action and life. This latter one is called "critical history", a 
rudimentary form of what he later came to formulate as "genealogy". In this context, 
however, one should not construe genealogy as the antipode of monumental and 
antiquarian histories. Genealogy does not oppose the plasticity of the other two with 
a solid ground, a truth claim. It does not undermine monumental and antiquarian 
histories by bringing into light hidden truths and uncovering the fictitious character 
of the latter. Genealogy, rather, 'undoes' the other two in that it counterbalances the 
petrifying effects of these histories by catching and demonstrating the "plastic 
power" in the act throughout history.  
 
Each of these types of history appeals to different facets of man. According to 
Nietzsche, monumental history concerns man "as one who acts and strives," 
antiquarian history relates to him "as one who preserves and venerates," and critical 
history appeals to him "as one who suffers and is in need of liberation" 
(Unfashionable 96).   
 
 
4.1 Monumental History 
 
Strong, adventurous man of action demands monumental history. These men are 
occupied with struggles and in need of "exemplars, teachers, and comforters," but are 
unable to find them among their fellow people and in the present age" 
(Unfashionable 96). They need history in order to derive inspiration from it. For that 
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reason, the monumental historian picks out great moments and achievements of man 
from the past and organizes these so as to compose a continuous and progressive 
chain of monuments. "The interpretation of the monumental historian," according to 
Mahon, "is founded upon a will to maintain as a living presence each great life-
enhancing moment in history" (97). Faced with a monumental history, man of action 
receives knowledge of the great feats of his past and a feeling of confidence to repeat 
such achievements in the future. While endowing people with an affirmative and 
celebratory vision upon their past, monumental history also instills heroism in the 
minds of people so that they will be ready and willing to accept the challenge of the 
future. Nietzsche describes the fundamental motive behind the demand for 
monumental history: 
 
That the great moments in the struggles of individuals form 
links in one single chain; that they combine to form a mountain 
range of humankind through the millennia; that for me the 
highest point of such a long-since-past moment is still alive, 
bright, and great –this is the fundamental thought in the belief in 
humanity that expresses itself in the demand for a monumental 
history (Unfashionable 97). 
 
As is the case with all histories, monumental history too is the result of both an active 
remembering and an active forgetting. It is founded upon active remembering in the 
sense of picking out greatest moments from the totality of past events. Moreover, it 
even includes "free poetic invention" by means of which the efficacy of past events is 
amplified, some minor events are declared important, or some great moments are 
altogether invented (Untimely 70). Hence, monumental history depends even more 
upon active forgetting. Nietzsche voices this point eloquently: 
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How much of the past would have to be overlooked if it was to 
produce that mighty effect, how violently what is individual in it 
would have to be forced into a universal mould and all its sharp 
corners and hard outlines broken up in the interest of 
conformity! (Untimely 69) 
 
Therefore, in order to bring about monumental effects, this kind of history, as Mahon 
aptly explains, "tends to overlook the differences in the causes of actions, the 
motivation of the actor, the differing instigations of actions" (97). In other words, a 
whole artifice of 'dramaturgy' is employed in the service of such a history. In this 
respect, Nietzsche remarks, monumental history favors the 'effects' as opposed to 
'causes', since it disregards the differences between the motivations behind the 
events. Therefore he proposes to call monumental history "a collection of 'effects in 
themselves,' of events that will have an effect on every age" (Unfashionable 99). In a 
sense, a trans-historical subjectivity, a version favored by the present culture, is 
projected backwards into the past events. Such a history, therefore, becomes 
monumental insofar as it is composed of so many "tableaux" of great moments, each 
of which bears in itself the ideal meaning of history (Barthes 72-75).  
 
To speculate further on this point, one can wager that monumental history is not a 
teleological one. The ideal meaning of monumental history, that is, the intentionality 
of history as the creative and progressive self-realization of man, is not so much the 
originary or ultimate meaning to which the sequence of historical events is 
approaching. This meaning, rather, is totally manifested in each one of the "great 
moments" of monumental history. Therefore, this proves that monumental history, in 
the hands of Nietzsche's man of great deeds, is not so much an inevitable destiny, 
however progressive, awaiting people as a preference to act in a creative and 
monumental fashion on the side of this people. As a result, it can be deduced that a 
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strong voluntarism underlies monumental history. This alone explains why fascistic 
subject, armored as the descent of man of great deeds, is the prime champion of 
monumental histories.      
 
According to Nietzsche's criteria of all value, furtherance of life through becoming, 
monumental history can be either life-enhancing or life-destroying contingent upon 
the kind of man who adopts it. It serves life by enabling and encouraging the 
powerful to act. The man of action acquires from monumental history not only moral 
support, assurance and courage needed to set out or proceed to do a great deed, but 
also the knowledge of how to take action in order to achieve this result. Thus, 
monumental history is the repository and disseminator of meaning, value as well as 
knowledge for the "strong artistic spirit".   
 
On the other hand, the same qualities of monumental history might produce a reverse 
effect in the hands of a weaker spirit who "recognizes greatness but cannot himself 
do great things" (Untimely 72). Caught up in a disciplinary power-knowledge 
mechanism, monumental history can easily degenerate into a canonic bible. The 
process of canonization takes place when the evaluation of any novel and evolving 
practice starts to be subordinated to the criteria of conformity to the founding 
principles and the authority of the monuments of the past. Monumental history, in its 
life-destroying mode, not only stagnates the creative potential within a community 
but also allows the impotent to "condemn the contemporary for lacking the authority 
of history" (Mahon 98). Since the great moments and achievements of the past are 
fetishized and petrified into static idols, connoisseurship results within any discipline 
or community with this infamous slogan: "Behold, this is true art: pay no heed to 
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those who are evolving and want something new! (Untimely 71)." This signifies the 
moment when the purpose of monumental history is turned into its opposite in the 
hands of those unartistic or second-rate artistic natures: 
 
Monumental history is the costume under which their hatred of 
all the great and powerful people of their age masquerades as 
satiated admiration for the great and powerful people of past 
ages, the costume in which they surreptitiously turn the actual 
meaning of the monumental view of history into its opposite; 
whether they are clearly aware of it or not, they act as though 
their motto were "Let the dead bury the living" (Unfashionable 
102). 
 
The dividing line between monumental history and mythical fiction always runs the 
risk of becoming blurred, since both can provide man of action with a similar kind of 
inspiration to emulate or improve. The past, then, is always open to distortions, not 
due to active-forgetting, but in the sense of drawing false analogies between the 
'effects' stripped of their causes and motivations. As a result, monumental history can 
turn into a dangerous weapon of destruction in the hands of fanatics, who mistake 
effects for causes. In monumental history, they may find the justification they have 
so longingly searched for in order to continue their murders, that is the "effects 
without sufficient causes" (Unfashionable 100).        
 
 
4.2 Antiquarian History 
 
While the so-called monumental history is demanded by man of action, antiquarian 
history addresses the sensibility of 'man the collector'. What belongs to past is seen 
indiscriminately as one's heritage, which, by the same token, is considered to be 
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worthy of reverence and preservation. This responsibility of preservation conferred 
upon people by antiquarian sensibility is, in effect, oriented towards future. In this 
conception, history is a relay race in which each generation is appointed to the task 
of preserving its past and passing it in perfect condition on to subsequent 
generations. This future orientation of antiquarian history is what Nietzsche 
considers as the life-serving aspect of it (Untimely 73).  
 
Antiquarian sensibility is the antidote of the evanescent and transitory nature of 
human memory and existence. It ties man firmly to a tradition; it gives a sense of 
reassurance; it creates a sense of community that finds expression in the pronoun 
"we"; and it gives rise to a feeling of loyalty to one's culture and heritage. Nietzsche 
explains how all these traits of antiquarian history can be life-enhancing:  
 
?Antiquarian? history pertains to the person who preserves and 
venerates, to him who looks back with loyalty and love on the 
origins through which he became what he is; by means of this 
piety he gives thanks, as it were, for his existence. By attending 
with caring hands to what has subsisted since ancient times, he 
seeks to preserve for those who will emerge after him the 
conditions under which he himself has come into being –and by 
doing so he serves life (Unfashionable 102). 
 
As has been indicated, antiquarian history too is characterized by a mix of active-
remembering and active-forgetting. Especially, what is forgotten by the antiquarian 
is determined by his active preference of the kind of lenses through which he 
contemplates the things and events of the past. According to Nietzsche, 
 
The antiquarian sense of a man, a community, a whole people, 
always possesses an extremely restricted field of vision; most of 
what exists it does not perceive at all, and the little it does see it 
sees much too close up and isolated; it cannot relate what it sees 
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to anything else and it therefore accords everything it sees equal 
importance and therefore to each individual thing too great 
importance. There is a lack of that discrimination of value and 
that sense of proportion which would distinguish between the 
things of the past in a way that would do true justice to them; 
their measure and proportion is always that accorded them by 
the backward glance of the antiquarian nation or individual 
(Untimely 74). 
 
In brief, we can deduce that 'age' is the sole criterion of relevance employed by the 
antiquarian sensibility for the establishment of a horizon. Without discrimination, 
being old suffices for an entity to pass as 'valuable' for antiquarian history. Yet, the 
cultural horizon supplied by antiquarian history can be regarded as either broad or 
narrow depending on the different angles from which one looks at the uses of history. 
In terms of the 'breadth' of coverage, antiquarian history undoubtedly establishes an 
enormously wide horizon for anything is admitted into this horizon as long as it 
belongs to past. In terms of the 'depth' of historical understanding, however, this 
horizon is a very narrow one since the past is interpreted with the totalizing logic of a 
single idea. Needless to say, interpreting the past on the basis of 'age' as a unique and 
unifying value is a perspective of the most acute angle. It is as if the plastic power at 
an antiquarian's disposal has not been used to distinguish certain things from the 
totality of things existed from old but, rather, it has been used to level out things so 
that they become indistinguishable from one another.    
 
Nietzsche recognizes the life-serving aspect of antiquarian history in its regulatory 
value. For the same narrow vision of this past-piety can also serve life "as a check on 
the flighty preoccupation with the ever new and allegedly improved" (Mahon 99).  
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One more thing might be added on behalf of antiquarian history: It is wrong to 
associate the antiquarian sensibility with that of the nostalgic. The sense of nostalgia 
is conditioned by the slightly sad and very affectionate feeling for a past that is 
clearly perceived to have gone. It is in the sense of yearning for 'the good old days' 
that nostalgia is felt. Yet, in nostalgic state, one is still certain of the fact that the past 
has been irretrievably lost. Nostalgic sentiment is triggered either by an occasional 
encounter with things survived from past or by a lapse into reveries. In either case, 
however, the past is clearly demarcated from a present which is denigrated as lacking 
the qualities of the past. On the contrary, antiquarian sensibility is founded upon the 
continuity of tradition: While a nostalgic can be said to be 'living in the past', an 
antiquarian wills to make 'the past live in the present and the future' and actively 
takes part in such a pursuit.   
 
From what has hitherto been discussed, it becomes easy to recognize how the 
destructive potential of antiquarian history can be actualized. Since "age itself 
bestows value," any activity in pursuit of the new is jeopardized and stagnated from 
the outset (Mahon 99). As Nietzsche points, 
 
This always brings with it one immediate danger: ultimately, 
anything ancient and past that enters into this field of vision is 
simply regarded as venerable, and everything that fails to 
welcome the ancient with reverence–in other words, whatever is 
new and in the process of becoming–is met with hostility and 
rejected (Unfashionable 105). 
 
This is the moment when the antiquarian sensibility no longer preserves, but 
'mummifies' the past life. This is the moment when the antiquarian history 
undermines further life. This is the moment when the antiquarian sensibility 'invents' 
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the tradition. This is the moment when the scholarly dissection without affect and a 
craze for collecting predominates. As Nietzsche quite eloquently describes, "at this 
point, piety withers, the scholarly habit persists without it and revolves with self-
satisfied egotism around its own axis. Then we view the repugnant spectacle of a 
blind mania to collect, of a restless gathering together of everything that once 
existed" (Unfashionable 105). 
 
For Nietzsche, the conservative core of antiquarian sensibility can easily lean 
towards the point of a general paralysis of life. This life-destroying weight of 
antiquarian sensibility can only be counterbalanced by other types of history, which 
allow space for the new and encourage inspirations from the present. Nietzsche calls 
for a merger of antiquarian and monumental histories as an example of a creative 
synthesis. Since, as Nietzsche points out, antiquarian history as such does not prove 
resourceful when confronted with the demand of engendering life:   
 
For it knows only how to preserve life, not how to engender it; it 
always undervalues that which is becoming because it has no 
instinct for divining it –as monumental history, for example, 
has. Thus it hinders any firm resolve to attempt something new, 
thus it paralyses the man of action who, as one who acts, will 
and must offend some piety or other (Untimely 75). 
 
 
4.3 Critical History 
 
Since every generation is also the result of the errors and crimes committed by 
previous generations, one's history may at times become a burden on his shoulders. 
Present circumstances and needs of a man may at times become so antagonistic to his 
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historical heritage that to come to terms with his present valuations he needs to 
painstakingly reevaluate and condemn his past. He does this as if he has put his past 
on trial. By doing so, one a posteriori discovers an alternative past from which one 
would prefer to have descended. Nevertheless, this newly adopted past is not so 
much a discovery as a creation. This is because there is no past that is exempt from 
injustice, violence, and weakness. Every past, maintains Nietzsche, "is worthy of 
being condemned –for this is simply how it is with human affairs: human violence 
and weakness have always played a powerful role in them" (Unfashionable 106). 
Therefore, it is impossible for man to get rid of his entire past. In the face of this 
dilemma, what we can do best is "to confront our inherited and hereditary nature 
with our knowledge of it, and through a new, stern discipline combat our inborn 
heritage and inplant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that 
our first nature withers away" (sic) (Untimely 75).  
 
Yet, as we have seen, Nietzsche did not encourage any close encounters with history 
as a way to restore justice and worth to one's past, for it is impossible to eliminate 
injustice in one's life. This is because, Nietzsche concludes, "it takes great strength to 
be able to live and forget the extent to which living and being unjust are one and the 
same thing" (Unfashionable 107). 
 
As is the case with the previous types of history, critical history can also prove to be 
life-destroying. In the hands of the "critic" who is not oppressed by any present 
burden, who critically interrogates history for the sake of knowledge or prestige, 
critical history becomes hostile to life (Unmodern 99). It can deteriorate into a 
scholarly mania to collect. Undertaking historical research for its own sake can 
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transform living things into "pure knowledge" and thereby destroy them 
(Unfashionable 133). In other words, the efficacy and liveliness of any actively 
created horizon is jeopardized, if historical dissection is practiced upon them.  
 
Nietzsche would reconsider critical history and formulate "genealogy" in the later 
stages of his life. With genealogy, critical history would become critical history of 
the 'present'.   
 
 
4.4 History and Objectivity 
 
As it must have become clear by now, Nietzsche was the first to undermine the 
possibility of an objective historiography. Nietzsche regards the claim to objectivity 
as the naiveté of a historian who evaluates ideas and deeds belonging to past 
"according to the widespread opinions of the present moment" (Unfashionable 125). 
This is a very benign attempt and, indeed, an inescapable one. As the precondition of 
objectivity in historiography, disinterested contemplation of the past is a bad 
mythology. The historian is not a passive and inert surface of inscription on which 
any event of the past automatically registers its empirical essence. On the contrary, 
the pursuit of history is an act of will and motivated by an "artistic urge" rather than 
an "urge to truth" (Unfashionable 126). At this stage, Nietzsche's witticism surfaces 
as he points to the irony inherent in the quest for the 'objective' view of history: 
"Indeed, one goes so far as to assume that anyone who is totally disinterested in a 
particular moment of the past is the one who must be called upon to portray it 
(Unfashionable 128)." The absurdity of the situation is only too clear.  
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Therefore, rather than the empirical truth of the past events, Nietzsche saw the "silent 
work of the dramatist" behind the so-called objective history (Unfashionable 126). In 
other words, he caught the objective historian in the act of imposing some a 
posteriori patterns on the past events and presenting these as the true meaning and 
direction of history. Principal ones among these patterns are the notorious notions of 
causality, identity, and teleology. These categories enable the historian to treat the 
study of the past in a figural, plastic manner. As a result of this treatment, we are led 
to believe that the succession of events in history is motivated by a purpose, or a plan 
which gives meaning and direction to history. We are led to believe that history 
unfolds in accordance with a set of underlying laws, and that beneath the 
contingency of historical change we could discern the workings or persistence of a 
suprahistorical subjectivity. We are led to believe in the evidential veracity of all 
these metaphysical and metaphorical assumptions, since these are the "silent" 
workings of the dramatist: 
 
To conceive history objectively in this way is the silent work of 
the dramatist; that is, to think of all things as interrelated, to 
weave isolated events into a totality –always with the 
presupposition that a unity of plan must be inserted into things if 
it is not already inherent in them. This is how the human being 
spins his web over the past and subdues it; this is how his artistic 
urge expresses itself –not, however, his urge to truth or to justice 
(Nietzsche, Unfashionable 126). 
 
We have seen at the beginning of this chapter that Nietzsche approved of history 
insofar as it fed the shaping power of life. The excess of history was life-destroying 
since it could dissipate the forward-looking enthusiasm of the man of action. 
Therefore, in order for history to serve life, it had to contain a great deal of 
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imaginative and forgetful interpretation. What's more, it had to cover only a limited 
horizon. If these are roughly what Nietzsche thought, then we can legitimately ask: 
'What proved wrong to Nietzsche, at this stage, so that he has also become critical of 
'dramatized' history?' After all, wasn't this kind of history also an imaginative 
construct in the interests of one's present state of affairs? Nietzsche did not provide 
us with a clear answer; so, the followings are only simple-minded speculations on 
this issue.   
 
1- The problem with this notably Hegelian version of history lies probably in its 
pretensions to objectivity. History is favorable insofar as it can be put to the service 
of life. If a certain kind of history masquerades as 'objective', how can people put it 
into the service of their lives? How can people any longer create for themselves an 
alternative interpretation of their past, if the final words on their past have already 
been said? Nietzsche proved objectivity to be a metaphysical fiction and 
demonstrated that it is the principal adversary of the plastic power of interpretation.  
 
2- The problem arises, because, at this stage of the treatise, rudimentary forms of 
Nietzsche's critique of reason begin to appear and illuminate his critique of history 
and historicism. Later in his life, his critique of reason and metaphysics would lead 
him to formulate his genealogies. Therefore, he became critical of the so-called 
'dramatized' history since it contained almost all the prejudices of reason "in favor of 
'unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, materiality, and being'" (Mahon 8). 
Critique, in the hands of Nietzsche, would turn out to be a historical investigation 
which uncovers the "moral will" that underlies these prejudices of reason (Mahon 8). 
Nietzsche would christen his critiques 'genealogy'.  
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5 THE NOTION OF GENEALOGY 
 
 
 
 
Genealogy is a form of historical critique inaugurated by Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-
1900) and later taken up, refined and consolidated by Michel Foucault (1926-1984). 
Yet, although his works are explicitly informed by Nietzsche's thought, it would be 
wrong to regard Foucault as a contemporary follower of Nietzsche. There were many 
facets of Nietzsche's thought that can not be construed as the various tenets of a 
single, unified theory. Indeed, Nietzsche was against thinking in terms of a system, 
and his attitude towards the theory of knowledge was characterized by his 
perspectivalism. He even recommended a deliberate change of perspectives. So, 
there were many Nietzsches, and Nietzsche the genealogist most appealed to 
Foucault. It is Nietzsche who problematized truth as inseparable from the procedures 
of its production, which are deeply embedded in the practices and relations of power. 
And, it is Nietzsche who, having undermined the notion of substratum beneath the 
entities and events we encounter, revealed the "multiplicity of relations of forces at 
the origin of our taken-for-granted values and concepts and even the things we 
experience" (Mahon 2). From these elements, Foucault derived the premises of his 
genealogy. Furthermore, it is Nietzsche's philosophy of power that allowed Foucault 
to develop his extremely versatile notion of power-knowledge (pouvoir-savoir). That 
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is to say, a certain indebtedness to Nietzsche allowed Foucault to demonstrate the 
positive functioning of power and formulate his cratology (i.e., his theory of power).  
 
Foucault, therefore, was not a wholesale follower of Nietzsche. Instead, he was 
always clear about his preferences for which Nietzsche to adopt. He declared that he 
was interested in the Nietzsche of The Birth of Tragedy and On the Genealogy of 
Morals rather than the one of Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Mahon 2). The late Nietzsche 
as genealogist of morals and philosopher of power interested Foucault in his 
historical studies. More generally, the Nietzsche who undermined both Cartesianism 
and Hegelian dialectic, who was an enemy of metaphysics, who decentered the 
'subject' as an effect of the grammatical structure of our language, was of great 
interest to Foucault. 
 
Foucault openly acknowledged his debt to Nietzsche for his formulation of 
genealogy. He regarded himself as a Nietzschean genealogist and in a 1975 interview 
he commented upon the growing presence of Nietzsche in contemporary thought in a 
way that sheds light on the nature of his involvement with Nietzsche:  
 
If I wanted to be pretentious, I would use 'the genealogy of 
morals' as the general title of what I am doing. It was Nietzsche 
who specified the power relation as the general focus, shall we 
say, of philosophical discourse–whereas for Marx it was the 
production relation. Nietzsche is the philosopher of power, a 
philosopher who managed to think of power without having to 
confine himself within a political theory in order to do so. 
Nietzsche's contemporary presence is increasingly important. 
But I am tired of people studying him only to produce the same 
kind of commentaries that are written on Hegel or Mallarmé. . . . 
The only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche's is precisely 
to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest. And if 
commentators then say that I am being faithful or unfaithful to 
Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no interest (Prison 53-54). 
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In this lengthy quotation, Foucault tries to demonstrate an emphatically Nietzschean 
understanding of Nietzsche scholarship. Instead of seeking to display doctrinal 
fidelity to Nietzsche's thought, one should, to employ an odd neologism, effect a 
Nietzscheisation of Nietzsche. That is to say, one should put Nietzsche into new 
'perspectives'. Therefore, it would be misleading to interpret Foucault's genealogical 
project as the application or continuation of Nietzsche's original method. As we shall 
see later in this chapter, Foucault's genealogical approach differs from that of 
Nietzsche in terms of both complexity and the role that it assigns to memory. And 
again, as I will discuss in the next chapter that is devoted to the 'prejudices of 
designers', when problematized in terms of the metaphysical assumptions that 
undergird them, any field of human activity, whether it is morals, arts, philosophy, 
clinical medicine, human sciences, knowledge, disciplinary practices and penal 
codes, or industrial design, demands and calls forth a genealogical approach that is 
specifically geared to its own historical, practical and discursive constitution. In a 
sense, there is not a singular and unified method of genealogy that would be adopted 
when dealing with a diversity of problems; rather, 'problematizations' call forth their 
genealogies.  
 
We can observe, in this respect, that Foucault correctly understood Nietzsche as to 
the scope of genealogy. As opposed to total criticism, genealogy should be local and 
specific. Foucault's provisional definition of his genealogies attests to this: 
 
Let us give the term genealogy to the union of erudite 
knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a 
historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this 
knowledge tactically today (Two Lectures 83). 
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With this definition arises also the fundamental difference of Foucault's genealogy 
from that of Nietzsche. Note that in the previous chapter, we have seen Nietzsche 
advising that we actively forget for the enhancement of life. The 'plastic power' of a 
culture that enables it to actively forget its past and establish a limited, actively 
invented 'horizon' around itself, praised vehemently by Nietzsche, has become the 
deficiency of our age against which Foucault directs his genealogical critiques. No 
longer functioning merely as a pedagogical tool, history has become centralized as 
one of the disciplinary techniques of normalization. This has given rise to the social 
amnesia that surrounds us, of which Foucault is so critical. History has become the 
winner's history, leading to the systematic exclusion of certain discourses from the 
accounts of the past. Nietzsche's age saw the birth of an historical cultivation. Since 
then, however, "too much forgetting has already gone on, too much discourse has 
been systematically excluded" (Mahon 8-9). In such circumstances, the task Foucault 
sets for himself is to unearth and compose a 'counter-memory' in order to undermine 
the self-evidences of the age. The task of Foucauldian genealogist, therefore, is to 
bring to light "forgotten documents, minor statements, apparently insignificant 
details, in order to recreate the forgotten historical and practical conditions of our 
present existence" (Mahon 9). Against the truth claims of a unitary body of 
knowledge, the genealogist constructs a counter-memory from local, neglected, 
discredited, and illegitimate knowledges that have been proclaimed worthless and 
obsolete in the hierarchy of knowledges and, thereby, have been denied a history.   
 
Therefore, it is reasonable to think that Foucault has put Nietzsche into a 
contemporary perspective. Together with Derrida, Foucault is responsible for the 
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contemporary presence of Nietzsche in critical thought. And, this current reactivation 
of Nietzsche is not so much a resurgence as an elaboration. In Foucault's case, for 
example, he did not invoke Nietzschean genealogy for its own sake. Rather, his 
historical problématique led him to such historical contents that only a genealogical 
approach proved pertinent to Foucault's project. Mahon clarifies the Nietzsche-
Foucault connection as follows: 
 
It was less a matter of Foucault's having been convinced by 
Nietzsche's dialogue with the philosophical tradition, than a 
matter of seeing a series of problems emerge from his own 
historical studies and political engagement for which only a 
Nietzschean approach was adequate (125). 
 
Having cleared the ground for a more mature understanding of genealogical 
approach, let me begin, first, with a close examination of the genealogical procedure 
as formulated and carried out by Nietzsche in his treatise On the Genealogy of 
Morals and reconstructed by Foucault in his article Nietzsche Genealogy History.   
 
 
5.1 Historical Spirit and Methodological Statements in Genealogy 
 
At a certain point in On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche mounts an attack on 
English psychologists, the historians of morality, by accusing them of lacking in "the 
historical spirit" (Genealogy 25). Obviously, Nietzsche used this expression with a 
polemical intent in order to validate an opposition between his genealogical approach 
and the previously understood and applied forms of historical investigation at the 
time. In a similar vein, the colors which Nietzsche selected in order to distinguish his 
genealogy from the English fashion of historical study were intended to depict the 
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different senses with which each approach the subject-matter and the different loci 
where each seek answers. While "blue," as the color of sky and extravagance of 
imagination, characterizes the direction pursued by English fashion, "gray," as the 
color of 'robust methodology' and dusty documents, represents historical spirit of 
genealogy which immerses itself in "what is documented, what can actually be 
confirmed and has actually existed, in short the entire hieroglyphic record, so hard to 
decipher, of the moral past of mankind" (Genealogy 21). After this preliminary 
discussion of 'historical spirit', in which the genealogical perspective is briefly 
touched upon, Nietzsche commences his genealogical essays concerning the origin of 
good and evil, guilt and bad conscience, and asceticism. However, except for a 
number of passing remarks on methodology and his manifest interest, as a 
philologist, in the etymology of words which permeate the whole body of the work, 
only in section 12 of the second essay that Nietzsche makes an explicit 
methodological statement concerning his genealogical analyses (Genealogy 76-79). 
Why was this text apparently lacking in a serious concern for methodology? Should 
we, then, tease such methodological elements out of the text by ourselves?  
 
First conjecture: Since Nietzsche so emphatically talks about historical 'spirit' or 
'sense', we can possibly conclude that genealogy is first and foremost characterized 
by a 'sensitivity' prior to its systematization as a 'method' of historical analysis. That 
is, genealogy may possibly be construed as a certain perspective informed by a 
specific form of sensitivity to historical events. However, when we consult The Gay 
Science or Human All Too Human, we come upon a strong emphasis Nietzsche 
places on methodological health. According to Nietzsche, quotes Foucault, the 
"cyclopean monuments" of genealogical knowledge are constructed from "discreet 
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and apparently insignificant truths and according to a rigorous method" (emphasis 
added) (NGH 140). It seems that although Nietzsche was against thinking in terms of 
a system, he argued strongly for the importance of scrupulously tailored methods. 
Therefore, our first conjecture is refuted.  
 
Second conjecture: We should seek Nietzsche's methodological concerns not in 
explicit statements, but here and there within the body of his text. In other words, we 
should tease out the fundamentals of his genealogical approach from his various 
remarks that are scattered across his corpus. This, in fact, is precisely what Foucault 
did when he 'fabricated' his famous Nietzsche essay from bits and pieces collected 
from Nietzsche's different works. This, I suggest, is the only correct way of studying 
Nietzsche, since it is Nietzsche who wrote in the aphoristic mode and voiced his 
arguments and methodological statements in the form of criticisms directed against 
his adversaries. As Mahon maintains, "Nietzsche's more explicit methodological 
statements appear in his confrontations with adversaries where he clarifies the lapses 
and wrong turns he wants to avoid in his own genealogical approach" (81).  
 
Therefore, we should tease out the elements that constitute the methodology of 
genealogy from his "oblique references" to and "passing remarks" on his 
methodology (Mahon 81, 89). To inform the reader, I must add that my account of 
genealogy will be dominated by sentences that start with 'genealogy is not, does not, 
etc.' as a natural outgrowth of the second conjecture.  
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5.2 Genealogy as the History of the Present 
 
In a 1977 interview with Bernard-Henri Lévy, Foucault described the genealogist as 
a "historian of the present" (Merquior 161, 16-20). Indeed, genealogy can best be 
understood as the history of the present since it starts with questions posed in and 
about the present. It is an attempt to undercut our self-evident values and truths and 
our inherited notions of who we are by revealing "the contingent, practical, and 
historical conditions of our existence" (Mahon 2). It is an attempt to reveal the moral 
will that undergirds our unquestioned truths. It is an attempt to demonstrate the 
multiplicity of the relations of forces at the origin of what we tend to think as always 
unified and identical with itself. Finally, genealogy is an attempt to reveal the 
'intentionality' beneath that which pass as 'neutral' or which we tend to think as 
immune from the operations of power. Therefore, genealogy is an attempt to cast 
doubt on the legitimacy of the present by severing its causal and teleological 
connections with the past. It accomplishes this by conjuring up images of the past so 
unfamiliar and radically different that, when confronted with the knowledge of our 
present, it undermines and relativizes the validity and authority of what appears 
natural and necessary in our present. Therefore, genealogy is a critique of the 
present, aiming to open possibilities for the enhancement of life and creative activity. 
In like fashion, Michael Mahon, in his well-written exegesis on the genealogical 
connection between Nietzsche and Foucault, points to this efficacy of genealogy as 
'critique': 
 
Genealogy is critique as a historical investigation into the events 
that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize 
ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. 
Moreover, critique is genealogical; that is, genealogy is history 
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oriented toward the future. Genealogy separates out, from the 
contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no 
longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think (122). 
 
 
5.3 Genealogy vs. Traditional History 
 
Furthermore, genealogy is designed to 'undo' the metaphysical assumptions which 
haunt man's vision of history. For this reason, it allowed both Nietzsche and Foucault 
to reject traditional historiography in its various guises: humanistic, Hegelian and 
evolutionary versions. Three 'D's characterize genealogical dissection of history: it 
introduces discontinuity into the course of events, and "into our very being"; it sorts 
out differences in order to manifest the multiplicity at the origin; it dissolves any 
stable identity into its different elements, together with the identity of the subject of 
knowledge (NGH 154, 145, 162). That is to say, genealogy disconnects, 
differentiates and dissolves. These three 'D's, broadly speaking, constitute the 
methodological armaments of genealogy with which it attacks various guises of 
metaphysics that inform traditional historical study. History as dependent upon the 
principles of causality, continuity, identity, and teleology, history informed by 
anthropological assumptions and evolutionist themes, history as dialectical progress, 
as an unfolding, all constitute the target of the genealogical critique. Yet, genealogy 
knows well that the faith in and dependence on such metaphysical notions are not 
extraneous elements that have been extended into historical study. On the contrary, 
these traits operate as systemic elements, which constitute the familiar notions of 
history from within. Therefore, the programme of genealogy entails undoing or 
uprooting history as we know it, rather than recuperating it by cleansing it of morbid 
forms which inhabit it. Furthermore, it would be very misleading if one opposes 
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genealogy, as a more truthful history, to conventional history. For "sacrificial use" of 
genealogy is directed to undermine both the truth claims of the historian as the 
subject of knowledge and, more significantly, the notion of history as 'knowledge' 
(NGH 162-164).    
 
 
5.4 Genealogy and the Singularity of Events 
 
Unlike traditional history, which weaves disparate events into totalities and 
continuities, genealogy prefers to highlight the singularity of events. It records these 
singularities with no intention of imposing an explanatory framework on them. That 
is, genealogy does not deduce a linear progress, an ideal meaning, underlying laws, 
or a teleological development from these disparate events. Then, it is reasonable to 
ask, 'where and how should genealogy seek these singularities?' It should seek them 
"in the most unpromising places" where the totalizing logic of history has not yet 
stooped to take over (NGH 139). In other words, genealogy must seek the singularity 
of events in "what we tend to feel is without history" (NGH 139). It must focus upon 
those things that are assumed to possess an essential meaning or a carefully protected 
identity since the beginning. As Nietzsche remarks in a marvelous epigram, "only 
that which has no history is definable" (Genealogy 80). And, since genealogy is 
never satisfied with such ready-made, axiomatic, self-evident, and immutable 
definitions, it directs its gaze upon those things that appear to have no history and 
isolates their different moments "where they engaged in different roles" (NGH 139). 
Genealogy, therefore, undermines the comforting illusion of a timeless, substantial 
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unity that we are used to thinking as persistent behind the fluctuating appearances of 
an entity in history.  
 
In this regard Nietzsche proposed genealogies of good and evil, responsibility, love, 
envy, bad conscience, the feeling of guilt, asceticism, piety, cruelty (the whole set of 
morals that are taken for granted and thought to have values in themselves), reason, 
truth itself, the soul, the subject, justice, punishment, etc.   
 
 
5.5 Genealogy and Moral Will 
 
We all regard values as worthy of respect. This is because either we conceive their 
values as immanent in them (value-in-itself) or we consider them as estimable 
acquisitions that humanity have gained through the long experience of sufferings in 
history. These values include good as opposed to evil, asceticism rather than 
hedonism, altruism as opposed to egoism, truth rather than falsehood, harmony as 
opposed to discordance, etc. Now, the genealogical task Nietzsche set for himself 
demanded that he trace the emergence and descent of these values. Consequently, a 
substantial part of Nietzsche's corpus was devoted to the genealogy of such values; 
and these genealogies led him to conclude that,  
 
Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in 
itself, according to its nature – nature is always value-less, but 
has been given value at some time, as a present – and it was we 
who gave and bestowed it (Gay Science 301).  
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In other words, all values emerged as evaluations from the perspective of a will. The 
origin of values, therefore, is not to be sought after in a Platonic world of ideas, in 
the things themselves, or in an essentially humanistic evolutionary process. Rather, 
we should seek the origin of our cherished values in an act of will that finds 
expression in the relations of forces. Therefore, the task of genealogy vis-a-vis values 
and ideals is (1) to reveal the particular act of will that gave rise to the value in 
question, and (2) to evaluate the value of these values in accordance with the quality 
of the will that posited these values. That is, Nietzschean genealogy tries to 
determine the quality of the will in accordance with the ultimate value of values, life. 
It asks, therefore, whether the value in question is the result of a strong or weak, 
noble or servant, active or reactive, affirmative or life-denying will (Mahon 83).     
 
Foucault's genealogies too examine the emergence of objects on the horizon of 
moralization. He showed that the emergence of positive knowledge is dependent 
upon a prior moralization. That is, moral problematization of entities and events 
authorizes and enables man to problematize them in terms of truth. In Madness of 
Civilization, for example, Foucault showed that only having been constituted as a 
moral experience that madness could assume positivity and become the object of the 
science of man, psychology. As Mahon remarks, "the negative moral judgment 
against madness, paradoxically, lends positive content to madness, enabling its 
problematization in terms of truth by medical rationality" (5).  
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5.6 Genealogy and the Pursuit of Origins 
 
Having examined Nietzsche's corpus, Foucault lays stress on two uses of the word 
ursprung (source, origin). In the first case, ursprung is undifferentiated and used 
interchangeably with other terms. In the second instance, however, Foucault 
distinguishes a stressed, qualified use of this term beginning with Human, All Too 
Human. In this work, says Foucault, Nietzsche began to put the term in opposition to 
another: "the miraculous origin (Wunderursprung) sought by metaphysics is set 
against the analyses of historical philosophy, which poses questions über Herkunft 
[stock or descent] und Anfang [beginning]" (NGH 140). And again, in On the 
Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche preferred to use the term Herkunft when he defined 
the objective of the study as an examination of the 'origin' of moral preconceptions. 
In this work, he also referred to the analyses in his previous works as driven by 
Herkunfthypothesen, that is, the hypotheses of descent (NGH 141). In the first 
instance, this appears quite unnatural since the word Nietzsche preferred to use in all 
these previous works had been ursprung. From this alteration in Nietzsche's 
terminology, Foucault draws the conclusion that "at this point in the Genealogy 
Nietzsche wished to validate an opposition between Herkunft and Ursprung that did 
not exist ten years earlier" (NGH 141). In other words, Nietzsche wanted explicitly to 
distance himself from the metaphysical search for origins in order to devise and run 
his emphatically anti-essentialist and anti-Platonist mode of analysis, 'genealogy'. In 
brief, he wanted to counter the pursuit of the origin (ursprung) with the analysis of 
descent (herkunft). Now, the question immediately arises: Why did Nietzsche 
challenge the pursuit of the origin? What enabled genealogy to avoid the pitfalls to 
which the search for origins inevitably succumbs? Foucault answers these questions 
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by examining the three postulates of the origin and briefly commenting upon the 
ways in which genealogy challenges the metaphysical assumptions that underlie this 
quest for origins.   
 
First postulate of the origin: The origin of a thing, an entity, or an idea is sought after 
in order to bring to light their "exact essence," their "purest possibilities," or their 
"carefully protected identities" (NGH 142). This search assumes that the purpose and 
task of inquiry is to reveal the 'nucleus' of an entity by cleansing it of the 
accumulated layers of historical trivia. This is because the origin is believed to be the 
locus of truth and identity of an entity, yet to be worn away by the flux of history. In 
other words, this postulate assumes first that "there are immobile forms that precede 
the external world of accident and succession" (NGH 142), and that, as a corollary, 
the effect of history is to deform, to cloud, to stain, to dilute, to cover over, to distort, 
to weaken the original identity or essence of an entity. In order to disclose this 
original identity, therefore, one should gradually remove all the masks that have 
covered its face throughout its history since the beginning. Genealogy, on the other 
hand, refuses to understand history from such a metaphysical outlook; instead, it 
advises us to listen to history. If we do this, we would find something we do not 
expect to discover behind things: "not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret 
that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion 
from alien forms" (NGH 142). In this regard, Nietzsche argued that 'reason' is born of 
chance and that the concept of liberty was invented by rulers. Therefore, at the origin 
of things, we would encounter no primordial truths or no essences to be subsequently 
corrupted; rather we find accidents and relations of forces as responsible for the 
emergence of things. In Foucault's words, "What is found at the historical beginning 
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of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other 
things. It is disparity" (NGH 142). 
   
Second postulate of the origin, in fact, forms the basis of the first. Among its various 
moments, we tend to confer the highest status upon the origin of a thing. This is 
because we believe that "things are most precious and essential at the moment of 
birth" (NGH 143). Hence our perfectionist quest for origins. In fact, however, this 
faith in the preeminence of the origin is an outcome of the metaphysical assumption 
that sees a divine intention in any beginning. Belief in this godly origin is the 
counterpart of the belief in Christian teleology. Underlying this belief is a theogony: 
In a sense, things do not emerge in history and disappear thereof; rather, they 
originate before the Fall, that is, "before the body, before the world and time" (NGH 
143). This is precisely a belief in the spirit, or the spirituality of the origin. From the 
genealogical perspective, however, the origin is worldly and the beginnings are 
lowly: "not in the sense of modest or discreet like the steps of a dove, but derisive 
and ironic, capable of undoing every infatuation" (NGH 143). In other words, 
beginnings always fail to satisfy our retrospective attempts to sympathize and 
identify ourselves with them. 
 
According to the third and final postulate, the origin is deemed to be the locus of 
truth. And, as similar to the former two postulates, the origin of a thing is pursued in 
order to grasp it in its primordial truth. "The origin lies at a place of inevitable loss," 
because what has happened since then (history) and what has been spoken of it since 
then (discourse) have obscured and finally destroyed its truth (NGH 143). And again, 
the origin lies at a place where what speaks and what is spoken shared the same 
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essence, where "the truth of things corresponded to a truthful discourse" (NGH 143). 
It is the task of inquiry to recover this lost truth by removing the historical 
accumulation of errors that have parasitically gathered around it. To sum, we can 
condense this postulate into such a simple formula: 'origin: truth vs. history: error'. 
That is to say, origin is the site of truth, and history is the originator of errors. 
Genealogy, however, forces us to reverse this relationship established between truth 
and error by metaphysics. Accordingly, our present truths may be the result of the 
age-old proliferation of errors. Foucault, quoting Nietzsche, remarks on this new 
relationship between error and truth: 
 
It is now impossible to believe that "in the rending of the veil, 
truth remains truthful; we have lived long enough not to be 
taken in." Truth is undoubtedly the sort of error that cannot be 
refuted because it was hardened into an unalterable form in the 
long baking process of history (NGH 143-144).    
 
This brief examination of the three postulates of the origin showed that, for both 
Nietzsche and Foucault, the idea of origin as the locus of the original essence or the 
primordial truth of an entity is embedded in metaphysics, and therefore, untenable. 
Yet, we also know that genealogy too is a search for origins, an inquiry into that 
which took place in the past. How, then, does it differ from the metaphysical search 
for origins? It differs toto caleo. Genealogy confronts metaphysics with new and 
completely different postulates of origin. Hence, the origin pursued by genealogy 
should by no means be confused with the origin understood as ursprung. As Mahon 
remarks, "if by the origin (Ursprung) one means the locale of something's primordial 
truth, essence, or original identity, nothing could be further from what genealogy 
seeks" (8). Genealogy traces the descent of an idea, thing, or entity in order to 
manifest the multiple relations of forces at the origin. It does not seek the origin in 
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order to identify the generic characteristics proper to an entity or an idea; rather it 
traces "the subtle, singular, and subindividual marks that might possibly intersect in 
them to form a network that is difficult to unravel" (NGH 145). Genealogy, therefore, 
conceptualizes the origin as a knot in an entangled net rather than a terminal point to 
be ultimately reached. To put it briefly, it treats the origin not as a 'terminus' or a 
'nucleus' but as a 'nexus' in a complex network of forces. In this fashion, genealogy 
traces the descent of an entity, splits its so-called nucleus at the origin, and thereby, 
reconstructs the network in which the entity in question figures for the first time. 
Note, however, that the task of genealogy is not to disentangle the knots in this 
network; it does not seek any resolution of the puzzle. Rather, it tries to reconstruct 
this network from the details, accidents, and "discreet and apparently insignificant 
truths" (NGH 140). It tries to reconstitute the puzzle itself. This is because the 
network and the puzzle do not inhere in the historical records; they do not wait for 
the historian to cast light on them. They come into existence insofar as one 
problematizes them from a genealogical perspective.      
 
Only treated in this sense that the substantial unity that was imposed by metaphysics 
upon the origin of things begins to disintegrate. From the genealogical perspective, 
the conditions of existence of a thing are not to be sought after in the preeminence of 
its secret essence at the origin, they should, rather, be traced in the exteriority of 
accidents, interpretations, and in this complex network formed by the relations of 
power. Finally, Foucault furnishes us with a very apt and almost epigrammatic 
description of the objective of genealogy understood as the analysis of descent: 
 
The search for descent is not the erecting of foundations: on the 
contrary, it disturbs what was previously considered immobile; 
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it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the 
heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself (NGH 
147). 
 
We have put forward the notion of the 'network' at the origin, which it is the task of 
genealogy to reconstitute. Now, it has become necessary to pose the question 
concerning this network, if we are to continue our explication of genealogy. In what 
does this network so rigorously studied by genealogy consist, then?   
 
 
5.7 Genealogy and Power 
 
The network at the origin which genealogy tries to map is composed of, or, 
engendered by, the relations of forces, that is, the realm of discursive and 
nondiscursive practices. According to Foucault, the concrete relations and practices 
of power immanent in this network are productive of the things, ideas, values and 
events we encounter and experience. That is to say, at bottom, we will encounter 
'power' and its complex web as "the historical a priori" condition of existence of our 
present reality (Mahon 12). Genealogical analysis, then, begins first by tracing the 
descent of an entity until its point of emergence is located in time, and second, 
continues with moving centrifugally out of this point of origin until the originary 
unity of the entity is shattered into splinters, revealing its embeddedness "in the fine 
meshes of the web of power" (Foucault, Truth 116). Now, we can confidently 
articulate the specifically genealogical postulate of origin: Genealogy studies the 
origin from the viewpoint of 'power', with a keen eye to spot the multiple relations 
that traverse it. Genealogy demonstrates that the origin of what we consider as 
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rational, true, self-evident, or worthy of respect is already "rooted in domination, 
subjugation, the relationship of forces – in a word, power" (Davidson 225).    
 
Note, however, that if what we come upon at the origin of things is power as a 
"productive network", then, we need to reconsider what we have been accustomed to 
think as power. After all, we are long used to think power as that which represses, 
excludes, confines, prohibits, and says 'no'. Now, Foucault, following Nietzsche, 
invites us to recast our traditional conception of power and change it into a positive, 
productive one. Therefore, we need to stay longer on this topic of power in order for 
a full picture of genealogy to emerge.  
 
Foucault refuses to think power either in the juridical terms of liberalism or in 
economic terms of Marxism. In the former, power is taken as a contractual right one 
possesses whose partial or total abandonment may either lead to the establishment of 
political power or sovereignty. This has been also called as the 'commodity' model of 
power. In the latter, power is conceived in terms of its economic functionality of 
maintaining the existing relations of production and, thereby, rendering the class 
domination possible. In both models, however, Foucault distinguishes a certain 
economism; that is, in both theories power is in a "subordinate position relative to the 
economy" (Two Lectures 89). To clarify this, let me refer to Foucault. He argues that,  
 
in the first case [juridical, liberal] we have a political power 
whose formal model is discoverable in the process of exchange, 
the economic circulation of commodities; in the second case 
[Marxist] the historical raison d'étre of political power and the 
principle of its concrete forms and actual functioning, is located 
in the economy (Two Lectures 89).   
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Therefore, in both cases, one is left with a 'substantive' notion of power, the analysis 
of which is doomed, from the start, to focus either on the originating 'subject' of 
power or on the 'substratum' of power. In other words, one is destined to study either 
'the powers that be' (historical or political analyses of those who held power and their 
intentions) or 'the economic processes and infrastructures' that favor or engender 
certain modes of power. Yet, with respect to the preeminence in philosophy of the 
notions of the subject and the substratum Foucault thinks along the same lines as 
Nietzsche who found the "seduction of language" solely responsible for our 
metaphysical tendency to posit a subject or substratum underlying actions and events 
(Nietzsche, Genealogy 45). At the end of the day, Foucault finds himself confronted 
with an as yet uncharted domain of the analysis of power, namely, a non-economic, 
relational analysis of power. Having voiced the demand for that type of analysis, 
Foucault begins to articulate some premises ('the available means') and pose a 
number of questions that constitute the first step for the formation of such an 
analysis: 
 
We have in the first place the assertion that power is neither 
given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised, and 
that it only exists in action. Again, we have at our disposal 
another assertion to the effect that power is not primarily the 
maintenance and reproduction of economic relations, but is 
above all a relation of force. The questions to be posed would 
then be these: if power is exercised, what sort of exercise does it 
involve? In what does it consist? What is its mechanism? 
(Emphasis added) (Two Lectures 89) 
 
What does this quotation from Foucault tell us about the new conception of power, 
then? Without going into further details, let me briefly outline the theoretical 
assumptions, scope and the objective of Foucauldian 'analytics' of power: 
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1) Analysis should focus on the 'exercise', rather than the origin, intention, or 
substance, of power. This is a new realm where power no longer denotes a 
possession or capacity that is localized at a fixed center or an apex in a society (i.e., a 
dominant class, sovereign, or state). It no longer signifies the set of dictates 
emanating from a determinate or determinable source, which can be either subjective 
or institutional in character. Power, Foucault argues, is rather "the name one 
attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society" that pertains to the 
multiple relations of forces (Ansell-Pearson 17). Power, therefore, should be studied 
from the viewpoint of its exercise, in accordance with "the intelligibility of struggles, 
of strategies and tactics" (Foucault, Truth 114). How, then, can such an analysis be 
performed? In what does its method consist? Foucault outlines the methodological 
programme of this analysis as follows: 
 
[It] is a case of studying power at the point where its intention, if 
it has one, is completely invested in its real and effective 
practices. What is needed is a study of power in its external 
visage, at the point where it is in direct and immediate 
relationship with that which we can provisionally call its object, 
its target, its field of application, there – that is to say – where it 
installs itself and produces its real effects (Two Lectures 97). 
 
This, in turn, implies that the exercise of power should be studied in regional or local 
levels where its effects reach into "the very grain of individuals", where it "touches 
their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, 
learning processes and everyday lives" (Foucault, Prison 39). This regime of power, 
Foucault asserts, was an invention of recent date, namely eighteenth century. This is 
a new form of power, which has no longer been exercised "from above" the social 
body (Prison 39). Rather, power in this new regime permeates the social body where 
it extends its effects through ever-finer channels. This, Foucault calls, is an exercise 
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of power "from within" the social body through a network that sprouts capillaries at 
its extremities (Prison 39).   
 
The relational theory of power is the first radical innovation Foucault introduced to 
political theory. With Foucault, it has become possible to think power as a 
relationship rather than a substance that someone holds in his hand. He thought that 
positing an absolute power, a commodity possessed by certain men in a subject 
position and exercised from the top of a hierarchy, would end up with endowing that 
power with substance. Power, he argues, is that which figures in relations. Hence, we 
should seek power in the relations of forces; we should capture its functioning at the 
level of our cultural practices. This is because, as Deleuze remarks, "power entails a 
concrete, practical interplay of forces at the level of life itself and with life as its 
object" (Mahon 12). This omnipresence of power, however, should not lead us to 
conclude that everything is under the sway of the same power and to the same extent. 
As Foucault explains, power is omnipresent, not "'because it englobes everything, but 
because it comes from everywhere'" (Merquior 111). Power is not an umbrella that 
covers everything at once; rather it circulates by forming a chain among individuals. 
It involves ever changing forms of subjugation that free individuals exercise in their 
mutual relations. As Foucault comments, 
 
Power is employed and exercised through a net-like 
organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its 
threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously 
undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert 
or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its 
articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of 
power, not its points of application (Two Lectures 98).     
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Power, in other words, is not applied to individuals. It is articulated via individuals, 
among individuals. Likewise, this relational conception of power also allowed 
Foucault to dispense with the notion of originating subject and to put forward the 
'productivity' of power. This is his second innovation. Let us now look into it. 
 
2) His Nietzschean understanding of power also led Foucault to dismiss the 
traditional, negative conception of power and to formulate his theory of productive 
power. It was Nietzsche who first revealed the positive functioning of power in On 
the Genealogy of Morals. His shocking hypotheses of descent involved a radical 
dismissal of power as originating from a founding, intending human subject in favor 
of a new conception that posits power itself as productive of the human subject. For 
instance, Nietzsche revealed fearful procedures of power and discipline as 
responsible for the emergence of the "emancipated individual". Thanks to the 
painstaking and uncanny procedures of "mnemotechnics" it became possible to 
"create a memory for the human animal" and, thereby, give birth to the "sovereign 
man" who is responsible for his actions and "master of a free will", who can reason, 
and who, as a result, has "the right to make promises" (Nietzsche, Genealogy 57-62). 
Foucault, too, emphasizes the productive role of power. He, too, subscribes to the 
Nietzschean reversal of the relationship that has long been established between 
power and the subject. The notion of subject as the 'source' of power is replaced with 
that of subject as the 'product' of power. Foucault, therefore, combats the prevalent 
notion of power as negative and argues for an essentially productive conception of 
power: 
 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power 
in negative terms: it 'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 
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'abstracts', it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact, power produces; it 
produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of 
truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of 
him belong to this production (Discipline 194).  
 
This insight had already informed Foucault, albeit in an implicit sense, in The Birth 
of the Clinic and Madness and Civilization. In the former, for example, Foucault 
argues that contrary to the enlightened medicine's own history it is not the 
"progressive transformation of its mode of knowledge" that is responsible for the 
emergence of 'individual' as the positive object of medical science (Mahon 6). That 
is, rather than finally turning its attention to preexisting objects, clinical medicine 
itself constituted objects to be known through a change in its discourse and practices. 
Practices of power such as practical and discursive "insertion of disease into social, 
political, and economic space" are constitutive of individual's body as medical object 
(Mahon 6).     
 
With this aspect of power, we have come to the crux of Foucault's conception of 
power. Problematization of truth, knowledge, and discourse in terms of their relation 
to power carries the brand of Foucault in contemporary critical theory.  
 
 
5.8 Truth and Power 
 
Foucault showed truth to be "a thing of this world", not to be sought after in the 
"distant ideality of the origin" (Truth 131; NGH 145). He problematized the notion of 
'truth' as woven from the tangled threads of power. In an oft-quoted proposition, he 
describes the interplay of truth and power as below:   
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'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power 
which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it 
induces and which extend it. A 'régime' of truth (Foucault, Truth 
133). 
 
Taking my cue from this synoptic statement let me expand upon Foucault's highly 
intricate conception of truth and power. First, Foucault warns us not to consider truth 
in an isolation, beyond the reach of power, waiting there to be discovered by "free 
spirits" who could liberate themselves from the 'worldly' struggle for power (Truth 
131). As opposed to this 'ascetic' conception of truth, genealogy poses the question of 
truth in terms of its production. Truth is not to be found at the origin, rather it is 
embedded in a "régime of truth" that is composed of "the ensemble of rules 
according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power 
are attached to the true" (Foucault, Truth 132). Note, however, that by this 'régime of 
truth' Foucault does not in any sense mean that finally in the history of humanity 
power succeeded in seizing complete control of truth and harnessing it for its own 
worldly interests, that truth has fallen under the increasing sway of power, or that for 
the first time humanity witnesses an alliance between truth and power. The régime of 
truth should rather be understood as a general apparatus which is responsible for "the 
production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation" of effective statements 
(Foucault, Truth 133). Truth is already power: not in the sense that those who 
possess truth can exercise power, but truth is linked to power both as its product and 
as that which induces effects of power. According to Foucault, 
 
Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of 
multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of 
power. Each society has its régime of truth, its 'general politics' 
of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and 
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makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which 
enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by 
which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures 
accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those 
who are charged with saying what counts as true (Truth 131). 
 
Power cannot be exercised without the existence and functioning of "a certain 
economy of discourses of truth" and truth cannot be produced outside the established 
relations of power (Two Lectures 93). As Foucault summarizes, "we are subjected to 
the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through 
the production of truth" (Two Lectures 93). In modern, western societies, power does 
neither conceal nor prevent the search for truth in order to function. Quite the 
contrary, power in such societies continually seeks, produces, registers, and 
disseminates truth in order to distribute its effects through ever finer channels into 
the social body, and to figure more irresistibly in the concrete relations of 
individuals. These societies are characterized by an ongoing battle among various 
discourses for the status of truth. In such modern societies, distinguished by the sort 
of productive, relational modes of power, the pursuit of truth has even become a 
professional and institutional one that is frequently rewarded (Two Lectures 93). The 
modern individual is, therefore, forced to produce the truth, even the truth about 
himself. As a result, Foucault maintains, "we are judged, condemned, classified, 
determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a 
function of the true discourses which are the bearers of the specific effects of power" 
(Two Lectures 94).  
 
If power and truth is so inextricably intertwined, then, how about the relationship that 
obtains between power and knowledge? To answer this question in a Foucauldian 
manner, we must, once again, start with the 'productivity' of power. Now, if we posit 
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power as productive of the objects, ideas, and events we encounter, does this not lead 
us to think that power as such is able to give form and substance to these entities? Is 
it possible, then, to think of power, which, according to Foucault, is relational and 
has no substantial existence, as capable of giving birth to such substantive entities? 
Surely not. Power does not directly produce objects themselves; rather, it causes 
objects to emerge as 'objects of knowledge'. Power constitutes at the same stroke 
both objects as the 'objects of knowledge' and subjects, that is, 'us', as 'subjects for 
the practice of that knowledge'.  
 
Foucault starts by raising the question of the relation between power and knowledge, 
of the articulation of one on the other, which, he claims, has never been studied. 
According to one of the central tenets of humanist tradition, with which we are long 
imbued, power and knowledge are not compossible. It has long come to be regarded 
as axiomatic that those who crave for power are blind to knowledge, those whose 
senses are atrophied cease to know, and only those who renounce power can attain 
the knowledge of truth (Foucault, Prison 51). Foucault, on the other hand, wants to 
reveal the continual articulation "of power on knowledge and of knowledge on 
power" (Prison 51). Note, however, that the articulation Foucault tries to 
demonstrate should not be construed as a reconciliation he seeks between power and 
knowledge. He warns us against the modern truism that power needs and makes use 
of knowledge and technology for its own interests, and against the truism of the usual 
cliché that 'knowledge is power'. These may be correct, but Foucault adds an 
altogether different proposition that "the exercise of power itself creates and causes 
to emerge new objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information" 
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(Prison 51). And, conversely knowledge itself gives rise to the effects of power. This 
is because, maintains Foucault, power and knowledge are isogenetic. He states that, 
 
We should admit . . . that power and knowledge directly imply 
one another; that there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field knowledge, nor any knowledge 
that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations (Foucault, Discipline 27). 
 
Foucault condenses his arguments into the term power/knowledge (pouvoir/savoir) 
in which the slash between the two terms does not denote their coexistence but their 
state of being inseparable from the very beginning. That is to say, power and 
knowledge, according to him, should not be studied separately. The value of the 
conception of power/knowledge for a genealogical, historical analysis must already 
have become clear. As David Couzens Hoy, a leading figure in the Foucault 
scholarship, remarks, Foucault devised the concept of power/knowledge for 
revealing how the true has become truth, how the true knowledge that is valued and 
practiced has become historically possible. Hoy argues that Foucault constructed the 
notion of power/knowledge as a device "for studying the social and scientific 
practices that underlie and condition the formation of beliefs" (Hoy 129). Genealogy, 
in this respect, can be regarded as a questioning of the historical conditions of 
possibility, modalities and constitution of the objects, bodies and fields of 
knowledge. For example, if, as 'individuals', we have bodies that we train, care, 
shape, discipline, etc., it is because power has constituted the body as an object of 
knowledge in the first place. Likewise, Foucault argues,  
 
If it has been possible to constitute a knowledge of the body, this 
has been by way of an ensemble of military and educational 
disciplines. It was on the basis of power over the body that a 
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physiological, organic knowledge of it becomes possible (Body 
59). 
 
And conversely, by virtue of the normative posture assumed by this newly 
constituted domain of knowledge in society, it has become possible for the exercise 
of power over bodies to induce pleasure and generate consent. In other words, since 
the regime of healthy living prescribed by medical authorities is neither repressive 
nor negative, it is welcome and voluntarily practiced by individuals.    
 
Foucault's conception of power/knowledge also shows us that power has not only 
been productive of the generic category of 'subject' but also of different 
'subjectivities'. The constitution of objects and fields of knowledge is inevitably 
accompanied by a correlative constitution of different subjects who are supposed to 
practice these fields of knowledge. That is to say, objects of knowledge presuppose 
their subjects. With each new domain of knowledge that power constitutes there 
emerges a new subject position from which one speaks, in which one practices, and 
on account of which one 'knows'.   
 
Now, let me finish this long, yet indispensable, digression devoted to an excursion 
into Foucault's oft-misconstrued conception of power with a number of remarks that 
would further clarify it.  
 
First remark relates to the positive functioning of power. If power were that much 
productive, shall we not justifiably expect it to appear so? And yet, we only 
encounter its negative face: it represses, it excludes, it confines, it prohibits, etc. 
After all, are not the insane confined to asylums and, thereby, excluded from the rest 
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of individuals? How is it possible, then, to still maintain that madness is the product 
of power? Foucault claimed that together with the emergence of a moral, critical 
discourse on madness, the practices of confinement were responsible for the 
appearance of madness as a positivity, as an object of psychiatric gaze and practices. 
Now the question is, 'how is power, functioning in such a manifestly negative way, 
able to give rise to this positivity, madness?' The answer: Power is productive of 
objects even in its apparent negativity. In other words, while apparently it represses, 
excludes, confines or prohibits 'things' and 'human beings', it creates, gives birth to, 
causes to appear, constitutes, or produces 'objects' and 'subjects'. It is a double act: to 
distinguish negatively and to constitute positively. While power isolates or 
circumscribes entities epistemologically, morally, or concretely, it practically confers 
meaning and significance upon these entities even in this isolation. Therefore, things 
assume positivity by this very act of power. That is to say, they begin to appear as 
positive entities of our knowledge and practices.    
 
The second remark aims to prevent false or incomplete appraisals of the relational, 
productive theory of power. Foucault's conception of power as the concrete, practical 
interplay of forces at the level of social relations and practices has given way to some 
misunderstandings. Merquior, for instance, demonstrates one such mistake when he 
attempts to criticize Foucault's conception of power. According to him, 
 
Now, in principle, practically every social relation does lend 
itself to be seen in terms of power. For instance, we can very 
well interpret the legal demand that food products bear on a 
label the terminal date of their healthy use as proof of the power 
of consumers over producers, instead of regarding it as an 
impartial governmental regulation concerned with the 
prevention of diseases (Merquior 115-116). 
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Although such an interpretation of power relations sounds correct, it is, nevertheless, 
still far from what Foucault meant by the exercise of power. For example, Foucault 
would insist that what Merquior takes for granted as an agent of power, namely the 
'consumer', has already been a product of power. But let me discuss the 'birth of the 
consumer' in the next chapter devoted to the genealogical problematization of design.    
 
Third and final remark is related with Foucault's removal of the constituent subject 
from the center. One can argue that what made 'genealogy' possible is both 
Nietzsche's and Foucault's elimination of the subject from the center of thought. In 
other words, genealogy as a search for the multiplicity at the origin could only be 
possible when the subject as a unifying and totalizing category was revealed to be an 
empty synthesis. Foucault's remarks, in this regard, is worth quoting at some length: 
 
One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the 
subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which can 
account for the constitution of the subject within a historical 
framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that is, a 
form of history which can account for the constitution of 
knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having 
to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in 
relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness 
throughout the course of history (Truth 117). 
 
We have seen that what we encounter at the origin of our present ideas, values, 
objects, truths, and even, of ourselves, is the productive network of power. In other 
words, what is responsible for the 'emergence' of an entity is the particular 
disposition of the relations of forces. Therefore, the next step of genealogical 
analysis consists in mapping the network of power relations that gave birth to the 
entities that comprise our present experience. This, in genealogical terms, is the 
'analysis of the emergence'.  
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5.9 Emergence, Power and Interpretation 
 
Emergence (entstehung) designates both the event of coming into existence and the 
"moment of arising" (NGH 148). From the genealogical perspective, it is neither a 
divine birth nor the culmination of a dialectic progress, evolution, or a gradual 
development. Emergence is the interplay of forces that gives rise to a new 
interpretation. It is the practicality of power to impose new functions, new purposes 
on the old forms of history. In this sense, emergence is a new interpretation enacted 
and activated by a particular drama of forces. Note, however, that emergence is not a 
category of identity; it does not conform to the postulate of ursprung. It does not 
designate the moment when the unalterable identity of an entity is established once 
and for all. It is neither the first nor the final term of a historical development. 
Emergence, rather, is the principle of difference and discontinuity that is regularly 
inserted into the system of rules, purposes, and meanings throughout history. In this 
respect, even the most natural traits and the most essentially purposeful practices of 
ours fail to demonstrate uniformity of purpose throughout history. For example, 
 
the eye was not always intended for contemplation, and 
punishment has had other purposes than setting an example. 
These developments may appear as a culmination, but they are 
merely the current episodes in a series of subjugations: the eye 
initially responded to the requirements of hunting and warfare; 
and punishment has been subjected, throughout its history, to a 
variety of needs –revenge, excluding an aggressor, 
compensating a victim, creating fear (NGH 148). 
 
By virtue of this episodic conception of emergence it has become possible for 
Foucault to replace the metaphysical belief in the persistence of purposes with a 
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caesural view of a series of interpretations that the interplay of forces brings to bear 
upon the system of purposes. When metaphysics looks out for the emergence of an 
entity in history, it is in order to see the first seeds of that entity's present purpose 
were already sown at the moment it arose. However, such an evaluation is only 
possible insofar as the metaphysician is in the habit of "placing present needs at the 
origin" (NGH 148). Genealogy, on the other hand, analyzes the points of emergence 
in order to delineate the various configurations of the network of power, thanks to 
which the entity in question emerged as such. Therefore, when genealogy looks out 
for the emergence of an entity, it is not in order to establish "the anticipatory power 
of meaning", but "the hazardous play of dominations" (NGH 148).   
 
Emergence takes place when the forces on the fringes of the scene begin to set foot 
in the center stage and come into conflict with each other. The task of the analysis of 
emergence is to map this interplay of forces. This confrontation of forces, however, 
may happen in various ways. Foucault provides us with a Nietzschean description of 
these interactions: 
 
1) The forces may be engaged in struggle against outsiders or adverse conditions 
especially when the survival, livelihood and longevity of their species are at stake. 
For the same reason, these forces may turn against those they oppress from within 
when they are threatened with revolts (NGH 149). 
 
2) The forces may be engaged in struggle among themselves especially when they 
attain prosperity and are no longer in danger of destruction. In such conditions, 
individual differences come to the fore and into conflict with each other. As Foucault 
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quotes Nietzsche, we observe a struggle "of egoisms turned against each other," 
seeking general recognition (NGH 149).  
 
3) The force may turn against itself when it weakens in order to regain its former 
strength. When the force reacts against its deterioration, "it imposes limits, inflicts 
torments and mortifications; it masks these actions as a higher morality, and, in 
exchange, regains its strength" (NGH 149). This is an instinct to overcome 
decadence; and Nietzsche locates the origin of the ascetic ideal in this stage of the 
forces.  
 
Of course, these are only Nietzsche's characterization of the interplay of forces. The 
network of power in modern societies allows more numerous, diverse, and complex 
confrontations to take place between forces. Yet, in whichever way they come into 
contact, only the struggle of forces is productive of entities. In this respect, Nietzsche 
revealed that "the domination of certain men over others leads to the differentiation 
of values" (NGH 150).  
 
 
5.10 Emergence and Interpretation 
 
Emergence can also be defined as the moment when the interplay of forces gives rise 
to a new interpretation and imposes it to the system of rules and purposes. In other 
words, emergence takes place when a new interpretation takes issue with the former 
one, supersedes it by imposing a new direction to the existing rules and gains 
recognition by inserting itself into institutions. Rules, therefore, are in an 
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instrumental position relative to the forces that struggle to seize control of them. 
According to Foucault,   
 
Rules are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized; they are 
impersonal and can be bent to any purpose. The successes of 
history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to 
replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves so as 
to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against 
those who had initially imposed them; controlling this complex 
mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the 
rulers through their own rules (NGH 151). 
 
This appropriation of rules is what Foucault calls an interpretation. The success of 
genealogy has been to appropriate such an originary conception as the 'emergence' 
and invert its meaning so that it begins to signify the infinite series of interpretations 
that humanity brings to force throughout history. Emergence of an entity, therefore, 
does not signify the prelude to "the successive configurations" of its "identical 
meaning" (NGH 151). It does not stand for the moment when the first principle of an 
entity is inaugurated. Emergence, rather, is a series of interpretations in which each 
discord in the equilibrium of forces brings about a substitution, displacement, or 
reversal of the former alignment of the rules. In a similar fashion to Derrida, who 
undermined the notion of 'presence' when he announced that "the original is always a 
copy", Foucault too undermined the dependency of interpretation to a ground 
(Descombes 146). According to Foucault, interpretation has turned out to be an 
infinite task because at the origin there is nothing primordial to interpret. In his 1967 
essay "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx", Foucault points to this essential incompleteness of 
interpretation:  
 
There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret, for after all 
everything is already interpretation, each sign is in itself not the 
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thing that offers itself to interpretation but an interpretation of 
other signs. There is never, if you like, an interpretandum that is 
not already interpretans, so that it is as much a relationship of 
violence as of elucidation that is established in interpretation 
(275). 
 
In the last line of this quotation lies the crux of Foucault's argument concerning the 
notion of interpretation. With Nietzsche, Freud and Marx, says Foucault, 
interpretation ceased to be understood as a gradual elucidation of the meaning hidden 
in the origin. This task is left to metaphysics. Interpretation, rather, does violence to 
its object, which was already an interpretation. And, only genealogy can account for 
the emergence of such interpretations. As Foucault maintains,      
 
if interpretation is the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a 
system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in 
order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its 
participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary 
rules, then the development of humanity is a series of 
interpretations. The role of genealogy is to record its history: the 
history of morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts, the history 
of the concept of liberty or of the ascetic life; as they stand for 
the emergence of different interpretations, they must be made to 
appear as events on the stage of historical process (NGH 151-
152).  
 
 
5.11 Nietzsche and Interpretation: The Major Point of Historical Method 
 
In the sections 12 and 13 of On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche explicitly states 
the major point of historical method apropos of a discussion on how the origin of 
punishment should be studied. Nietzsche here makes two working distinctions 
between the emergence and successive interpretations of a thing that are of 
genealogical concern. He draws distinctions (a) between the origin and the eventual 
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purposes of a thing and (b) between the stable procedure and ever changing 
meanings of a thing.   
 
Nietzsche starts this methodological excursion by criticizing the previous 
genealogists of morals for being in the habit of confounding two problems, which 
are, at bottom, separate. That is, when they perceive a demonstrable purpose of a 
thing, they project this purpose upon the origin as its reason of emergence. However, 
Nietzsche asserts, the purpose or utility of a thing proves most fruitless when it is 
employed as the index of its cause of emergence. This is because there is a great deal 
of active interpretations that take place between the emergence of a thing and its 
eventual meaning and function. As we have seen, each of these interpretations has 
been forged by the shaping force of a will to power that engaged in a struggle to 
become master. As Nietzsche explains,  
 
the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual utility, its 
actual employment and place in a system of purposes, lie worlds 
apart; whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is 
again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, 
transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it; all 
events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, 
and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh 
interpretation, an adaptation through which any previous 
"meaning" and "purpose" are necessarily obscured or even 
obliterated (Genealogy 77). 
 
Nietzsche here warns us not to be taken in by such anachronistic conclusions as that 
which were drawn by previous genealogists of morals concerning the origin of 
punishment. According to him, we should cease to posit a clear-cut connection 
between the presently verifiable purposes and utilities of a thing and the reason why 
it emerged in the first place. In brief, Nietzsche demands us to abandon our simple-
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minded belief in the certainty even of such truisms as, "the eye being made for 
seeing, the hand being made for grasping" (Genealogy 77). Nietzsche, therefore, 
boldly claims that the original purpose of punishment was not punishing! Far from 
supplying us with causal explanations concerning the emergence of a thing, the 
appearance of purposes and utilities are only signs that should refer us back to a 'will 
to power', which "has become master of something less powerful and imposed upon 
it the character of a function" (Genealogy 77). For this reason, Nietzsche regards the 
history of a thing, form, custom, or institution as a 'sign-chain' composed of 
successive interpretations that follow each other in a purely contingent fashion. With 
this genealogical conception of history, therefore, Nietzsche rejects history as 
'evolution' in all senses of the word. That is, history is neither a 'progress' toward a 
goal in Hegel's sense nor a logical progress through adaptations in the most efficient 
way as the theory of evolution holds. History, rather, is a series of incongruous 
interpretations, that is, "a succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually 
independent processes of subduing, plus the resistances they encounter, the attempts 
at transformation for the purpose of defense and reaction, and the results of 
successful counteractions" (Genealogy 78).  
 
With this emphasis on the pivotal role of interpretation in history, Nietzsche counters 
the passive conception of adaptation that formerly dominated the theory of history 
with the active conception of 'will to power' that is responsible for the emergence of 
ever new forms, meanings, purposes, or utilities in history. For Nietzsche, whereas 
the activity of "the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give 
new interpretations and directions" to events is what engenders life, adaptation, as a 
 88 
second-rate activity, is only a reactive, derivative mode of existence that cannot by 
itself give form to anything new and great (Genealogy 79). 
 
The second distinction Nietzsche forged between the stable and fluid aspects of a 
thing is, in fact, a qualification he made upon the first distinction. This second point 
will cast more light upon the concept of interpretation as Nietzsche understood it 
and, thereby, allow us to compare and highlight the differences between the 
genealogies of Nietzsche and Foucault with respect to the concept of interpretation. 
Still discussing the example of punishment, Nietzsche now distinguishes between its 
enduring and fluid aspects. By the enduring element, Nietzsche meant the relatively 
unchanging exercise of punishment. According to Nietzsche, the ritualistic aspect of 
punishment that involves "the custom, the act, the 'drama,' a certain strict sequence of 
procedures" has undergone little or no change since the beginning (Genealogy 79). 
On the other hand, "the meaning, the purpose, the expectation associated with the 
performance of such procedures" constitute the fluid element that has been subject to 
change by way of new interpretations throughout history (Genealogy 79). To sum, 
while the forms of punishment persist from age to age, ever new contents or 
meanings are successively interpreted into these forms.  
 
Now, we have come to the point of enormous importance where we can grasp 
Nietzsche's most original contribution to cultural history. For the sake of clarity, let 
me remind you of Nietzsche's two premises: 
 
1) There is a world of differences between the cause of emergence of a thing and the 
eventual purpose to which it serves.  
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2) While the ritualistic forms of a procedure remains constant, it is given diverse 
meanings and subjected to diverse purposes throughout history.    
 
Now, Nietzsche makes a syllogism from these two premises. He asserts that if these 
two propositions are true, then we can deduce that even the original purpose of a 
thing must have been interpreted into it. In other words, the procedure itself must 
have existed even before the recognizable origin in which it was first put into 
whatever use. In this respect, it is worth quoting Nietzsche at some length. He 
deduces that, 
 
the procedure itself will be something older, earlier than its 
employment in punishment, that the latter is projected and 
interpreted into the procedure (which has long existed but been 
employed in another sense), in short, that the case is not as has 
hitherto been assumed by our naïve genealogists of law and 
morals, who have one and all thought of the procedure as 
invented for the purpose of punishing, just as one formerly 
thought of the hand as invented for the purpose of grasping 
(Genealogy 79). 
 
With this deduction, Nietzsche inverts the prevalent relation between purposes and 
procedures. Man does not first have a definite purpose in his mind so that all he 
needs to do is to contrive the appropriate procedure that serves this purpose. Rather, 
the reverse is the case. That is, man continually invents procedures and techniques of 
which he knows nothing or very little, and puts these into different uses thereafter. 
This post factum pragmatism of man is precisely that which trivializes the pursuit of 
origins, since the origin has turned out to be already an interpretation.   
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The final point Nietzsche makes is concerned with the fluid element, that is, the 
meaning, of a thing. He describes how the variety of meanings given to a thing at 
different times accumulates and achieves a synthesis that gives the visage of its 
identity. In other words, he puts forward the genealogical argument that posits 
difference in apparent identity. Behind the apparent unity of a thing resides a fragile 
synthesis of different meanings. Accordingly, the task of genealogy is not to define 
the meaning of a thing, but to trace its different moments where it has engaged in 
different roles in accordance with its different meanings. Below Nietzsche explains 
this methodological point in relation to the example of punishment: 
 
. . . the previous history of punishment in general, the history of 
its employment for the most various purposes, finally 
crystallizes into a kind of unity that is hard to disentangle, hard 
to analyze and, as must be emphasized especially, totally 
indefinable. (Today it is impossible to say for certain why people 
are really punished: all concepts in which an entire process is 
semotically concentrated elude definition; only that which has 
no history is definable.) At an earlier stage, on the contrary, this 
synthesis of "meanings" can still be disentangled, as well as 
changed; one can still perceive how in each individual case the 
elements of the synthesis undergo a shift in value and rearrange 
themselves accordingly, so that now this, now that element 
comes to the fore and dominates at the expense of the others; 
and under certain circumstances one element (the purpose of 
deterrence perhaps) appears to overcome all the remaining 
elements (Genealogy 80).  
 
To sum, Nietzsche asserts that while the ritualistic aspects of things remain relatively 
untouched, the meanings they stand for and the purposes they are expected to serve 
continually undergo alterations, mutations, substitutions, displacements, etc. In other 
words, "the one and the same procedure," whose original purpose is beyond the grasp 
even of our imagination, has been continually "employed, interpreted, adapted to 
ends that differ fundamentally" (Genealogy 80). Finally, we must add that precisely 
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at this point Foucault's genealogies differ from that of Nietzsche. As opposed to 
Nietzsche, who based his genealogies upon the transformations of the 'meaning' and 
'purpose' of punishment, Foucault detects discontinuities among the 'practices' and 
'procedures' of punishment and focuses his genealogies upon these elements. 
According to Foucault, only when the transformations in these practices are charted 
can they be interpreted as to their meanings and purposes. Foucault's emphasis on the 
practices and procedures themselves is quite congruent with his analyses of power 
from the viewpoint of its exercise. In this respect, Mahon remarks that this focus on 
the "concrete, practical and historical conditions" for the existence of a form like 
punishment enabled Foucault "to avoid taking recourse to quasi-transcendentals, 
such as human nature, our instincts, intentions", to which even Nietzsche at times 
succumbed (133). We can conclude by stating that although for both Nietzsche and 
Foucault 'power' is responsible for the emergence of new interpretations, each 
analyzes the history of these interpretations from different viewpoints. Whereas 
Nietzsche's analysis of interpretations was informed by semiotic considerations, 
Foucault's orientation is more towards practices themselves. Nietzsche thought that 
the practices of power remain relatively constant while their interpretations change 
from age to age. Foucault, on the other hand, claimed that the practices too undergo 
changes because they are already interpretations.  
 
This discussion of the role of the notions of emergence and interpretation in 
genealogy has brought us to the study of documents. Genealogy, as has been known, 
is a documentary study of history. How, then, are we to handle these documents 
when we undertake a genealogical study? How are we to interpret these documents? 
Let us now examine 'documents' as understood by genealogy.  
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5.12 Genealogy and the Study of Documents 
 
Genealogy is a documentary study of history. How, then, does it differ from 
conventional history which also studies, as objects of analysis, documents? The 
difference lies in the way in which each questions the document. The historian 
interprets documents so as to reconstitute what took place, what people said or did in 
the past. In this sense, the task of the historian vis-à-vis documents is one of 
hermeneutics and semiology. In other words, for the historian documents function 
exactly as 'signs' or tokens for a certain historical content which should be correctly 
deciphered. The interpretative task of the historian consists in analyzing a document 
"into its unsaid" and, thereby, slowly uncovering the true meaning hidden in it 
(Foucault, Truth 115). The historian, therefore, questions the documents about their 
meaning, their veracity (i.e., "whether they were telling the truth"), their reliability, 
their authenticity, their fidelity to the events, and about whether they are "tampered 
with" (Foucault, Archaeology 6). In deciphering documents on the basis of these 
questions, the historian attempts either to unearth the thoughts, intentions and 
preoccupations of the actors at the time or relate the contents of the document to a 
wider whole that gives it meaning. In either case, however, the historian treats the 
document "as the language of a voice since reduced to silence, its fragile but possibly 
decipherable trace" (Foucault, Archaeology 6). As a result, the historian conceives 
the document as an opaque screen through which he is destined to look into the 
events of history, and which it is his task to make transparent.       
 
 93 
Genealogy studies not the hidden meanings buried in the deep layers of documents, 
but the documents themselves. For genealogy, documents are not in a secondary or 
derivative position in relation to that which takes place in the past, that is, their 
referent. Documents are not allegorical; they are not bearers of meaning through 
which the past communicates itself to our present generation. In other words, 
genealogy does not regard the document as "the fortunate tool of a history that is 
primarily and fundamentally memory" (Foucault, Archaeology 7). Documents are not 
composed of traces that more or less faithfully reproduce, in a condensed form, the 
events of the past. The status genealogy confers upon the document is altogether 
different from that of history. For genealogy, documents do not require any further 
effort of interpretation, because they are already transparent. Genealogy regards 
documents as 'surfaces' that do not stand for anything else. For genealogy, documents 
are more like 'events' than inert and second-hand records. Therefore, genealogy 
studies the document in a similar way it studies the 'emergence'. Remember that 
genealogy conceived emergence as the moment when the interplay of forces gives 
rise to a new interpretation and imposes it to the system of rules and purposes. In 
what way do the forces impose their interpretation to the system of rules and 
purposes? Of course, they do so by producing "books, texts, accounts, registers, acts, 
buildings, institutions, laws, techniques, objects, customs" and so on (Foucault, 
Archaeology 7). What, then, do we presently call these diverse elements that survive 
today from the past? Documents? Surely they are.  
 
Therefore, documents are not to be interpreted; they are themselves 'interpretations' 
in the way genealogy understands them. That is why genealogy prefers to operate 
"on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been 
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scratched over and recopied many times," since this kind of documents more readily 
yields the demonstration of multiple and disparate forces and successive 
interpretations at work (NGH 139). How, then, genealogy should study documents? 
Genealogy should attend to an "intrinsic description" of the document (Foucault, 
Archaeology 7). In other words, the primary task of genealogy is "to work on" the 
document "from within and to develop it" (Archaeology 6). As Foucault introduces 
and describes the method of 'archaeology', whose congruity with his ongoing 
genealogical problematic has been generally acknowledged, he defines the task of 
this newly mutated history. According to Foucault, 
 
history now organizes the document, divides it up, distributes it, 
orders it, arranges it in levels, establishes series, distinguishes 
between what is relevant and what is not, discovers elements, 
defines unities, describes relations (Archaeology 6-7).     
 
This examination of documents has clearly demonstrated that, broadly speaking, for 
the traditional historian "the object of knowledge preexists knowledge" (Mahon 113). 
He studies documents in this way. That is, by interpreting documents, he tries to 
reconstruct the historical facts, which were always there, waiting for the historian to 
cast light on them. For such a historian, documents are merely means to an end. For 
genealogy, on the other hand, objects are only given to knowledge through 
problematizations. Therefore, genealogy opts to undertake an intrinsic 
problematization of documents rather than impose interpretative frameworks upon 
them.    
 
This has brought us to the point where we can more confidently state the 
irreconcilable differences of conventional history and genealogy. Note that when I 
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employ the term 'conventional history', it is in order to denote all possible senses of a 
conception of history that is informed inclusively or exclusively, implicitly or 
explicitly by various metaphysical postulates, Hegelianism and dialectics, the theory 
of evolution, anthropologism, etc.   
 
1) In our examination of the genealogical conception of emergence, we have seen 
that the metaphysician is in the habit of imposing present needs and assumptions at 
the moment of arising. This enabled the metaphysician to claim that the ultimate 
purpose and meaning of an entity has already been included in the notion of that 
entity since it emerged. By virtue of this metaphysical manoeuvre, it has become 
possible to posit a continuous, teleological progress culminating in the present. This 
is how the metaphysician reads meaning, purpose and direction into history. The 
genealogist, on the other hand, does not see the present as the natural and inevitable 
outcome of the past. He avoids thinking "the present state of affairs" as the result of a 
"meaningful development" (Mahon 112). Genealogist sees the present state of affairs 
as the current episode "in a series of subjugations" (NGH 148). The task of the 
genealogist, therefore, is to trace the descent of an entity from various networks of 
power. When the genealogist studies history, it is not in order to subscribe to "the 
anticipatory power of meaning", but to reestablish "the hazardous play of 
dominations" (NGH 148).   
 
2) Genealogy also rejects dialectic thought, which permits 'difference' to exist only as 
the negative of identity. For dialectics, identity and negativity denote the 
complementary aspects of one and the same given reality. Dialectic thought is based 
on the interplay and successive syntheses of being and non-being. For this reason, 
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difference can only be admitted into dialectics as that which negates the given in 
order ultimately to achieve a higher synthesis. Within the dialectical interplay of 
contradiction and totality, the positivity of difference is always transformed into 
negativity. That is to say, by purging difference of its positivity, dialectics turns 
difference into the negative, the non-being, which, by definition, is derivative of the 
identity of the given. Therefore, dialectics does not permit differences free reign; 
rather, it effaces them. As Foucault maintains, 
 
dialectics does not liberate differences; it guarantees, on the 
contrary, that they can always be recaptured. The dialectical 
sovereignty of similarity consists in permitting differences to 
exist, but always under the rule of the negative, as an instance of 
non-being. They may appear as the successful subversion of the 
Other, but contradiction secretly assists in the salvation of 
identities (Theatrum 184-185).  
 
Genealogy, on the other hand, attempts to free the difference from the totalizing and 
normalizing treatment of the Hegelian dialectic. Whereas dialectic seeks identity in 
difference and continuity in change, genealogy attempts to liberate the "difference in 
apparent identity" and to reveal the discontinuity in apparent continuity (Mahon 
126). This entails removing all the assumptive notions of dialectics – i.e., opposition, 
identity, negation, etc. – from the center of our thought and adopting an affirmative 
outlook whose instrument is "disjunction", that is, "thought of the multiple" 
(Foucault, Theatrum 185). Hence the importance of genealogy.  
 
3) According to the traditional historian, there are laws in history that can be 
objectively analyzed and described. If history is to be objective, then, its findings 
should be verifiable. This, however, can only be possible, if we take it at face value 
that the object of knowledge preexists knowledge. Yet, to accept such a position 
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would be to adopt a preeminently metaphysical attitude toward the theory of 
knowledge. In other words, this position presupposes a suprahistorical perspective, 
whose vantage point is situated outside of time. From a suprahistorical perspective, 
one sees the past and the present as essentially identical, and the events of history as 
instances of an eternal law or replicas of an ur-model. Such a perspective, according 
to Foucault, is only possible "because of its belief in eternal truth, the immortality of 
the soul, and the nature of consciousness as always identical to itself" (NGH 152). 
For example, Hegelian history as the self-realization of the spirit or reason (of 
humanity) is governed predominantly by a suprahistorical perspective. Genealogy, in 
contrast, places within a process of becoming everything that was formerly 
considered as eternal, immortal, immutable, constant, or stable by the traditional 
history. Genealogy, that is, refuses "the certainty of absolutes" (NGH 153). Its vision 
is so sharpened that it can even disintegrate the "dull constancy of instinctual life" 
and reveals its intermittent course through a series of elaborations in history (NGH 
153). Finally, the vision of genealogy, 
 
corresponds to the acuity of a glance that distinguishes, 
separates, and disperses, that is capable of liberating divergence 
and marginal elements – the kind of dissociating view that is 
capable of decomposing itself, capable of shattering the unity of 
man's being through which it was thought that he could extend 
his sovereignty to the events of his past (emphasis added) (NGH 
153). 
 
4) Its attempt to 'shatter the unity of man's being' brings genealogy in another conflict 
with conventional history. This is linked to the status of anthropological thought in 
historical inquiry. Genealogy objects to any fundamental assumptions about 'who is 
man' that inform thinking. Now, let me examine this 'deanthropological' stance of 
Foucauldian genealogy. 
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In an appendix to a lecture he delivered in 1938, Heidegger remarked that, 
 
Anthropology is that interpretation of man that already knows 
fundamentally what man is and hence can never ask who he may 
be. For with this question it would have to confess itself shaken 
and overcome (153). 
 
Foucault replies him thirty years later: 
 
As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an 
invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end (The 
Order of Things 387).       
 
And, he adds that if the fundamental arrangements of our knowledge "were to 
disappear as they appeared", then "one can certainly wager that man would be 
erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea" (The Order 387). By 
proclaiming the deletion of man, Foucault consummates the decentering of man that 
was initiated by Nietzsche. This is quite in agreement with his genealogical project 
that intends to question totalities and teleologies in conventional history. According 
to Foucault, those old themes of historical analysis such as continuity, identity, 
totality, and teleology find their support in the figures of anthropology and 
humanism. Maintenance of these themes is dependent upon the belief in the human 
consciousness as the sovereign actor of history (humanism) and in the human 
essence that secure the constancy and fundamental sameness of what has been 
underlying man's actions from time immemorial (humanism plus anthropologism). 
Hence, humanism and anthropology are jointly responsible for the gestalt of history. 
That is to say, thanks to this couple, the historian can picture the uninterrupted 
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contours of history that is not readily available to perception when he studies events 
in their singularity.  
 
Genealogy, in contrast, denies any fundamental assumptions about man's nature or 
human essence. For genealogy, neither man's instincts nor human values can provide 
the stable ground on which the historian bases his prejudices in favor of continuity, 
constancy, and uniformity. It is Kant, according to Foucault, who reduced all critique 
of reason to an anthropological question when he finally posed the question, "what is 
man?" (Mahon 75). In the hands of Kant, therefore, critique turned into a concern 
with 'what man essentially is' in order to determine the basis on which man should 
take his bearings. Conversely, genealogy denies any preconceived notion of human 
essence that would either bridge the gap between our past and present or ground our 
present activities in a prior knowledge of what we originally are. Genealogy attempts 
to disrupt our continuities, disturb our foundations; it breaks off the lines of 
inevitability that regularly connect the present to what precedes it. For genealogy, the 
past is divided by foreign times, swarming with foreign 'men'. By separating the 
present from the past, by tearing the monolith of history to pieces and releasing a 
multiplicity of pasts, genealogy undercuts the certainty of the present. Genealogy, 
therefore, does not seek to determine who we essentially are. It rather analyzes, 
 
who we have been constituted to be, to ask what we might 
become. It is the philosophy for a practice in which what one is 
capable of being is not rooted in a prior knowledge of who one 
is. Its principle is freedom, but a freedom which does not follow 
from any postulation of our nature or essence (Mahon 13).   
  
Genealogy, therefore, tries to cleanse historical analysis of its anthropological themes 
and assumptions by decentering 'man' and, thereby, opening a space for the critique 
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of the present. We have seen man or subject decentered in both Nietzsche's and 
Foucault's genealogies. Let me conclude this discussion with Foucault who asserts 
that genealogy disperses our subjectivity, dissipates our "temporal identity" by 
demonstrating that, 
 
we are difference, that our reason is the difference of discourses, 
our history is the difference of times, our selves the difference of 
masks. That difference, far from being the forgotten and 
recovered origin, is this dispersion that we are and make 
(Archaeology 131). 
 
5) Finally, genealogy challenges the evolutionist conclusions that the conventional 
history draws from its studies. The linear development from simple to complex or 
from lower to higher, the struggle for survival through adaptation, the decisive role 
played by the notion of utility, the theme of natural selection are the characteristics 
that define evolutionary theory. As will be seen, many forms of traditional history are 
under the governing influence of these themes. For instance, in many histories the 
idea of biological evolution and its related themes of 'utility' and adaptation are taken 
up, by analogy, as a framework for explaining the dynamics of social and historical 
change.  
 
From exactly this ground that Nietzsche denounced the practice of English 
genealogists, among whom Paul Ree was a prominent figure, as a perverse type of 
genealogical study. Since, for Nietzsche, the fallacy of the English tendency lied in 
their evolutionist and psychologist bent of mind and their dependence on the notion 
of 'utility' as an explanatory master-concept. For instance, they sought the original 
meaning of a moral value and its reason of present existence in its once-proved 
utility for the people benefited from it in history (Nietzsche, Genealogy 25). It is 
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obvious that this line of reasoning is very similar to the premises of evolutionary 
theory mentioned above. On this basis, Nietzsche thought – and Foucault affirms – 
that, 
 
Paul Ree was wrong to follow the English tendency in 
describing the history of morality in terms of a linear 
development –in reducing its entire history and genesis to an 
exclusive concern for utility. He assumed that words had kept 
their meaning, that desires still pointed in a single direction, and 
that ideas retained their logic; and he ignored the fact that the 
world of speech and desires has known invasions, struggles, 
plundering, disguises, ploys (NGH 361). 
 
From this strictures levelled against the assumptive notions involved in English 
genealogical tradition, however, we can deduce some of the guidelines that 
characterize the spirit of Nietzschean genealogy.  
 
While traditional history studies the events of history in order to restore an unbroken 
continuity or establish a coherent identity which is supposed to persist till the 
present, genealogy traces the descent of an entity in order to reveal its multiple points 
of emergence where it assumes different roles. Genealogy isolates these different 
moments, not in order to align them on a curve of evolution, but to keep them in their 
proper dispersion so that it can reveal the contingency of events and accidents "that 
gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us" (NGH 146). 
Where the traditional history seeks to establish the persistence of purposes from time 
immemorial, genealogy studies numberless moments of emergence where a new 
interpretation takes issue with the former one, supersedes it by bending it to a new 
purpose and, thereby, grant ever new functionalities to an entity. While conventional 
history attempts to "demonstrate that the past actively exists in the present, that it 
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continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a predetermined form to 
all its vicissitudes", genealogy reveals the radical heterogeneity of foreign times 
(NGH 146). 
 
Moreover, as our examination of Hegelian conception of history showed, 
conventional study of history aims for the 'resolution' of differences into great 
totalities. That is to say, conventional history treats diverse elements as varied 
expressions of a single essence. Genealogy, on the other hand, challenges this 
conception even at the level of microscopic totalities such as human essence, nature, 
etc. – namely it aims to realize the 'dissolution' of any stable identity into its different 
elements, together with the identity of the subject of knowledge.   
 
Its dependence on such grand explanatory systems also compels traditional history to 
work in the narrative mode. In other words, traditional history forces the elements of 
'difference' into the pattern of 'identity and opposition' in order to reconstruct the 
coherence of a narrative. Therefore, for such a history, even contradictory findings 
and documents are vital, since within the same totalizing mode they serve as 
elements of 'conflict' which are ultimately resolved by the unifying and teleological 
logic of narrative history. This is because 'conflict' is an indispensable element for 
the articulation and working of a truthful narrative in the realistic mode. For a 
historical study informed by genealogy, on the other hand, contradictory facts are not 
considered as 'conflicts' which are to be ultimately resolved; they are, rather, 
welcome in their dispersion so as to maintain their 'difference'.  
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5.13 Nietzschean Genealogy vs. Family Tree 
 
Nietzschean genealogy is also different from the established notion of genealogy as 
we know it: Genealogy, in its accustomed sense, has been the study of the history of 
families over generations with an aim to trace the proper identity of each person, to 
establish his relationship to particular people or families. It starts its procedure by 
taking a confused element in the present and continues its analyses by tracing the 
lineage of this element into past until an original identity is found or a proper 
relationship is established. To illustrate this procedure, imagine the parts of a tree 
from bottom to top: from the roots grows the trunk; the trunk divides itself into 
branches as it ascends; the branches further bifurcate themselves indefinitely. The 
genealogical procedure proceeds from top to bottom, starting from an element at the 
edge of an uppermost bifurcation, tracing it downwards until a satisfactory level of 
identity is reached. Theoretically, this analysis may follow this downward path as 
deep as the soil where the tree grows; yet, in practice, a substantial branch arrived at 
can readily yield the necessary lineage of identity.  
 
Since, it refuses to understand the pursuit of origins as the search for the original 
identity or the primordial truth of an entity, Nietzschean genealogy inverts the former 
procedure of genealogy as such. Imagine the same tree upside down: the singular and 
unified trunk is at the top, the divided branches and their diverse bifurcations extend 
indefinitely towards the ground. This image of an inverted tree serves us well in 
elucidating the procedure and true objective of Nietzschean genealogy. The trunk, 
then, becomes the starting point of the genealogical analysis as conceived by 
Nietzsche, since this singular and unified trunk represents for genealogy the locus 
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"where the soul pretends unification or the self fabricates a coherent identity" (NGH 
145). From this point downwards, the Nietzschean genealogist proceeds in order to 
allow the multiplicity of alien forms, as the elements of exteriority, to appear and 
disperse this taken-for-granted identity. Genealogy, then, traces these indefinite 
bifurcations not to arrive at a stable beginning which provides reassurance or 
foundation for the coherence of an identity, a subject, an entity, or an idea, but to free 
the "numberless beginnings" so as to effect a dissociation of that identity, to disturb it 
from within (NGH 145). Far from serving as a ground for the play of recognitions, 
this type of genealogy, as the analysis of descent, "permits the dissociation of the 
self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion 
of lost events" (NGH 145-146).      
 
Traditional history undertakes the genealogical analysis of an entity in order to 
identify a set of properties that would help one establish and demonstrate the 
belonging of that entity to a certain class, family, or a type in history. Such lineage 
studies dig out the past in an attempt to authenticate the true origin of a present 
entity, to enact its proper belonging in history so that it can be qualified as having 
this or that identity. The origin is sought in the name of an ideal recognition, in the 
face of which one can recognize oneself in the past, to the extent that the origin 
discloses the essential 'truth' about oneself. Finally, traditional history subscribes to 
the search for the truths of essence, which is governed by the principle of identity – 
that is, the subject is the same as the attribute or the predicate in a proposition like 'A 
is A'. In such a pursuit of origins, then, history becomes nothing but a repository of 
identities, a repertoire of ideal roles to be assumed, the locus where foundations are 
sought to be erected. The epistemological premises of genealogy in the hands of 
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conventional history are predicated upon the categories of resemblance, recognition 
and the gradual unfolding of a clearer and unified identity through the analysis of 
descent. In this context, Nietzsche, quite correctly, located the emergence of the need 
and enterprise of history in nineteenth-century Europe as "the land of interminglings 
and bastardry, the period of the "man of mixture"" (NGH 159).  
 
In Nietzschean genealogy, previously illustrated as an inverted tree, things are 
altogether different. Far from devoting itself to the restoration and maintenance of 
the unity of an idea, thing, or one's subjecthood throughout history, Nietzschean 
genealogy traces origins in order to sort out differences, to allow the multiplicities to 
appear. This is because for Nietzschean genealogy the origin is a nexus of the entry 
of forces, the emergence of a new interpretation, the co-presence of different events. 
Therefore, in the analysis of descent, the traits genealogy tries to identify "are not 
exclusive generic characteristics of an individual, a sentiment, or an idea, which 
permit us to qualify them as "Greek" or "English"; rather, it seeks the subtle, 
singular, and subindividual marks that might possibly intersect in them to form a 
network that is difficult to unravel" (NGH 145). Genealogy, in this respect, is a 
critique of identity.  
 
 
5.14 Summary 
 
Nietzschean genealogy problematizes the notion of 'truth' as woven from the tangled 
threads of power. And, with its patiently documentary disclosure of the 'multiplicity 
at the origin', genealogy makes us disgruntled in our metaphysical search for 
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essences or primordial truths at the origin of entities. However deep one digs the 
ground, his spade would not come across an ultimate substance or a substantial 
nucleus beneath the earth. And if in an adventurous moment he believes that he has 
captured the essential truth at the origin, it will only be to see this truth dissipate and 
quickly give way to the prospect of a multiplicity of relations of forces at the origin 
of our self-evident ideas, values and the things we experience. Yet, let alone 
disapproving it, genealogy encourages spadework because it is the only way of 
tracing the descent of an idea whose essence was fabricated from extraneous 
elements at irregular intervals. Thus, any truth is the result of a particular but 
precarious disposition of the relations of forces. The virtue of genealogy is that it 
undercuts the legitimacy and rationality of our present by simply introducing us with 
an altogether different past. Genealogy, therefore, does not seek continuities and 
coherences, or in a sense a gestalt, in history, rather its perspective is adapted to 
detect ruptures, discontinuities, reversals in history: the points of emergence when a 
new interpretation takes issue with the former one, replaces it discursively and 
establishes itself practically by having its procedures installed in institutions. In other 
words, in Nietzschean genealogy, multiple events and diverse interpretations that 
supersede one another throughout the course of history are reclaimed and liberated 
from the operations of conventional historical study which transforms these different 
and irreducible elements into various 'appearances' of a universal mind or the 
predetermined forms of an original intention.  
 
We have come to the point where most of the spadework has already been done, so 
now we should proceed quite well with our task of working out a genealogical 
problematization of design. Let me, however, conclude this chapter with a quotation 
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from Foucault about the task of genealogical thought, which, I think, will excellently 
illustrate the underlying motive of my study: 
 
After all, what would be the value of the passion for knowledge 
if it resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and 
not, in one way or another and to the extent possible, in the 
knower's straying afield of himself? There are times in life when 
the question of knowing if one can think differently than one 
thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely 
necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all… But, 
then, what is philosophy today – philosophical activity, I mean – 
if it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? 
In what does it consist, if not in the endeavor to know how and 
to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead 
of legitimating what is already known (The History of Sexuality 
2 8-9). 
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6 INTRODUCTION TO  
THE GENEALOGICAL PROBLEMATIZATION OF DESIGN 
 
 
 
 
6.1 On the Mode of Writing 
 
Before venturing into our genealogical problematization of design, for which our 
previous efforts have equipped us, I need to put forward some remarks that will, 
hopefully, facilitate a smoother passage from the rather large body of the text 
formerly presented to the second half of the study that will follow. These remarks are 
intended to assist the reader as well as me in the passage from general to specific, 
from what precedes to what follows, from potential to actual (i.e., from what can 
potentially be questioned to what I shall exactly, justifiably and actually question 
concerning design), from a mode of analysis and critique generally accepted as suited 
to such fields as critical theory, cultural theory, history, philosophy, ethics, history of 
ideas, etc. to its formulation in a different field that has not been accorded a similar 
status. Let me start, therefore, with these observations and remarks. 
 
1) In the sense it is understood by designers, any text whatsoever can be regarded as 
an 'interface' between a writer, author, or an 'originating consciousness', and the 
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reader. That is to say, any text should be designed to be understood well, to elicit 
certain responses from the reader or to induce certain feelings in the reader, to 
present the contents in an order that is meaningful and most relevant to the reader's 
needs or expectations, to prevent possible misunderstandings, to communicate its 
contents in the most unequivocal way. Note that with small changes in its wording 
(e.g. 'misuse' for misunderstanding), this definition can turn out to be a standard brief 
for a design project. However, if we set aside, for a moment, the notion of authorship 
and accept that a text is, rather, an interface between its 'contents' and the reader, we, 
nevertheless, can not dispense with the involvement of a subject beneath or behind 
the surface of the text. This is because to talk of a content and a form presupposes (1) 
that a certain content might assume different forms and (2) that the principle of this 
differentiation – and, for the same reason, the principle of their coincidence too (i.e., 
'form follows function') – has to be the agency of a real or an ideal 'subject'. This 
point I will further elaborate in my critiques. For now, suffice it to say that, in design 
terms, a text is a 'product', which has an interface that is also designed.  
 
2) This conception of writing is exactly what post-structuralist critique attempted to 
remove. The author was declared dead and came to be regarded as a function of the 
text. Writing ceased to be understood as a transcription of the original thoughts of its 
author; it no longer implies a more or less faithful, more or less immediate, more or 
less controlled recording or representation of a prior thought. The author, that is, 
does not precede his work; neither is he coextensive with his work. The condition of 
writing is the removal of the author. This is because, states Barthes, "writing is the 
destruction of every voice, of every point of origin" (Death 142). Writing is a space 
where the search for origins is continually undermined, where all identity is lost, 
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where the subjectivity of the author is regularly divided and dispersed. Text, 
therefore, is a plane of dispersal, a surface composed of multiple writings, a "field 
without origin" other than "language itself" (Barthes, Death 146). Beneath this 
surface, there is neither the original intention of its author nor an ideal meaning. This 
surface is like a "tissue" without a definite "center" (Death 146). This tissue is 
composed of "variety of writings, none of them original," that "blend and clash" 
(Death 146). That which confers unity upon the text is neither its author as its origin 
nor its ideal meaning towards which all the dispersed signifiers at its surface 
converge. The reader, pure and simple, is the one who holds together this dispersion 
that we call text.      
 
3) Now, we have two rival conceptions of text in our hands: the text as an interface 
and the text as a surface. The latter is born of a criticism of the former. Whereas text 
as an interface reinforces our dependence on such notions as the subject and the 
author and endorses the search for its origin, text as a surface decenters the subject 
and the author and makes the pursuit of origins pointless. At this point, let me state at 
once that I am much more inclined to practice writing as an interface, which I can 
design of my own accord, than to accept that I am not in control of my text and my 
reader's responses. No doubt, to couch a preference in these terms is a rather naïve 
attitude since, 
 
 a) These conceptions are not presented as equally valid alternatives that one 
can freely select in respect of one's needs. Their mutual status is not one of 
equivalence. They have a temporal and theoretical relationship. One precedes the 
other; and, one negates, refuses, or criticizes the premises and epistemological 
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structure of the other. Especially, for the post-structuralist conception of writing, 
assuming the position of the author is not a matter of choice. The position of the 
conventional writer in command of his text is not a vacant place that can be occupied 
at will, but an illusion, an effect to which the capitalist ideology of individualism has 
historically given rise.  
 
 b) These are theoretical positions whose objects are theoretical too. That is, in 
both of these conceptions the 'text' is not an empirically given object, but a 
theoretical object. Therefore, the formation of the 'text' as an object is dependent 
upon theoretical delimitations, not empirical observations. As a result, the translation 
of a theoretical object into an empirical object that is to be dealt with can not be done 
in a straightforward manner. In this regard, my avoidance of writing in a post-
structuralist way and my conscious intention to adopt the position of an omnipotent 
author is a simple-minded attempt. Yet, this way of reasoning, that is, the 
argumentation based upon a confusion and conflation of theoretical objects with 
empirical objects, is one of the characteristics of design discourse, which I will try to 
lay bare and criticize in a subsequent section.       
 
4- I should add that the post-structuralist conception of textuality has wide currency 
in the departments of arts and humanities as well as our current intellectual milieu. 
Yet, a PhD dissertation is still expected to be written in accordance with the author-
text-reader model, which is, in a sense, governed by the episteme of representation 
(Foucault, The Order of Things). As an author, I should precede my text in order to 
represent my thoughts in a comprehensible form. According to this model, the 
finished text is only the tip of an iceberg. In other words, this model presupposes the 
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existence of a larger body of material that is composed of findings, notes, documents, 
drafts, etc., which are more spontaneous and personal, more numerous, and less 
organized than that which is presented to the reader as the finished text. The writer of 
a PhD dissertation, then, is supposed to convert this amorphous body into a readable 
form by organizing it, omitting its irrelevant parts, abridging it where necessary, 
eliminating the redundancy of its contents, dividing it into manageable portions, 
hierarchizing it, adjusting some of its parts, establishing relationships between its 
different parts, ordering and aligning these parts on a linear schema of succession, 
and arranging this totality according to the current conventions of academic writing. 
In brief, one is to 'design' his text in accordance with more or less established criteria. 
Now, in view of the objectives of academic study, we can not find fault with this 
conception of writing as an interface. After all, theses are written in educational 
contexts where the primary objective is not so much to enjoy texts as to evaluate the 
efforts of the researcher himself. That is, the research text is read primarily with an 
eye on the strength of the arguments, coherence of the reasonings and novelty of the 
findings that the researcher achieves in his studies. Therefore, it will be quite natural 
to expect the author of a PhD dissertation to eschew 'writerly' attitudes and to aim for 
the condition of transparency in his text. However, at times this approach to texts 
may prove detrimental to the inner consistency of some research undertakings. For 
example, how can a study informed explicitly by a post-structuralist problematic be 
handled without recourse to the surface of the text, which allows the dispersal of the 
identity of the subject of knowledge?  
 
5) However, when we consider our prior experiences of writing we can see that this 
problem of authorship is not confined to so-called post-structuralist texts. This, I 
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believe, is a problem that confronts virtually any writer in any kind of text. In other 
words, in every text there is a point where one can not be quite sure of whether he or 
the text itself controls the pace of writing.  
 
6) These problems have concerned me since the beginning of this study. Without 
pretensions either to scientificity or to textuality, I have adopted an approach to 
writing that consciously tries to preserve the ethos of sketching. Let me explain my 
point. Remember that I have previously designated the academic text as a product. 
Now, a product is, by definition, an entity which does not readily yield information 
about the process of its production. In other words, what lends an object the character 
of a product is the success of industrial manufacturing methods in either erasing or 
concealing the traces of its technical as well as social production. For this reason, the 
end products of design present themselves to perception as impenetrable, opaque, 
and therefore, indisputable items that magically came into existence. In a similar 
vein, David Fleming states that,  
 
'[T]he process of construction involves the use of certain devices 
whereby all traces of production are made extremely difficult to 
detect.' If we want to examine the 'coming-into-being' of an 
object which could have been other than it is, we will need some 
way to 'break open' the object and view the history of its 
construction (42). 
 
A sketch, on the other hand, lends itself to such an opening that Fleming remarks, 
because it does not conceal the traces of its production. This trait of sketches enables 
one not only to perceive the "coming-into-being" of the object but also to trace the 
multiplicity of paths that were opened but not followed, the multiplicity of 
alternatives that were alluded to but not solidified by the designer. My point might 
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have already been understood. Sketching has a twofold significance for a 
genealogical study: 
 
a) The idea of sketching has served as a model for the writing of this text. By 
this, I do not mean a sketchy attitude that pervades the text. My text is not sketchy in 
the sense of being incomplete, inadequate, or imprecise. Rather, I have tried to keep 
to the ethos of 'openness' that only a sketching hand can adequately confer upon the 
text. Sketches allow the entry of the observer into the shop floor of design whereas 
the illustrated, final drawings can only represent the shop front of design. That is to 
say, while sketches present the design idea in a sufficient level, they also, and more 
importantly, demonstrate the 'descent' of this final design decision. Accordingly, the 
text I have written is not so much a product as the production process itself. I have 
deliberately tried not to present the text as an end product of a long and laborious 
production process. Rather, I have openly tried to fabricate the text, its arguments, 
and even its scope while I have been writing it. For example, I have learnt and 
written about genealogy at the same time. Therefore, I will unlearn and write about 
design at the same time in the following pages.   
 
b) I also insist upon the methodological value of the notion of sketching for a 
genealogical analysis that is to be performed in the field of design. When considered 
at the level of individual products, sketches, in a sense, perform their own 
genealogies since they are the genealogical records of products, demonstrating the 
'descent' of final design decisions (Figure 1). The reader may object to this 
proposition by pointing to the near impossibility of finding relevant sketches of a 
product. Indeed, apart from the published sketches of a number of historically 
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famous artists and designers, the field of design is notoriously lacking in this kind of 
documentation for the contemporary, everyday products. The rapid growth in the use 
of 3-D modeling softwares such as '3-D Studio' or 'Rhinoceros' only exacerbates the 
problem of obtaining sketches. Yet, the significance of sketching for the model I will 
propose is not dependent upon the availability of sketches.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The pencil and watercolor concept sketches of toothbrushes. 
 
 
6.2 Re-Sketching as a Method for a Genealogical Critique of the Formal Unity 
and the Functional Identity of Designed Products 
 
A genealogical mode of analysis particularly suited to the logic of designed products 
might be derived from the notion of sketching. This may allow us to break open the 
object and trace its descent from diverse sources. Note, however, that by this sources 
I do not mean, in any sense, the influences – stylistic, cultural, etc. – under which the 
product in question were designed. Neither do I mean the sources of inspiration that 
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activate the designer's imagination and find implicit or explicit expression in the 
finished product. For example, Philippe Starck, the eccentric designer of the 80s who 
designed ultra chic and dysfunctional objects, had a collection of imagery hung on 
the walls of his studio that 'inspires' him to design his masterpieces. Let's leave the 
task of disclosing such secrets behind designed products to the glossy magazines 
(Starck's sources of inspiration were indeed published by Elle Decoration in 1988 
and, then, by Arredamento Dekorasyon in 1989).  
 
What, then, do I mean by the sources from which the product was descended? By the 
sources, I mean an intergenetic field properly belonging to the domain of design 
thinking. This may be difficult to grasp, so let me explain it. To make references to 
an intergenetic field is an existential function of design thinking. If a designer draws 
a particular shape, he does it by reference to a repertoire that is more or less shared 
by the practitioners at a certain time in history. Note, however, that this repertoire is 
not composed of stylistic devices. It is rather composed of tools of design thinking 
that are at the disposal of every designer regardless of his stylistic preferences. 
When, for example, a designer sets out to design a remote control device for a 
television set, he refers to an unlimited repertoire of forms, details, mechanisms, 
functions, functionalities that is available at the time. These may belong to the family 
of remote controls as well as to the most unexpected product types such as toys. The 
intergenetic field, therefore, is this unlimited repertoire. A designed product, 
therefore, is not a nucleus. According to this conception, each designed product has, 
by definition, a mixed lineage. The unity of form is not a 'given', not an a priori 
category of designing (Figure 2). Rather, the unity of form is fabricated from 
extraneous elements in a piecemeal fashion.   
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Figure 2. "The unity of form is not a given…" Braun record player, designed by 
Dieter Rams. 
 
 
The aim is, therefore, to shatter the apparent unity of the designed product together 
with the identity of the designer. The idea of 'unity' has always been central to design 
thinking and practice in the modern period. Though critical of it, postmodern design 
has not been able to succeed in displacing the notion of unity so much as transposing 
it into the notion of 'identity'. While in modernist aesthetics the unity of form was 
elevated to the rank of a basic principle of design, in postmodern design atmosphere 
the idea of unity has nevertheless enjoyed a second life thanks to the proliferation of 
different styles. At first sight, this claim may sound paradoxical since everybody 
knows that the idea of unity is one of the central tenets of modernist design, which 
the postmodernists have attacked and attempted to displace. However, the 
postmodern recognition of different subjectivities and the related proliferation of 
different styles have only transposed the 'unity of form' into the 'identity of style'. 
Product differentiation policies in the postmodern era have given rise to ever-new 
styles that correspond to an ever-increasing number of cultural niches. Consequently, 
products of this era have still enjoyed their recognizable identities, which can be 
easily recognized by reference to the market segment to which they were intended.     
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A genealogy of designed products themselves could only be done by tracing their 
descent at the level of this intergenetic field. This could be achieved by reconstituting 
the sketches of the products. Note that the criterion of success of this method is not 
dependent upon producing sketches as faithful as possible to its original sketches. 
Rather, designs should be re-sketched at the level of this intergenetic field. This I call 
the method of 'Re-Sketching'. Only a re-sketch allows us to establish the disparity at 
the very origin of a designed product.   
 
To dissociate the unity of form and to dissolve the functional identity of products, I 
propose a number of procedures that may, in the future, be the basis of this method 
of Re-Sketching. Therefore, at present we should employ the term 'tool kit' rather 
than the pretentious term 'method' in order to characterize Re-Sketching.  
 
1) At the level of 'form', Re-Sketching should aim to deform the object by employing 
the procedures below. 
 
1) Decompose the gestalt (the unity of form). This should be done not according to 
the given articulations of the object but by creating new articulations.  
2) Change the scale by enlarging or shrinking the object. Since designers make 
sketches without any definite scale, any design element, irrespective of its former 
scale, can be the source of the sketch.  
3) Deform the proportions. The notion of proportion is not a given of design 
thinking. Only at the latter stages does a concern with proportioning appear. 
4) Work the lines to achieve a parody of the object (Figure 3). 
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5) Disrupt the continuities and constitute new ones. 
6) Disperse the groups and compose alternative groups. 
7) Change the orientations of lines and shapes.  
8) Undo the symmetries and hierarchies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The parody of the object. 
 
 
2) At the level of 'function', Re-Sketching should aim to dissociate the functional 
identity of the product by applying the procedures below. 
 
1) Decontextualize the object functionally and recontextualize it. 
2) Constitute new functional groups. 
3) Undo the multifunctionality. 
4) Multiply the unifunctionality.  
5) Detach functions from functionalities.  
6) Constitute new series from these functionalities. 
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Note that functions and functionalities are different. While the function of a radio is 
to receive signals and convert them into audible form, a radio set might be compact, 
portable, fool-proof, digital, adjustable, etc. These latter are called as functionalities. 
The same function, therefore, can be delivered by means of different functionalities.  
 
Yet, although Re-Sketching might be a promising method, we should leave it aside 
and engage in a genealogical critique of design and designers, which we have 
originally set out to undertake.  
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7 FOR A GENEALOGICAL CRITIQUE OF DESIGN AND DESIGNERS 
 
 
 
 
On the Genealogy of Morals starts with Nietzsche's assertion that, 
 
We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge – and with 
good reason. We have never sought ourselves – how could it 
happen that we should ever find ourselves? (15). 
 
This is perhaps because any creative activity that man engages in demands an 
attentive involvement in the present. The doors of perception need to be closed to 
that which takes place outside the immediate concerns; the doors of consciousness 
should also be closed to the passage of time as well as that which took place in the 
past. The man of creative deeds, in other words, needs a degree of amnesia and a 
"tabula rasa of the consciousness" in order to "make room for new things" and, 
thereby, attend more seriously and closely to his preoccupations (Nietzsche, 
Genealogy 57-58). Hence, there is every likelihood that the man engaged in creative, 
forward-looking pursuits is a stranger to himself, who is oblivious to his descent. 
According to Nietzsche, this is necessarily so, since an active life entails an 
atmosphere, or horizon, that is not polluted by the heavy air of historical reflection 
upon one's past and critical reflection upon one's present. This rule of absent-
mindedness with respect to one's being pertains to the 'men of knowledge' as well. 
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Nietzsche regards this as an unavoidable condition that awaits man of knowledge. As 
he observes, 
 
So we are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not 
comprehend ourselves, we have to misunderstand ourselves, for 
us the law "Each is furthest from himself" applies to all eternity 
–we are not "men of knowledge" with respect to ourselves 
(Genealogy 15).     
 
How, then could we, designers, become critical of ourselves in the sense of revealing 
the unquestioned assumptions on which our work depends, if even the men of 
knowledge are destined to be strangers to themselves? Is it a fate that one should 
choose either to be a practicing designer and remain ignorant of his genealogy or to 
give up designing in order to question his profession from an external position? If 
one is to engage in critical reflection upon design, which paths of critique will be 
opened before him? Is one to follow the path of criticism opened for him by the 
professional ideologies that hold sway in the field of design? (e.g. Critical problem: 
why do people discard products while they are still functioning? Proposed solution of 
design: how should we design products so that they would be more pleasurable to 
use and, therefore, unlikely to be discarded prematurely?) Or, alternatively, is one 
impelled by the theoretical poverty of his discipline to have recourse to more 
established paths once opened and consolidated by scientific disciplines armed with 
critical, analytical tools that are more reliable and trustworthy than the ones available 
in the repertory of design studies? In other words, should one engage in a 
transcendental critique of one's own profession or discipline and, thereby, reduce it to 
the status of an object among other objects of a foreign discipline? (e.g. a quasi-
phenomenological conception of designed products as things with particular 
technological intentionalities in phenomenal experience) 
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7.1 Genealogy as Self-Critique 
 
There must certainly be a way out of this impasse. That is, as a designer by training, 
one should justifiably, if not understandably – since it may lead one to stray afield of 
himself – bring critical reflection upon his very foundations, upon the soil from 
which he has sprung. And, indeed such a prospect for a critique of one's own 
foundations exists. A road map of such a critical path was drawn by Antonio 
Gramsci; and we are indebted to Edward Said for unearthing this half-lost map for 
us. Therefore, let me consult Said for this remark of Gramsci. In the Prison 
Notebooks Gramsci states that, 
 
The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of 
what one really is, and is 'knowing thyself' as a product of the 
historical process to date, which has deposited in you an infinity 
of traces, without leaving an inventory (emphasis added) (Said 
25). 
 
However, Said reveals that the English translation drops the final sentence of 
Gramsci's comment, which, in fact, exists in his original, Italian text and gives the 
comment its full meaning. In Italian text, Gramsci concludes the above statement by 
adding, "therefore it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory" (Said 
25). This, I think, is a clear-cut and perfect description of the initial task of a 
genealogical inquiry, since this is what Nietzsche has already done – albeit tacitly – 
in Beyond Good and Evil when he compiled the traces on him of the metaphysical 
tradition under the heading "On the Prejudices of Philosophers" as a starting point of 
the genealogy of his sub-soil.  
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Therefore, as a designer one needs first of all to compile such an inventory of the 
traces that have accumulated over time to constitute one's identity as a designer. 
Having composed this inventory, one can proceed to study it in order to sort out 
multiple points of emergence of design where it assumed different roles, where it 
was engaged in different games. That is to say, this inventory of traces enables one 
to trace the descent of design, to dissolve the taken-for-granted identity of the 
designer, and to reveal its connections to power.    
 
 
7.2 A Designer's Inventory of Traces 
 
How, then, should we compile such an inventory pertaining to the field of design? 
Even if we limit the scope of our inventory to the traces left on designers since the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution around 1770, we are, nevertheless, confronted 
with an almost infinite task. That is, how could we cope with the immensity of traces 
accumulated over a period of more than two centuries within the limited scope of a 
PhD dissertation? One can wager that a comprehensive inventory of the traces that a 
present day designer carries on his personality may take up as much space as a tome 
like Said's Orientalism. Then, it becomes necessary to reduce the scope of this 
inventory to a manageable level without losing sight of the genealogical significance 
of the concepts, statements, and objects we are dealing with. We should, therefore, 
ask: What kind of limitations should we impose upon the subject matter? What 
criteria of relevance should we adopt when we approach the vast body of material 
that confronts us?  
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When we talk about the inventory of traces that the historical process has deposited 
in the personality of a designer, we refer to the totality of diverse statements that 
belong to the discursive field of design. Therefore, let me break this totality of 
statements into its various units so that we could determine the most suitable objects 
of our genealogical analysis. This field comprises, 
 
a) Statements of methodology: systems of methods and principles for designing, 
quasi-scientific formulas and procedures based on a particular model of design, etc. 
These statements are usually formal, rational, explicit, generalized (not context 
specific), and publicized in written form (in treatises, articles and books). Examples 
include John Christopher Jones' epoch making work Design Methods, Christopher 
Alexander's curious book Notes on the Synthesis of Form, and Eskild Tjalve's more 
practicable study A Short Course in Industrial Design. 
 
b) Normative guidelines: statements that prescribe particular norms and rules of 
designing. These include well-established design statements and themes in the form 
of precepts, maxims, credos, mottoes, or dicta that permeate design practice and 
implicitly or explicitly define what makes up good design, what designers should and 
should not seek to achieve through their designs. Examples are, "good design is as 
little design as possible" (Dieter Rams), 'less is more' (Ludwig Mies van der Rohe), 
"ornament is crime" (Adolf Loos), "good design is not precious, arty or highfalutin" 
(Gordon Russell), 'truth to materials' (anonymous), "forms should be the visible 
expression of the inner driving force of the age" (Hermann Muthesius, a clearly 
Hegelian stance then-prevalent in design thinking), the infamous 'form follows 
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function' (credited to Louis Sullivan but can be traced back to Horatio Greenough), 
and 'form follows meaning' (counter-slogan of product semantics). 
 
c) Historical accounts: the texts that more or less selectively describe what was done 
in the name of design in the past. Note that each historical account also contains a 
statement concerning the genesis of design. That is, each account attributes a 
different date and cause for the emergence of design. For example, while in the 
Pioneers of Modern Design, Nikolaus Pevsner traces the descent of design back to 
William Morris and the British Arts and Crafts Movement, John Heskett, in 
Industrial Design, links the advent of design "to the development of industrialization 
and mechanization that began with the Industrial Revolution in Britain around 1770 . 
. ." (10). Still others, such as Simon Jervis, tend to locate the origin of design in 
earlier dates than that of both Pevsner and Heskett. For example, while in his 
controversial study The Penguin Dictionary of Design and Designers, Jervis 
considers goods dating from the period 1450 to 1800 as the outcomes of design 
activity, many others trace the origin of design even back to prehistoric periods when 
primitive man began making tools. This diversity of origins results from the fact that 
each history of design relies on an implicit or explicit (but generally implicit) 
definition of what design is.  
 
d) Statements that convey technical knowledge: written or oral statements of 
relevance to practicing professional's knowledge. Written statements include 
handbooks and guides (e.g. the classical Human Engineering Guide for Equipment 
Designers by Wesley E. Woodson, or guides to creative color combinations, etc.), 
technical manuals (e.g. instruction manuals for design softwares, handbooks on 
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drawing techniques, etc.), reference sources (e.g. databases for mechanisms and 
materials, visual databases such as image banks, specialist dictionaries, etc.), patent 
literature, 'how to' books for the novice practitioner (e.g. how to draw, how to work 
with materials, manuals for freehand sketching, visual thinking, etc.). Oral statements 
of professional knowledge have their grounding in training, experience, practical 
wisdom and interpersonal communications that take place among professionals. 
They are generally context specific, tacit, non-systematic, based on rule of thumb 
judgments. 
 
e) Theoretical paradigms: These are theoretical models that try to explain the 
phenomena of design rather than prescribe a regime or method of designing. Though 
these theoretical models may at times be generative of new ways of designing, they 
are first and foremost produced for the purpose of analysis and understanding. 
Theories do not attempt to solve practical problems. Rather, by observing these 
problems, they arrive at a 'problematic' within which the practice or discipline of 
design gains a specific meaning and value. In other words, theories of design 
problematize the activity of designing in terms of its foundations, assumptions, 
objectives and roles. In this respect, 'product semantics' is a theory-based study that 
has been loosely derived from the semantic problematic, which dominated design 
discourse in the 80s and posited the primacy of ‘meaning’ as an indispensable 
element of design.  
 
f) The concepts, themes, and objects, of which design statements are composed: 
Examples include form, function, beauty, style, need, utility, purpose, problem, 
order, product, object, meaning, innovation, concept, redesign, craft, user, consumer, 
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man, designer, industry, artist, creativity, etc. It is important to note that by these, I 
do not mean the specialist jargon of design. The existence of concepts, themes, and 
objects of design is not a guarantee that they can be readily comprehended with 
reference to a specialist terminology. Rather, they are formed by mechanisms 
specific to the "discursive formation" of design (in the sense Foucault employs it in 
Archaeology of Knowledge); and these mechanisms are also subject to changes 
throughout history. For example, let me compare two statements from different 
historical periods, 'form follows function' and 'form follows meaning'. Seemingly, the 
term 'form' is common to both statements, and, therefore, one is easily led to think 
that, as concepts, they have the same meaning or that, as objects of which both 
statements speak, they are the same. Yet, neither as concepts nor as objects these two 
'forms' are the same. While in the former statement, form is a physiognomic index of 
the function, a skin of the object, a passive surface that reflects the 'truth' about 
function, in the latter, form is an actively created, plastic emballage, which is made 
to represent or connote an associated range of meanings that properly belongs to the 
object. That is to say, in neither of these statements does the term 'form' belong to the 
same conceptual domain. Moreover, 'form' is not the same object, upon which a 
designer can act in the same way, in both of these statements. Therefore, even if 
'form' is designated with the same 'term' in different statements, as a concept or 
object, it certainly engages in different roles.   
 
g) Definitions: These are statements that explain 'what design is' in some respect or 
capacity. Definitions of design contain implicit or explicit information about,  
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(1) Designation of the designer (e.g. the artist of today, businessman, planner, all 
men, specialist, etc.), 
 
(2) The object(s) and subject matter of design (not to be confused with 'designed 
products'; I use this term to denote material as well as theoretical 'objects of study' 
pertaining to design activity. Examples include form, physical things, functional 
objects, everyday life, problems, all that we do, etc.),  
 
(3) The objective(s) of designing, or intrinsic goals of designing (e.g. to give a form 
appropriate to function, to make sense of things, to solve problems, etc.), 
 
(4) The mode(s) of action proper to design (e.g. invention, organization, creation, 
transmitting ideas, conception and planning, synthesis, etc.) 
 
(5) The status of design activity (practice, process, intellectual activity, effort, ability, 
profession, etc.) 
 
(6) The stakeholders of design, that is, the individuals, parties and agents who are 
affected by the outcomes of design activity and who, therefore, endorse, commission, 
employ designers, implement, market, use, or promote designed products and design 
itself (e.g. manufacturer, consumer, user, public, buyer, society, etc.),  
 
(7) The social, economic, public, cosmic roles that design assumes (opposing 
disorder and accident, to reestablish contact between art and public, to impose 
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meaningful order, to transform man's environment, to enhance the quality of life, to 
make profits for employers, to deal with social problems, etc.), 
 
(8) The presumed origins of design (e.g. industrial revolution, art, prehistory, 20th 
century, nature, God, etc.) 
 
(9) The boundaries that separate design from what is not design (not art, not styling, 
not engineering, not science, not trade, not invention, etc.).  
 
h) Documentation (sketches, visual databases, design museums, collections of 
designed products, catalogues, etc.) 
 
i) Codes of professional conduct: These include sets of rules for ethical behavior, 
usually drawn up by professional associations (e.g. ICSID: International Council of 
Societies of Industrial Design) for the guidance of its members, national and 
international regulations against design copying, safety regulations for products, 
product liability laws against defective designs, etc.  
 
 
7.3 Determining the Units of Analysis 
 
Without a doubt, this is an incomplete description of the statements that comprise the 
discursive field of design. Of course, if the objective of this study had been to 
conduct a discourse analysis in the field of design, it would have been necessary to 
divide this totality into more microscopic units than the ones I have sketched out in 
 131
the above list. But, this level of description would efficiently serve our above-
mentioned purposes of data-reduction. Now, we should pick out a unit of analysis 
that is most appropriate and susceptible to genealogical critique from this diversity of 
statements that make up the horizon of design. This unit should satisfy a number of 
conditions: 
 
1) It should be describable. That is, it should be clearly isolated from all the other 
statements that are connected with it or close to it. Only having been isolated as a 
unit can a statement become analyzable.   
  
2) It should positively exist on the surface of language. That is, it should be identified 
without any further effort of interpretation. The analyst need not engage in a 
symptomatic reading, which aims to disclose 'the unsaid' of a text, in order to 
determine these units.  
 
3) For practical reasons, the textual content of the unit should be limited to a few 
statements. That is, our unit of analysis should be concise enough to be dealt with. 
Note, however, that we are not looking for statements that would yield an abundance 
of meanings if properly interpreted. We are not seeking units of analysis for a 
hermeneutic interpretation. Our unit should be composed of statements which state 
confidently what they intend to state. Instead of an abundance of hidden meanings 
that await elucidation, our unit should be saturated with concepts, objects, and 
themes that are operative in design thinking and practice. 
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4) Our unit should be neither scarce nor omnipresent in design discourse. There 
should be enough of them for the analyst to select typical or representative instances 
from them. For the same reason, the number of such units should allow the analyst to 
identify atypical ones. Yet, there should not be too many of these units so that they 
may be coextensive with the design discourse itself.        
 
5) The statements that comprise our unit should be so effective and operational in 
ordinary design practice that they must have left traces on the personality of the 
designers. That is, we should omit those statements that have been confined to the 
scholarly-scientific level of design discourse. Yet, we should not overlook the 
exchanges between scholarly-scientific realms and professional design practice. The 
mechanisms of this exchange warrant genealogical analysis; but this is a different 
problem that should be dealt with elsewhere.  
 
6) Our unit should lie at the intersection of the diverse statements I have sketched out 
in the above account. That is, it should contain, albeit concisely, as many types of 
statements as possible.  
 
 
7.4 Definitions of Design as the Unit of Genealogical Analysis 
 
In view of these criteria, and without further ado, I propose to compile our inventory 
from the definitions of design and employ them as the units of our genealogical 
analysis. This is because definitions of design are (1) relatively easy to isolate, (2) 
they are so obvious that they may easily pass unnoticed (that is why they leave traces 
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so insidiously), (3) they are concise yet saturated with concepts, objects and themes, 
(4) they are neither scarce nor ubiquitous, (5) they are so operational that they 
permeate every level of design discourse and practice. That is to say, definitions of 
design are produced, learned, used, and exchanged in such diverse realms and 
activities pertaining to design as education, argumentation in discussions, theory, 
practice, popular-journalistic literature, and even the decree on the protection of 
industrial designs (for such a legal definition of design adopted by Turkish laws see 
definition no.33 in the Appendix). Moreover, (6) definitions of design intersect with 
other types of statements in design discourse. First, they have links with theoretical 
statements since each theoretical endeavor starts by generating a definition of design 
on which to premise its arguments. Second, they have intimate connections with 
normative statements – in fact, each design definition contains a normative element 
that finds expression in its statement of objectives (There is more than strong links 
between the goal statement, "to give a form to an object as appropriate as possible to 
its function" and the normative statement, "form follows function". See definition 
no.10 in Appendix A.). Third, each definition of design contains some references to 
the presumed origin of design, and therefore, has links with historical accounts. In 
turn, each historical account is also informed by an implicit definition of what design 
is. Fourth, each design definition delineates, activates, or gives rise to a number of 
objects, concepts, and themes, and establishes relations between them. Last but not 
least, definitions are of such special significance to genealogy that we will discuss it 
in a separate section devoted to the genealogical definition of definition.  
 
Therefore, we are determined to focus our genealogical gaze upon the definitions of 
design. For our present purposes, we select any definition that satisfies the conditions 
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we have laid out in pages 95-98. In what follows we shall be engaged in a 
genealogical critique of design and designers through the analysis of an inventory 
composed of design definitions. From now on, the reader is referred to Appendix A 
for an inventory of these definitions and Appendix B for an analytic table of these 
definitions prepared in accordance with the above mentioned components. To guide 
the reader through the following discussions, a schematic representation of how we 
shall study these definitions is given below.  
 
 
 
 
The status of the design activity[5] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[4] The mode of action proper to design: NONE 
 
[8] The presumed origins of design: CAPITALISM  
 
 
Figure 4. The nine components of a design definition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The industrial designer is a technical specialist in visual appeal . . . [he] is retained by a
manufacturer with one object only: to increase the demand for his products through their
increased attractiveness to the consumer. He is paid by the manufacturer according to his
success in achieving that object. The industrial designer stands or falls upon his ability to
create and maintain profitable trade. He is first and foremost an industrial technician and
not primarily an educator of public taste. Under existing conditions his business must be to
make profits for his employers (Mercer, 1947). 
 
Designation of the 
Designer [1] 
The status of 
the design 
activity[5] 
The objects and 
subject matter of 
design [2] 
The objectives of 
designing  (intrinsic goals 
of designing) [3] 
The stakeholders of 
design [6] 
The boundaries that separate 
design from what is not 
design [9] The … roles that design 
assumes (the ethical 
experience) [7] 
Designation of the 
Designer [1] 
[4] The mode of action proper to design: NONE 
 
[8] The presumed origins of design: CAPITALISM  
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Yet, this genealogical critique of design and designers demands our problematization 
of the earlier approach of design theory and criticism to the problem of design 
definitions. Therefore, we should, first, give a critical account of the 'prejudices of 
designers' against fragmentation and diversity, and in favor of a unified definition of 
design.   
 
 
7.5 The Prejudices of Designers: The Role of Definitions in the Constitution of a 
Design Discipline 
 
Beginning in the 80s, especially with the appearance of the journal Design Issues, we 
saw the opening and gradual expansion of a space for critical and scholarly debates 
about design. For the first time in the intellectual trajectory of design, scholarly 
attention turned towards such matters as the identity and social role of design, the 
generative interactions with other disciplines or spheres of knowledge, and the 
constitution and delineation of objects proper to design knowledge and 
understanding (i.e., theories of design). Some argue that this self-reflexivity of design 
coincides with the stage of maturation of the discipline. For example, the design 
historian John Walker defines a discipline and its evolutionary stages in conformity 
with this argument. According to Walker,  
 
[a discipline] can be described briefly as the ensemble of 
assumptions, concepts, theories, methods and tools employed by 
a particular group of scientists or scholars. During the early 
stages of a discipline, most of these assumptions, etc., will be 
implicit and unconscious. When they become explicit the 
discipline attains self-awareness. Also, of course, disciplines are 
defined by the particular body of material or field of research 
they claim for themselves (1). 
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We can deduce, therefore, that when a discipline reaches maturity it turns back upon 
itself by trying to identify its objects and to demarcate its field of study, by 
performing the metacritical act of evaluating its mode of being, its role and 
questioning the implicit assumptions that hitherto undergird its methods and 
procedures. Consequently at this stage, a discipline is faced with the necessity of 
absorbing the diverse outcomes of this self-reflexivity within new frameworks that 
will intellectually, socially and practically justify its existence. Naturally, the 
discipline of design is not an exception to this rule. Hence, beginning with the 80s we 
started to witness new justificatory frameworks that the designers adopted, new 
alliances that the design discipline forged between itself and other fields. We have 
seen the advent of 'design management', born of an alliance with economics, or 
precisely the science of ‘business administration’, which studied and promoted the 
specific role and importance of design in the policies and organizations of companies 
in the multinational competitive environment. We have also seen the birth of ‘eco-
design movement’, which, perhaps naively, tried to align industrial design with the 
concerns of ‘ecology’ and found the meaning of design in the sustainability of its 
products. Moreover, we have witnessed the problematization of design in terms of 
meaning under the rubric of ‘product semantics’, which claimed recognition as a 
scientific endeavor, attempting to translate the concepts and models of ‘semiotics’ 
and ‘linguistics’ into both design and the study of products. Recently in the 90s we 
have seen design discourse dominated by themes derived and concepts imported 
from phenomenology such as 'intentionality', 'experience', 'engagement', 'lifeworld', 
'counter reductionism', 'things themselves', 'the non-linguistic apprehension of 
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objects', etc. (Verbeek and Kockelkoren 28-42; Borgmann 13-22; Margolin, The 
Product Milieu 121-145).   
 
What is common to these diverse and frequently incompatible quasi-scientific 
endeavors has been an awareness of the need for a shared understanding of what 
design is. Almost all of these scholars emphasized the importance of the formulation 
of a clear and coherent definition of 'what design is' for developing and elaborating 
theories of design. Indeed, clearly demarcated definitions of concepts are the 
prerequisite of any theoretical undertaking. The word 'design' is not a concept. Since 
sciences and theories work on concepts, the word 'design' should first be 
conceptualized by being defined and given "a distinct, discursive existence" 
(Teymur, Environmental 34). Only on the basis of definitions can a theory be 
advanced since the theoretical language of description necessitates the production 
and adoption of concepts, "which are derived by abstraction from the real, and not by 
ordinary generalization or designation" (Teymur, Environmental 34).    
 
From exactly this ground that Victor Margolin criticized designers for their lack of 
attempts at a self-definition. He stated that “compared to professionals in law, 
medicine, and the natural sciences, designers of all kinds have given very little 
thought to their own self-definition (Introduction 4)”. Obviously, by such a self-
definition he meant a shared understanding of what design is, since even a brief 
examination of design history reveals the over-abundance of definitions. I, for 
example, have compiled more than 30 definitions of design within a rather short 
period of time from the limited sources available to me. It seems that designers never 
ceased to devise definitions of their profession. As John Walker states, "many texts 
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on design include a definition on the assumption that the theoretical problems of 
specifying the discipline's object of study can be solved in this way" (27). Yet, this 
multiplicity and diversity of definitions is precisely what these newly bred design 
scholars have contested. They considered the previous accounts of design as 
fragmentary, unable to provide the coherence that the discipline needs. Margolin, for 
instance, claimed that,   
 
While much has been written about design, particularly in the 
postwar period . . . this writing has been fragmented, not 
integrated within the context of a coherent definition of what 
designing is. Although we can easily imagine what a legal 
scholar might contribute to the profession of law (as is evident 
in the recent development of critical legal theory), or what a 
scholar of medicine might offer to his or her profession, we still 
have little understanding of how a design scholar might be able 
to bring theory, criticism, or history to bear on issues central to 
the design professions, whether these issues relate to practice, 
education, or even public perception of design and designers 
(Introduction 4).  
 
Almost twenty years have passed without arriving at a coherent and shared definition 
of design that will serve as the stable ground, upon which a theory can be based. 
Looking back in 2001, these attempts to establish design as a discipline that is 
founded upon the coherence of its object seem like "a storm in a designer teacup" 
(Walker 30). The objects and subject matters of design delineated and proposed by 
theorists and scholars in this 'self-conscious' period of twenty years have been so 
diverse and disparate that today the prospect of identifying a unified discipline of 
design seems remote. This failure has recently urged design scholars to shift their 
attention from seeking the determinable positivity of the object of design as the basis 
of the discipline toward an exploration of the specific nature of designing as an 
integrative framework for the would-be discipline of design. Consequently, we 
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observe a tendency among design scholars to abandon their attempts to model design 
on science and to focus their arguments upon design as a fundamental activity that 
"everyone engages in" (Margolin, The Product 122). Design, therefore, is given the 
status of an integrative art of making. This, however, has led design to the dead-ends 
of anthropologism ('all men are designers') on the one hand and essentialism ('the 
essential nature of design') on the other. Consequently, the growing influence of such 
conceptions of design has obscured "the fact that design came into being at a 
particular stage in the history of capitalism and played a vital part in the creation of 
industrial wealth" (Forty 6). This statement of Forty can be read as a call for a 
genealogy of design and designers. And, indeed, we have recently witnessed an 
unprecedented focus on design history and a new current of design studies that 
engages in research dedicated to local critiques of design history. For instance, the 
articles published in the Journal of Design History, though majority of them does not 
contain references to any of the concepts and themes of genealogy, manifest an 
impromptu orientation towards a genealogical understanding of design history. By 
way of example, I refer the reader to a marvelous essay by Paul Atkinson published 
in the same journal under the heading "The (In)Difference Engine: Explaining the 
Disappearance of Diversity in the Design of the Personal Computer" (59-72). 
Through an analysis of the archive of computer manufacturer's catalogues, Atkinson 
discusses how the previously diverse and innovative forms of computers have been 
replaced by a universal and indifferent 'product type' that has recently come to 
populate our office surroundings. What lends genealogical significance to this study 
is the author's awareness of the concrete relations and configurations of power in 
which different forms of computers have figured. That is, he tries to reveal different 
scenes of power where computers have engaged in different roles and, thereby, 
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illustrates the immediate, 'productive' relationship between design and power. 
Though his conception of power is informed by such notions as the relations of 
gender and status – which are based on the model of power as a possession or 
capacity that is localized at a fixed center in a society (e.g. a dominant class or 
gender) – he, nevertheless, can be regarded as having engaged in genealogical 
critique.  
 
Yet, the number and efficacy of such quasi-genealogical analyses of design has thus 
far been too limited to represent a genealogical, critical turn in design scholarship. It 
is true; there have been sustained efforts to bring critical reflection upon design for 
twenty years. However, these efforts have remained mainly committed to critique in 
Marxian and Kantian terms. The critique of design posed in Marxian terms has 
sought to break through the illusion, the ideological forms of false consciousness that 
prevent designers to understand the real conditions in which they live, think, and 
work. The influential journal Block, for example, has been the medium of lively 
discussions of art history, design and cultural theory that were explicitly informed by 
a historical materialist perspective and the themes of critical theory (Frankfurt 
school) in 1980s. The general tendency of this historical materialist critique of design 
has been to see the forms of design as the reflections solely of the economic base that 
consists of "productive forces and relations of production" at any given stage of 
history (Marx 569, 162-195). Nevertheless, this conception has given rise to the then-
prevalent underestimation of the materiality of design itself. As a repudiation of this 
tendency, Teymur (himself a Marxist then) has argued for thinking design as a 
material force that expresses itself in a multiplicity of forms (Materiality 148-166). 
The Kantian version of critique, on the other hand, has been an attempt to reveal the 
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metaphysical 'conditions of possibility' of design in order to show the extent to which 
designing can be possible. Yet, insofar as this critique is founded upon the question 
'what is design?' (and indeed it has been so), the critique starts to obliterate itself and 
give way to a concern with design as a 'thing-in-itself'. As a result, we have been 
confronted either with too dependent a notion of design (e.g. Marxian critique of 
design as a reflection of larger and more substantial structures) or with too 
independent a conception of it (e.g. design as a nucleus that can not be broken).     
 
 
7.6 Indeterminacy of the Subject Matter of Design 
 
To return to the question of definitions, we observe that neither in terms of its 
positive object nor in terms of the essential nature of design activity can a coherent 
and unified definition of design be achieved. Therefore, in the face of such a failure 
we should ask why a unified definition of design is so difficult to achieve. As an 
answer to this question, Richard Buchanan, a design scholar, has given a reasonable 
explanation based on the indeterminacy of the subject matter of design. We will, 
first, examine Buchanan's account and, then, try to answer the same question from a 
genealogical perspective. 
 
Buchanan is involved in the problem of definitions for the same reasons that 
motivated design scholars in the past 20 years. That is, Buchanan too aims to 
contribute to the establishment and consolidation of design as a discipline in its own 
right. His starting point is the difficulty posed by the extremely wide scope of design 
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ideas, principles, definitions, methods, theories, and even products, which are, to 
complicate the situation, in a fragmented and disorderly state. According to him, 
 
The scope of design appears to be so great, and the range of 
styles and other qualities of individual products within even one 
category so diverse, that the prospects for identifying a common 
discipline seem dim. To compound the problem, histories and 
theories of design are also exceptionally diverse, representing a 
wide range of beliefs about what design is, how it should be 
practiced, and for what purpose (Buchanan 23).  
 
It seems that 'the will to impose order' determines the vision of design scholars too. 
Yet, what makes Buchanan atypical among these design scholars is his clear 
apprehension of the problematic nature of design definitions based on the 
consistency and determinacy of their objects. Contrary to other design scholars, he 
welcomes the indeterminacy of the subject matter of design and seeks the condition 
of possibility of a design discipline thereof. He is critical of theorists who insist on 
thinking design as a form of science on the assumption that design has a determinate 
object, which confers a predictive quality upon it. However, says Buchanan, the 
subject matter of design is not "given to the designer in the same way that the subject 
matter of nature is given to the scientist" (24). Rather, the subject matter of design is 
constituted ever anew through processes of invention and creation and through 
individual efforts of designers to characterize their works. Though it may be argued 
that the subject matter of sciences is not totally given too and that it should be 
discovered through scientific methods, nevertheless discovery and invention are 
radically different ways of forming objects. In a field governed by the model of 
discovery, the researcher assumes the preexistence of the objects to be discovered. 
According to Buchanan, discovery "implies that there is something constantly 
available, waiting passively to be uncovered, and that the discovery will yield only 
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one result, which may be confirmed by other experimental techniques for 
questioning nature" (24). Such a determinacy can not be found in the design activity. 
The subject matter of design is indeterminate precisely because it is always open to 
alternative formulations. There are not only diverse solutions to the same design 
problem but also diverse conceptions of what design deals with. In other words, the 
subject matter of design is being designed in the same way the products are designed.  
 
However, one may speak of the diversity of determinants (e.g. economic, technical, 
commercial, ideological etc.) that exert strong and continual influence on the 
formation of the subject matter of design, and justifiably ask, 'how can one still 
maintain that the subject matter of design is indeterminate and open to possibilities?' 
Although at first sight, this objection sounds correct, the reverse is true. The more 
there are determinants the less the subject matter of design is determinate. This may 
seem paradoxical; so let me explain it. The very existence and diversity of a number 
of seemingly alien constraints on the work of the designer is a sign that there are an 
equal number of stakeholders with whom design has a reciprocal or unilateral 
relationship. In general, these stakeholders are impersonal rather than personal. The 
domain of design is contested by institutions (e.g. product safety boards, human 
factors research institutes, trade associations, consumer unions, marketing research 
agencies, museums), legal practice (e.g. product liability pressures, decrees on the 
protection of intellectual property and industrial design rights), various disciplines 
and specialist fields of study (e.g. ergonomics, marketing and business 
administration, engineering, computer science, psychology and behavioral sciences), 
milieux that are conducive to the study of design (e.g. avant-garde art, research and 
development), historical affiliations (e.g. art history, architecture, aesthetics), 
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alliances (e.g. semiotics, ecology, mathematics and system theory), governments 
(e.g. design policies) etc. We can deduce from this evidence that insofar as the field 
of design is contested by various stakeholders, the subject matter of design can not be 
decided once and for all. As regards this deduction, one can argue that if design is so 
entangled in a network of power, there must be times when one of these contestants 
predominates the field and forces a definition of design specifically geared to its own 
purposes upon design discourse. For example, when the interaction and the exchange 
of knowledge and expertise between designers and human engineering specialists 
intensified after World War II, we started to witness a predominance of objects, 
concepts and themes that are derived from or originally belong to the field of human 
engineering in the definitions of design. The 'user' or 'customer', which had thus far 
prevailed in design discourse, was replaced, to some extent, with 'human operator' or 
'man' as the beneficiary of the activity of designers. No need to add that this is not 
merely a change of terminology resulting from a pretension to scientificity on the 
part of designers. Rather, designers also adopted the operational definition of the 
'human operator' as a "male or female" human user with "pertinent capabilities and 
limitations" in their discourse as well as practice (Burgess ix). The object of design 
turned out to be the 'man-machine system' in which "at least one of the components 
is a human being who interacts with or intervenes in the operation of the machine 
components of the system from time to time", and the subject matter of design 
became the pertinent design initiatives, skills and knowledges (anthropometry, 
physiology, psychology of perception, cognitive science and a body of technological 
knowledge) that ensure the flawless and effective match between man and machine 
(Chapanis 16).  
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In view of this example (and, such examples are abundant in design history), should 
we draw the conclusion that in each period, the subject matter of design has been 
determined by a foreign discipline or agent that has ascendancy over the field of 
design? Does the indeterminacy of the subject matter of design result from the 
impotence of designers with regard to the established scientific community that 
surrounds the field of design or the capitalist economy that has sustained interests in 
the use or abuse of the outcomes of design? Finally, do we have to adopt a 
methodological framework based upon this premise and study the definitions of 
design by referring the objects, concepts and themes of each definition back to their 
original source and conclude that at a given period, design was under the sway of this 
or that power? Wouldn't that be an ill-conceived genealogy that understands – and 
misunderstands – power as domination, as a set of dictates emanating from a 
determinate or determinable source in society and not as a productive relation of 
force? 
 
 
7.7 Design and Power: The Origins of Design 
 
To answer these questions, we must clarify the relations between design and 
capitalism. As we shall argue, capitalism has thus far been the most influential agent 
of the formation and progression of design. Design, as we know it today, has been 
historically possible as a result of an epistemic shift in the conception and production 
of objects and an organizational change in the manufacturing process that began with 
the specialization and industrialization, which were stimulated by the Industrial 
Revolution that took place in Britain around 1770. In this regard, the emergence of 
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design was closely associated with the rise of capitalism that superseded the 
mercantilist economic principles then prevalent in Europe. The rise of bourgeoisie 
and the rapid expansion of national markets were signs that the days of mercantilism 
were numbered. The artistic patronage and royal investment in 'art manufactures' 
gave way to capital investment in industrial production when the mercantilist 
economic principles based on "harnessing and controlling resources, skills and 
products for the purposes and profit of the state, embodied in the person of the ruler" 
were superseded by the capitalist ownership of the means of production (Heskett 12). 
If we are reminded of a description of the capitalist that was current at the time, the 
connections between capitalism and design becomes even clearer. Thomas Hodgskin, 
in Labour Defended against the Claims of Capital (1825) wrote that, 
 
betwixt [between] him who produces food and him who 
produces clothing, betwixt him who makes instruments and him 
who uses them, in steps the capitalist, who neither makes nor 
uses them and appropriates to himself the produce of both 
(Williams 50). 
 
In accordance with the capitalist division of labour, the designer emerged as a 
specialist who neither manufactured nor marketed products himself, but who was 
commissioned to conceive them before their production and marketing. For this 
reason, the descent of the designer should be more closely associated with the 
capitalist division of labour than the craft tradition in which the processes of 
conception, realization, and even selling were united in the person of the craftsmen. 
This is also evident in the diversity of meanings that were semiotically concentrated 
within the word 'craft'. It means a particularly manual kind of "skill" as well as 
"trade" or "occupation" (Walker 38). This explains clearly the inextricable fusion of 
activities, which were later broken into distinct specialisms by the capitalist division 
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of labour, in craft tradition. The advent of mass production industry shattered this 
unity and gave birth to a specialist that we today retrospectively call as the 'designer'. 
As Heskett remarks, 
 
In craft production, conception and realization are linked and 
co-ordinated by the interplay of hand, eye and materials. The 
fact that the entire process can be accomplished by one person 
disguises its complexity, giving it a human scale and apparent 
simplicity that allows it to be experienced by both practitioner 
and observer as a comprehensible unity. In mass production 
industry this coherence is fragmented, and the complexity of 
conception and making is exposed by its subdivision into a 
series of specialized activities. These processes are interlinked, 
but in relationships that are often perceived as remote and 
impersonal (7).     
 
Note, however, that this newly opened specialist field was first occupied by artists 
and engineers. At that time, there were not yet professionals who were either trained 
or called as 'designers'. Yet, the production process was organized in such a way that 
the conception of visual form became a separate task that was entrusted to a separate 
professional. Though at first it was infrequently called as 'design', this new specialist 
field demanded an approach to production that even today qualifies one as a 
designer. This is an analytic approach. Designers have been characterized by their 
analytic approach towards the product to be designed as opposed to the synthetic 
skills that were demanded of a craftsman by his task. The demand for such an 
analytic approach was due to Industrial Revolution; and this was more of an 
epistemic shift in the art of making than a change in the technique of production. 
This is because, contrary to popular belief, the Industrial Revolution did not result 
from the introduction of machines into manufacturing shops. Although it depended 
to a large extent on practical inventions that facilitated mechanized production, it 
was, rather, an outcome of a change in industrial organization. This new organization 
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of production brought forth the factory system in which the process of production 
was divided into discrete, well-defined steps. Mechanization could enter the 
industrial production only after this new organization were successfully 
implemented. This rationalization and simplification of operations made it possible 
to employ unskilled labour under supervision in industrial production (Bronowski 
and Mazlish 308, 311-312). Design emerged in such conditions as a response to the 
capitalist factory system. The historical condition of possibility of design, therefore, 
was an epistemic shift in the art of making that occurred as a result of these changes 
in industrial organization.  
 
The advent of design meant that products could no longer be conceived as organic 
totalities. Craftsmanship required synthetic abilities. In this sense, craft production 
could be regarded as a dialectic process that takes place between the negating actions 
of hand and eye and a given material. It could be regarded as a dialectic process in 
another sense too. Not only that which takes place during the isolated and introverted 
process of craft production but also the continuance of craft tradition itself was a 
progression through dialectic process. Hence, any finished product of a craft process 
was a synthesis achieved through two parallel negations. On the one hand, the given 
material is successively negated by the craftsman's performance until the given 
material and skilled actions of the craftsman are fused into such a synthesis that it 
can no longer be negated. That is, the dialectic process of craft production ends when 
the craftsman judges the product to be complete and not in need of further 
adjustments or improvements. On the other hand, from a broader perspective each 
craftsman was also negating the traditional patterns, types and forms that were 
passed on to him from his predecessors. In this respect, craftwork can be 
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characterized as what Gombrich, in a fully Hegelian sense, calls the "gradual 
modification of the traditional schematic conventions . . . under the pressure of novel 
demands" (Bryson 62-63). However, this negation of tradition could only engender 
minor variations of earlier patterns since the given patterns were already syntheses 
that achieved perfection and integration through the long baking process of history. 
For this reason, most craft production was dependent upon copying of the traditional 
patterns time and time again. Therefore, in both senses, craft production was based 
on identity in difference and continuity in change.   
 
Design, on the other hand, emerged as an analytic activity in response to the changes 
in the organization of production. Industrial Revolution not only fragmented the 
coherence of craft production into different activities but also converted these into 
specialist fields. In this regard, many accounts suggest that the diverse processes of 
planning, decision making, conception (design and imagination), production, and 
marketing that were previously united in craft tradition became distinct specialisms 
with the introduction of capitalist division of labour. Although, at first sight, this 
remark seems true, it, nevertheless, overlooks the simple fact that before the 
capitalist tendency towards specialization these diverse processes did not exist. That 
is to say, capitalism did not so much liberate an already existing – albeit in unison – 
set of processes as constitute or invent them in the first place. Before they were 
divided, there were neither production nor conception or design. That is, before the 
advent of industrial capitalism there was no available epistemological horizon that 
allowed one to formulate these processes as production, conception, design etc. They 
emerged as positive entities or fields only as a result of an epistemic shift from 
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synthesis towards analysis that took place with the emergence of industrial 
capitalism. 
 
In what did this analytic approach that was expected of the designer consist then?  
 
The numerous developments such as the new factory system, the emergence of 
design, the new roles the drawings for production assumed were all interrelated 
manifestations of a profound techno-epistemological change. The newly 
industrialized society did not so much put new demands on the older modes and 
forms of practice as create new objects of knowledge and new domains of practice. 
Design was one of these new domains of practice. Underlying the emergence of 
these newly constituted domains and objects was an epistemic shift from synthetic to 
analytic, metaphorical to instrumental thought. Likewise, in one of his studies that 
was devoted to a genealogy of the epistemic rupture occurring at the end of the 18th 
century in the human sciences, Michael Foucault detected a concurrent shift from 
"resemblance" as the governing episteme of Renaissance thought to "representation" 
as the episteme favored by classical and early modern ages (The Order of Things). 
These, I suggest, were isogenetic developments. While the newly industrialized 
culture underwent an epistemic shift from synthetic and metaphorical to analytic and 
instrumental thinking, there occurred a parallel shift in the human sciences from the 
episteme of resemblance to the episteme of representation. What's more, these were 
closely interrelated shifts. Analysis to design and production was precisely what 
representation to human sciences. Both shifts resulted from a changed perception of 
the being of language. As Mahon remarks, "in contrast to the Renaissance when 
'language spoke,' in the classical age all reflection on language centers on the simple 
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idea that 'language analyses'" (72). When language came to be thought of as 
representational, it was also made to function as analytical. Hence the close 
connections between these two epistemic shifts. We should, therefore, ask, 'what was 
the significance of these epistemic shifts for the emergence and consolidation of the 
practice of design?' Let me start expanding on this question by analyzing the techno-
epistemological demands and constraints that the new organization put on designing 
people at that time. At present, I prefer employing the term 'designing people' instead 
of 'designers' since, at the time, the professionals who were responsible for the 
conception of a product were neither trained nor designated as 'designers'.  
 
First of all, the specialization and rationalization of production required designing 
people to plan the product in strict accordance with the available means and methods 
of production and the level of skill that can be expected of the labour force. If an as-
yet-nonexistent product were to be designed in order that it can be produced in a 
fragmented and impersonal industrial organization, it would necessarily be treated in 
an analytical manner even from scratch. Second, this newly constituted industrial 
network required precise and unequivocal communications between its different 
branches. That is, the drawings expected of designing people should have been 
readable and understandable by engineers and by those responsible for manufacture 
and assembly of the product. Moreover, the forms conceived by designing people 
should have been capable of mass production by mechanical means and the drawings 
should have been directly applicable to the fragmented process of production. 
Accordingly, this new culture of industrial production required drawings that were 
prescriptive rather than descriptive, analytic rather than synthetic, communicative 
rather than expressive of the personality of designing people. Yet, one will be misled 
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if one thinks that people began to make drawings to which they would refer during 
production only with the advent of industrialization. The craftsman too had made 
such drawings long before Industrial Revolution. However, the content of these 
drawings had been severely limited to the function of serving "as an aide memoire 
and a hardcopy record for the craftsman" (Pipes 9). They were characterized by their 
"diagrammatic approach to the third dimension" and intended to provide a scheme of 
resemblance that would be more or less faithfully followed by the craftsman (Pipes 
9) (Figures 5 and 6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. A sketch by the 13th century master stonemason Villard de Honnecourt. 
 153
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The designer Gerrit Rietveld's 1923 sketches for a baby wagon. 
 
 
Drawings for industry, on the other hand, were not intended so much for personal 
memorization of the designer as to communicate precise, complete and unequivocal 
information to people with whom the designer was unlikely to have personal 
acquaintance. This meant that a shared and uniform language of drawing should have 
been implemented for this impersonal and fragmented network of production to be 
successful. As the design historian David Brett remarks,  
 
Descriptive drawings of machines, mines, and buildings are, of 
course, very ancient types of drawing; but industrial production 
at that time demanded a prescriptive clarity that could convey 
unambiguous instructions in a universally comprehensible code. 
This was equally true in both decorative and mechanical design 
(3).  
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Therefore, for the first time in history drawing came to be seen as a 'monosemic' 
language. This ideal, however, could only be achieved through the codification of 
drawing. First successful attempts at such a codification began when a set of 
conventions that systematize and standardize the content, style and detail of drawings 
were implemented and perfected in treatises and textbooks of the 19th century (Pipes 
20; Brett 3). The common orientation of these studies was towards fashioning an 
analytic visual grammar suited to the demands of precision technology and the 
intrasystemic communications of industrial practice (Figures 7, 8, 9).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. First and third angle orthographic projections, perfected by William Binns 
in 1857. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Isometric projection, developed by Sir William Farish in 1820 as a 
derivative of orthographic projection. 
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Figure 9. Perspective drawing. Perspective grid as a drawing aid (Lawson 
perspective charts, manufactured for use by designers and architects). 
 
 
These attempts at codification had two broad epistemological consequences. First, 
the earlier conception of drawing as an iconic system based on resemblance was 
superseded by the notion of drawing as an activity predominantly involved "with the 
creation and interpretation of signs as symbols" (Ashwin 201). Purely conventional 
symbolic systems such as "codes for the representation of cross sections, 
interruptions of form, or the depiction of materials, colors, and textures in black and 
white" were introduced into the practice of drawing (Ashwin 201). Second, drawing 
became the language of analytic thinking and the medium of analyzable relations 
between the totality of the product and its different facets, parts, details, etc. Note 
that this analytic attitude did not only dominate the working drawings where the 
product's component parts, its pertinent projections, assembly instructions, material 
specifications and measurements were depicted accurately, but also the way the 
sketches were done. Sketching as a drawing for the exploration of forms also came to 
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be governed by an analytic outlook. The transformation of drawing into an analytic 
language meant that the notion of 'form' and its attendant ideal of 'beauty' also came 
to be construed as a language, which could be broken down into its constituent 
elements. Accordingly, most artists and theorists of the time embarked on an 
excessive meditation on the 'analytic of form', according to which 'beauty' could only 
be attained through abstracted and geometrically construed forms. For example, in 
1841 John Nasmyth wrote that all machines were composed of six elementary 
geometrical forms. According to him, 
 
Viewing abstractedly the forms of the various details of which 
every machine is composed, we shall find that they consist of 
certain combinations of six primitive or elementary geometrical 
figures, namely, the line, the plane, the circle, the cylinder, the 
cone, and the sphere; and that, however complex the 
arrangement and vast the number of parts of which a machine 
consists, we shall find that all may be, as it were, decomposed 
and classed under these six forms; and that, in short, every 
machine, whatever be its purpose, simply consists of a 
combination of these forms (emphasis added) (Brett 13).  
 
Yet, not only the machines but also the lines that compose any drawing were 
subjected to analysis. Attempts to determine the elementary lines, which could be 
generally accepted as the a priori conditions of any kind of drawing, had been 
successful before Nasmyth formulated his machine elements. The most characteristic 
of these analyses can be found in William Robson's Grammigraphia (1799) where he 
wrote that, 
 
Lines are four; perpendicular, horizontal, oblique, and curve. All 
the variety of appearance in nature are presented by a 
combination of these four lines placed agreeably to proportion 
and position (emphasis added) (Brett 7).  
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As the title of Robson's book suggests, drawing was not only analyzed into its 
constituent parts but also construed as a language with its grammatical rules of 
combination of these parts (Figure 10). As mentioned in the quotation, "proportion" 
and "position" supplied the rules of syntagmatic construction of these lines. At the 
time, there were many who held that drawing and writing were congruent with one 
another. In addition to Robson, Horace Mann, for example, was another who thought 
that "drawing is a form of writing and should be taught with it" (Brett 10). Not 
surprisingly, these attempts to formulate drawing as a form of writing quickly led 
people to consider form itself also as a language.     
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. ABC of drawing. 
 
 
The analytic of form was also conducted in the field of decorative design where the 
ornamental analysis of botanical types coincided with the epistemological 
assumptions of the classical age natural philosophy, which posited determinacy in 
nature and analyzed it in order to reveal its underlying laws. For example, 
Christopher Dresser, one of the first theorists of design for industry, argued in 1858 
that plant drawings for decorative designs should be derived from nature by way of 
analysis rather than by analogy. He asserted that, "for ornamental purposes we deem 
literal copies altogether insufficient; representations of a more rigid character and 
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analytic nature being necessary" (Brett 5). Of course, this analytic approach towards 
natural forms did not completely result from the technical constraints of industrial 
production, which demanded a flat and geometrical display of natural forms so that 
they could be easily reproduced by "painting, weaving, stamping, etc., to which 
naturalistic renderings did not readily lend themselves" (Brett 5). The analytic 
treatment of natural forms was also closely connected with the governing episteme of 
representation, according to which nature, among other things, came to be dominated 
by the model of language (Mahon 50). It was assumed that if nature were carefully 
analyzed, it would reveal its secrets to man. Therefore, direct translation of the 
language of nature into the language of beauty became possible. The key to this 
translation was 'analysis'. In this respect, William Dyce, who created The Drawing 
Book of the Government Schools of Design in 1842-43, wrote that beauty was "a 
quality separable from natural objects" (Brett 6). It was separable from nature 
through abstraction, which can be attained only as a result of analysis. Dyce 
explained that,  
 
[The designer] makes the separation in order to impress the 
cosmetic of nature on the productions of human industry. Works 
of industry thus molded into shape are not imitations of nature 
because they are covered with pictures or sculptural 
resemblances of natural objects, but because they are adorned 
on the same principles as the works of nature themselves 
(emphasis added) (Brett 6). 
 
The epistemic shift from resemblance to representation, from synthesis and analogy 
to analysis can not be observed more clearly than can be observed in this quotation. 
Moreover, if we are reminded of the intellectual biography of Dyce, which included 
a training in science and a sustained involvement with German artistic life and design 
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education, the coincidence of the analysis of nature and the analytic of beauty 
becomes clear.  
 
These examples show that at the onset of industrialization, the language of nature 
and the language of beauty were speaking in the same tongue. The world became 
"the analogue of language" and the gap between the natural and the man-made were 
bridged through 'analysis' (Mahon 50) (Figure 11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. The gap between natural and man-made were bridged through the 'beauty' 
of geometrical shapes.  
 
 
The dispute over nature and natural forms in 19th century was not so much an 
attempt to eliminate references to nature from man-made things as to incorporate 
nature as a structural element in the products of industry. What was taking place was 
a shift from analogy (nature as ornament) to analysis (nature as structural element). 
This new episteme finally found its most eloquent statement in America through the 
writings of Horatio Greenough in 1852. He asserted that, when carefully studied 
(read 'analyzed'), "Nature spake of the laws of building", and all that man should do 
was to reply by bending "his mind to hear and to obey" (Greenough 61). Moreover, 
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stated Greenough, by analyzing how nature speaks, one can learn to speak the 
language of 'form'. According to him, "the entire gamut of visual qualities in objects 
is, therefore, a language, a tongue, whose vocabulary must be learned, word by word 
. . ." (Greenough 95). This was a profoundly significant statement since not only 
drawings and lines but also 'form' itself came to be regarded as a 'language'. With this 
conception of form as language, the epistemic shift towards analysis and language 
achieved completion in the middle of the 19th century.  
 
The emergence of design, therefore, was clearly connected with a semantization of 
the world in general and a semantization of industrial complex in particular. 
Designers, in this context, emerged as specialists who had analytic skills and 
command over the language of form demanded by the new techno-epistemological 
structure of industrialization and modernization (Figure 12). The prescriptive and 
analytic nature of drawings and the conception of form as language indicated "a 
change in the nature and flow of information; it is the visual language of experts 
instructing operatives" (Brett 4). This also indicated the birth of the designer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Designer trained as a specialist who had analytic skills and command 
over the language of form. 
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Yet, this herkunfthypothesen (i.e., hypothesis of descent) concerning the emergence 
of design may sound strange to the ears of our contemporary designers who define 
their profession as that which involves "an eventual synthesis of contributory and 
often conflicting factors into a concept of three-dimensional form" (emphasis added) 
(Heskett 10). Located in the corporate milieu and in an interdisciplinary matrix, 
design has really had to become a 'synthetic' activity. However, the synthetic activity 
of contemporary designers has nothing to do with the synthetic abilities of 
craftsmanship in the past. Design has recently become a synthetic activity only on 
the condition of a prior conception of form giving as an analytic activity involved 
with the language of form. That is to say, only having been established as an analytic 
language can form giving become a matter of synthesis.  
 
 
7.8 Design, Semantics, and Genetics 
 
A bold claim may follow from this. If the semantization of drawing and form was 
among the conditions of emergence of the design profession, then it follows that 
designers must have been engaged in 'product semantics' from the very beginning. 
Even 'form follows function' was a semantic statement, according to which form 
should represent function as truthfully as possible. Furthermore, one wonders 
whether designers of the first half of the 20th century did not venture into a practice 
of product semantics, when the ideal of function became itself a source of symbolic 
inspiration and, instead of following function, form became a conveyor of images 
reminiscent of machines with the advent of ‘machine aesthetics’. In this respect, 
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product semantics movement of the 1980s was the last attempt to recover the system 
of classification of designed objects based on their function or 'functional identity'. 
Beginning with the 1990s the scheme of classification based on identity and 
representation has exploded and given way to a model both metaphorically and 
technologically based on genetics. The species boundaries between products have 
begun to shatter: both formal and functional identity of products has ceased to supply 
the stable ground on which to build a design argument. Products have become 
decipherable only by reference to their genes. As an example, I refer the reader to a 
recent television advertisement of a mobile personal communicator device (the 
length of the names of these new devices is an evidence of the loss of functional 
identity), which has been depicted as a descent of mixed origin. The device has been 
portrayed as having descended from a personal computer (its mother), a cellular 
phone (its father) and a palm computer (its?). Canadian director David Cronenberg's 
1999 movie "eXistenZ" can also be watched as an artful reflection on the future of 
biogenetic engineering and its ensuing products. Typical of these products was a 
gristle gun constructed from the bones and gristles of genetically engineered 
organisms. The film defined that weapon as, 
 
A pistol made of bone and gristle, almost like the half-decayed 
body of a small mammal whose snout is the barrel, and whose 
rigid hind leg is the trigger. Instead of bullets, the gun shoots 
human teeth (Cronenberg).   
 
Though as yet products are not so much grown as produced, Cronenberg's movie can 
still be understood as pointing towards an impending crisis of design. We have, at 
present, mobile personal communicator devices or similar gadgets whose identity can 
not be established in either functional or formal terms. These products are 'chimeras', 
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and in the foreseeable future, design will be dealing with the creation of chimeras 
rather than products. And, this is true for each of the three meanings of the term: 
 
Chimera. 1. (a) A fire-breathing she-monster in Greek 
mythology having a lion's head, a goat's body, and a serpent's 
tail. (b) An imaginary monster compounded of incongruous 
parts. 2. An illusion or fabrication of the mind, esp. an 
unrealizable dream. 3. An individual organ or part consisting of 
tissues of diverse genetic constitution. (Anker 371).   
 
 
7.9 Power and the Definitions of Design 
 
I have thus far given an account of the historical conditions that were responsible for 
the emergence of design profession. It seems that design emerged as an outcome of 
and in response to conditions that were overdetermined. The advent of industrial 
capitalism, transformations in the organization of production, an epistemic shift that 
occurred in 18th and 19th centuries, an unprecedented exchange between art and 
natural science formed a network in which designers, a new breed of specialists, 
found their conditions of existence. I have also briefly touched upon a contemporary 
crisis that awaits design in the near future. Where has this genealogical detour 
brought us now? What conclusions should we draw from this account, especially 
with respect to our analysis of design definitions? Let me, first, remind you of the 
questions that have led us towards such a genealogical reflection upon the origins of 
design. We were asking the following questions before we have ventured into this 
detour through the emergence of design:  
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a) Is it always true that in each period, the subject matter of design has been 
determined by a foreign discipline or agent that has ascendancy over the field of 
design?  
 
b) Does the indeterminacy of the subject matter of design result from the impotence 
of designers with regard to the established scientific community that surrounds the 
field of design or the capitalist economy that has sustained interests in the use or 
abuse of the outcomes of design?  
 
c) Do we have to adopt a methodological framework based upon this premise and 
study the definitions of design by referring the objects, concepts and themes of each 
definition back to their original source and conclude that at a given period, design 
was under the sway of this or that power?  
 
d) Wouldn't that be an ill-conceived genealogy that understands – and 
misunderstands – power as domination, as a set of dictates emanating from a 
determinate or determinable source in society and not as a productive relation of 
force? 
 
All these four questions center on the choice of theoretical perspective. There are 
three theoretical perspectives on design implied by these questions. To characterize 
these three positions, I designate them as 'design as stylus', 'design as nucleus', and 
'design as nexus'. 
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7.9.1 Design as Stylus 
 
'Design as stylus' regards design and its outcomes as the reflection of wider social 
and economic phenomena. The term 'stylus' is employed as a metaphor of this base-
superstructure model. In a turntable, a stylus is the part which reproduces and 
reflects in audible form the traces on the vinyl disc. Similarly, the objects, subject 
matter, intrinsic goals and status of design activity as well as the social, economic 
and public roles of design are determined or dictated by the interests of capitalist 
economy, which is in full command of the dynamics of the market. According to this 
model the themes, preoccupations and outcomes of design activity can only be 
explained with reference to the dynamics of capitalist economy. Design is in an 
instrumental position with respect to the dominant capitalist power, which has 
control over the means of production and organizes the distribution of wealth. As to 
the definitions of design, they should be regarded as imprints of the interests of a 
determinate source of capitalist power on the discourse of one of its subordinate 
organs, that is, the design profession. The proponents of this approach would 
welcome F. Mercer's definition of design as a strong evidence that supports their 
position:    
 
The industrial designer is a technical specialist in visual appeal . 
. . [he] is retained by a manufacturer with one object only: to 
increase the demand for his products through their increased 
attractiveness to the consumer. He is paid by the manufacturer 
according to his success in achieving that object. The industrial 
designer stands or falls upon his ability to create and maintain 
profitable trade. He is first and foremost an industrial technician 
and not primarily an educator of public taste. Under existing 
conditions his business must be to make profits for his 
employers (12; definition no.3 in Appendix A).  
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Yet, if the tasks of designers were always dictated word by word by the capitalist 
patronage as the above definition suggests, why have there been sustained efforts of 
designers to rise above their professional ideologies and give their practice a 
discursive existence so that today we can talk about a 'discipline' of design? Can this 
model explain the discursive materiality of design activity whereby it has a share in 
the distribution of social power? Does not the nature of design "as a discipline 
closely related to daily life" confer upon it "an authoritativeness that other fields of 
knowledge lack" (Vitta 36)?  
 
 
7.9.2 Design as Nucleus 
 
'Design as nucleus', in contrast, situates 'power' solely within the private process of 
designing and in the personality of the individual designer. According to this model, 
design is deemed to be a self-contained phenomenon, a value in itself, which can not 
be explained by terms other than design's own. Since it is elevated to the rank of a 
purely creative activity undertaken by certain talented individuals, design activity 
becomes increasingly isolated from the social map. The designer is depicted as a 
genius who works alone in his studio, immersed in the privacy of his inspirations 
(Remember the case of Philippe Starck). As a result, the design process comes to be 
regarded as a nucleus impervious to any influences outside of its immediate 
concerns. The practical and discursive existence of design gradually disappears from 
the scene, giving way to a 'mystique of design'. The influence of this model on 
design criticism has been disastrous. Not only the channels of critical reflection on 
design have been closed but also the scope of design activity has been severely 
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reduced to a pretentious preoccupation with the production of 'serve-the-rich' and 
'serve-the-gallery' objects. As to the definitions of design, 'design as nucleus' is an 
altogether useless notion. According to this model, design can not be defined, since it 
is an intuitive talent of a few privileged individuals. It has nothing to do with 
definitions; if you do not understand what design is, at least you can admire its 
creators and creations. 
 
 
7.9.3 The Question of Power Unsettled 
 
The problem with both models lies in their conception of the relation between design 
and power. While in the former model (i.e. design as stylus) power is given a place 
outside of the field of design, in the latter (i.e. design as nucleus) a magical power is 
solely attributed to the province of design and designers. According to these 
conceptions, the relation between design and power can be studied with recourse to 
either a too extrinsic or a too intrinsic notion of power. This is precisely because both 
models understand power as domination, as a set of dictates emanating from a 
determinate source in society rather than as a multi-faceted relation that takes place 
within a network. According to the former model, for example, design is considered 
as a superstructural activity determined by forces that are more material than that of 
design activity and reside solely in the base. This conception can also give way to 
such ill-conceived attempts as Victor Papanek's Design for the Real World to restore 
design to a more respectable status than its present state in industrial capitalist 
society. Design is regarded as having been an overly benevolent and liberal activity 
in which everyone once engaged but which has become corrupted since the power of 
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industrial capitalism seized hold of it and began to utilize its products in various 
ways and according to its own ends. Such a stance, however, is untenable since it 
overlooks both the materiality of design – thereby, overlooks its power too – and the 
fact that before the advent of industrialization design simply did not exist. Therefore, 
while the notion of 'design as stylus' positions design and power in mutual exteriority 
(power utilizes, takes hold of, or represses the potential of design; design, in turn, is a 
benign activity that prefers to be left alone), the notion of 'design as nucleus' restores 
design, under the protective shield of the mythical notion of 'genius', to an 
unattainable world from where its power emanates.    
 
 
7.9.4 Design as a Material Activity 
 
Now, how can we genealogically handle the problem of power concerning design? 
We may take our cue from Norman Bryson who asked the question of power for the 
field of art and art history. He relocated the activity of painting within the field of 
power by emphasizing its discursive nature (Bryson 67). Having defined painting as 
a discursive activity, he went on to ask which tier of the base-superstructure model 
one should place the sign. He asked that, 
 
Where shall one allocate the sign? Does the sign belong above, 
along with ideology, law, and other derivations? Or is it 
primary, down there next to the technology, the plant, the hard 
productive base (Bryson 67)? 
 
According to the conventional historical materialist perspective, signs and the 
discourse they generate are the imprints of the base upon the superstructure. In other 
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words, discourse "takes its patterns from power and repeats them in another key, the 
key of ideologies" (Bryson 67). The apparent paradox of this model is that while 
discourse is necessarily an expression of the given reality, since it is an ideological 
construct, it also obscures the reality of the material base. This, however, obscures 
the fact that the production of signs is always already a material practice. As Bryson 
explains, contrary to the economist position which posits a material base, itself 
directly – and magically – productive of signs, generation of discourse is also a 
material activity, which "as much entails material work and elaboration as the 
activities of the alleged base" (68). In this respect, it is worth quoting him at some 
length: 
 
Discourse doesn't appear spontaneously out of matter: it is the 
product of human work and human labour. It is an institution 
that can't be simply derived from the alleged economic base. 
Like economic activity, discursive activity is nothing less than 
the transformation of matter through work, and though the 
economic sphere and the discursive sphere may interact, and in 
fact can hardly be conceived outside their interaction, to think of 
discourse as a floating, hazy, transcendental cloud hovering 
above the machinery amounts to a mystification of the material 
operation of ideology. To put this another way: to theorize the 
image as a nebulous superstructural accompaniment to a hard 
and necessary base is to deny the institution of discourse as a 
cultural form which interacts with the other, legal, political, 
economic forms in the social world (Bryson 68). 
   
Nowhere has this interaction been more vivid and evident than the field of design. As 
an evidence to such an interaction we can quote a design definition prepared by legal 
institution in collaboration and through negotiations with ETMK (Industrial 
Designers' Society of Turkey) and TPE (Turkish Patent Institute). This definition was 
intended as a legal framework to be referred in design registration applications or in 
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the suits against design thefts. I have translated this definition into English to quote it 
here: 
 
'Design' denotes the totality that can be perceived by human 
senses, resulting from a product's features and characteristics 
such as the lines, shape, form, colors, texture, materials, 
elasticity, etc. belonging either to the whole of the product or to 
its parts or ornamentation (Ankara Patent Bürosu 107). 
 
Fatma Korkut, one of the members of the executive board of ETMK, took active part 
in the preparation of the law amending ordinance on 'The Protection of Industrial 
Designs', in which the above definition figures. She reports that the primary concern 
of jurists was to define design in such a way as to allow them to document and 
compare designed products as objectively as possible (oral communication with the 
writer). They, therefore, insisted on defining design in terms of measurable, readily 
describable qualities. For example, they emphasized the visual qualities of products 
through their advocacy of the term görünüş (appearance), which had actually 
appeared in the definition of EU Directive. Designers, on the other hand, were more 
inclined towards legislating design as a totality, not to be confined solely to a 
concern with appearances. They wanted the definition to keep the ethos of designing, 
that is, an activity preoccupied with generating ideas and concepts, which are to be 
embodied in products. They, therefore, wanted the definition to do justice to the 
qualities of products that are not readily perceivable to the eye. For example, they 
proposed the term 'totality' on the assumption that it would also cover the qualities 
that are not visible but tactile and ideational. This account clearly shows that the 
production of this definition – in the end, an effort to compose a few signs into a unit 
of discourse – is a material activity, which is contested by various stakeholders and 
which has taken place within a network of power. This is also evident in the ETMK's 
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annual activity report of 1998, which states that the involvement of ETMK in the 
preparation of the decree on 'The Protection of Industrial Designs' has "brought about 
a designer's point of view to the formation of the Industrial Design Registration in 
Turkey" (Industrial Designers' Society of Turkey 2). The result is this definition, 
which can not be regarded as a direct expression of the interests of any of the 
participants.    
 
 
7.9.5 Design as Nexus: A Genealogical Perspective on Design 
 
Situating design among the material activities in society brings us to the third model 
of 'design as nexus', which is the closest one to the genealogical conception of power. 
According to this model, design should be considered as a 'nexus' in a complex 
network of forces. In this respect, design discourse takes shape as a result of multi-
faceted exchanges between the field of design and a diversity of other discourses and 
practices in society. Furthermore, both the nature of these exchanges and the 
discourses and practices themselves with which design discourse has a series of 
connections and links are subject to changes throughout history. To reveal the 
historicity of these relations demands a dissociating genealogical perspective rather 
than a unifying framework that explains the mechanisms of design discourse at a 
single stroke. That is to say, if we are to characterize design discourse, we should do 
justice to its diverse mechanisms of formation. For instance, we should study the 
formation of design statements in relation to, as a response to, as a reflection of, as 
opposed to, in complicity with, in struggle with, as indifferent to, as a 
misunderstanding of, as coextensive with, as transgressive of, as a variant of, as 
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differing from, as a part of, as a symptom of, as representing, as an epiphenomenon 
of, as an obstacle to, as resisting to, as traversing, as concurrent with, … a diversity 
of other discourses and practices in society. This multiplicity of relations also 
explains why there have been so much different and frequently incompatible objects 
of design that have been formed in design definitions. However, having posited such 
a multiplicity in design discourse, a problem simultaneously arises. If design 
discourse were productive of such diverse objects of design, how could we still talk 
about the existence of a discourse proper to the field of design? A number of 
questions also arise.         
 
What constitutes the identity of a discipline like design if not the persistence of its 
object? What gives coherence to a discipline if not its clearly delimited object? Our 
analysis of design definitions has showed that the object of design proves incapable 
of providing the coherence, the unity of the discipline. As can also be expected, the 
historical unity of design as a discipline can still less be based upon the particular 
weltanschauung of its practitioners throughout history. The self-evident unity of 
design discipline, therefore, is untenable. As Mahon remarks, "if the object of a 
discipline could not undergird its coherence, neither could a consistent style or 
manner of statement shared by practitioners" (106). To cut it short, what unites such 
geographically and historically disparate figures as Greenough, Semper, Loewy, 
Fuller, Graves, Sottsass, or Stark under the banner of design so that an industrial 
designer of today can find his lineage in this figures? 
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7.10 Morality in Design Discourse 
 
I propose that a shared morality, relatively constant throughout history, is that which 
gives design discourse the visage of its identity. The field of design is not only a 
nexus within a network of power but also organized internally as a status group in 
pursuit of social power. The pursuit of such an interest, however, demands a higher 
morality that unites the members of the profession around certain goals. In addition, 
this morality will serve as a protective shield, as a framework of justification when 
the field of design is contested by various agents, disciplines, institutions, 
professions, societies, etc., which are foreign to design. Though it was couched in 
terms of ideology, A. W. Goulden's account of instrumental rationality as dependent 
on a larger morality is relevant here: 
 
If we divest ourselves of any notion of instrumental rationality 
as a Geist-like disembodied wraith, and see it instead as a part of 
the occupational culture of experts and technicians who 
constitute a specific status group, with status interests they wish 
to protect and advance, and for which they require political 
allies, and which, in turn, require an ideology acceptable to these 
allies, then it becomes clear: technicians and experts are forced 
to go beyond instrumental rationality, and to generate a larger 
morality (Goulden 269). 
 
Similarly, designers felt themselves compelled to develop a substantial morality in 
order to rise above the instrumental position to which they always felt the danger of 
being relegated. In other words, while the advent of industrial capitalism and a 
number of accompanying developments prepared the conditions of existence of the 
design profession, designers had to find the raison d'etre of their activities by 
themselves. They, therefore, generated a moral-critical discourse on 'form', which 
prepared the ground for the subsequent problematizations of form in terms of truth 
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(e.g. form as the bearer of truth about materials and function, form as the 
physiognomy of the object, form as the bearer of meaning, etc.). Moreover, thanks to 
this morality in design, design discourse has been equipped with mechanisms that 
allow it to project "ideas about technology, progress, and, above all, ways of life, into 
objects and environments" (Dilnot 248). Therefore, we should study the definitions 
of design on the horizon of morality as well. We should seek the specific 
mechanisms of this moral orientation in design discourse. As we shall see, the 
presumed identity of a design discipline can only be maintained on the basis of 
relatively unchanging mechanisms, which are responsible for the moralization of 
design discourse, rather than the coherence of its object or subject matter. In what 
follows, we shall be examining the definitions of design with special reference to a 
morality that animates them from within. To accomplish this, however, we shall first 
redefine the notion of definition from a genealogical perspective.      
 
 
7.11 Definitions of Design Reconsidered 
 
To define an object, concept, etc. is to delimit it. To define something is to determine 
the boundaries that separate it from all the others. Yet, to engage in a definition is not 
as benign an exercise as drawing more or less faithfully the boundaries of an object 
that preexists definition. To define is, rather, to impose an interpretation, to constitute 
an object. Therefore, even if it exists empirically, an object is not yet a real object 
before and unless it is defined. That is, things assume the status of an object only by 
virtue of being defined. Objects appear only in definitions, since it is definitions 
which has given birth to them in the first place. Yet, for exactly the same reasons, 
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objects can also disappear in definitions. The objects that were previously constituted 
and established through a series of definitions can be replaced with new objects or 
eliminated altogether by way of a new definition. This point has enormous 
consequences for our definition of definitions, since it opens the exercise of 
generating definitions to the field of power. If definitions are constitutive of their 
objects rather than reflections of them, then, they should be considered as 
interpretations that emerge within a network of power. Definitions are, therefore, 
active interpretations rather than outcomes of passive contemplation or observation. 
For this reason, definitions, as interpretations in the Nietzschean and Foucauldian 
senses of the term, are always already enmeshed in the web of power. When one 
declares that 'design is a problem solving activity', one rather means 'we want design 
to be a problem solving activity'. Therefore, we should focus on the moral will that 
forges a definition of design by appealing to certain mechanisms that are active in 
design discourse.  
 
If the study of definitions is so fundamental to the mapping of a field in terms of 
power and morality, why did not design scholars study the multiplicity of definitions 
of their discipline? Why did not they ask such questions as below? 
 
1) Who has the power, qualification and knowledge to define design?  
2) How is it that design came into being? 
3) What were the historical conditions of existence for the formation of a profession 
and/or activity we now call design?  
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Instead of asking 'what design is', would it not have been more illuminating if they 
had sought answers to such genealogical questions? Why did they obstinately 
continue their attempts to formulate still new definitions that they hope would 
capture the phenomenon of design more comprehensively, more correctly and more 
essentially than the previous ones? Would it not have yielded more enlightening 
results if they had studied the definitions themselves instead of trying to fabricate 
still newer ones? The answer, I propose, is 'no'. They could not have posed such 
genealogical questions to their subject matter. They are destined to generate 
definitions ever anew. The reasons why they should do so are twofold: 
 
1) Since to define is to exercise power, before everything else, the members of the 
newly developing design scholarship should have engaged in the production of 
definitions that would characterize the field and its objects in accordance with their 
concerns (e.g. to constitute objects that are the most amenable to research and 
analysis, to impose a unifying framework upon the field, to control the field by 
monopolizing the power to define it, etc.). As must be clear by now, the territory of 
design is not only contested by foreign agents and stakeholders but its ownership 
may also be disputed by a number of factions from within. The interests at stake 
might be material, as implied by the growing power of the professional ideologies of 
design, or symbolic, as suggested by the continual efforts to pass design as a 
scientific discipline and the activity of designing as the "primary underlying matrix 
of life" (Papanek 3). Nevertheless, continual re-interpretation of the subject matter of 
design has always been a constant need for designers in the face of competitors and 
rivals, both within and without.  
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2) The continual generation of definitions is also indispensable for the livelihood and 
continuance of any organization of people who are involved in creative deeds. As 
was discussed extensively in the previous chapters, such people demand a limited 
horizon that enables them to engage in future-oriented, creative deeds. Definitions, in 
this respect, are among such statements that effectively trace a limited horizon 
around these people.  
 
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche also alluded to the problem of definitions. 
According to the Nietzschean perspective, to define an entity is both an impossible 
and an inevitable task. Let me, therefore, expand upon Nietzsche's critique of 
definitions. This would shed more light on the above two points I have raised with 
respect to the necessity of definitions.   
 
 
7.12 The Notion of Definition Genealogically Defined 
 
In one of his brilliant epigrams, Nietzsche remarked that "only that which has no 
history is definable" (Genealogy 80). According to Nietzsche, there is a great deal of 
active interpretations that take place between the emergence of a thing and its 
eventual meaning and function. Each new interpretation gives rise either to an 
alteration or mutation in or to a substitution or displacement of the previous meaning 
or purpose of a thing. Therefore, the history of a thing, form, custom, or institution 
can be regarded as a 'sign-chain' composed of successive interpretations that follow 
each other in a purely contingent fashion (Nietzsche, Genealogy 77). In this regard, 
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the analysis of descent reveals the impossibility of assigning a stable identity (i.e., a 
proper definition) to an entity.  
 
This series of interpretations can take place in two distinct forms. Various 
interpretations either supersede one another or accumulate over time to form "a kind 
of unity that is hard to disentangle, hard to analyze and . . . totally indefinable" 
(Nietzsche, Genealogy 80). As we have discussed earlier, the former is closer to 
Foucault's conception of interpretation than the latter, which carries the brand of 
Nietzsche. Foucault does not allow continuity to play any role in the series of 
interpretations. According to his caesural view of historical change, interpretations 
regularly insert difference and discontinuity into the system of rules and practices. 
That is to say, practices, not meanings, constitute the major target of interpretations 
according to Foucault. Nietzsche, on the other hand, regards meanings and purposes 
as the fluid elements that are ever susceptible to new interpretations while the 
practices represent the enduring skeleton. Nietzsche's genealogies, therefore, allows 
interpretation to transform the semantic profile of things instead of the manner in 
which they are exercised. Each time we isolate this profile of an entity we encounter 
the crystallization of different meanings that forms the visage of its identity.         
 
In this respect, the quest for definitions is doomed to failure from the very start. This 
failure can occur in two different ways. Firstly, the attempt to define an entity may 
lead us to mistake effects for causes. That is, when we isolate an object in order to 
define it, we habitually regard its present interpretation as its essential meaning or 
identity and, therefore, make the mistake of imposing our present needs and 
assumptions on the cause of its origin. Secondly, when we happen to define a 
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concept in which an entire series of interpretations has been "semiotically 
concentrated", we simply flounder, since our gaze is only adapted to detect absolutes 
and unities (Nietzsche, Genealogy 80). However, if we listen to history, we can 
realize that there is not any moment, even at the origin, when we can grasp an object 
in its purity or a concept in its unity. Therefore, only when we overlook its history 
can we define an object or a concept. In other words, only from 'ahistorical' and 
'suprahistorical' perspectives can it be possible to define a thing.   
 
Yet, definitions are still indispensable for the livelihood and continuance of any 
organization of people, whether it is the culture at large or all sorts of professions, 
associations, communities, arts, disciplines, etc. Devising definitions is an important 
part of the plastic power of a culture. As mentioned before, this plastic power enables 
a culture to establish a horizon around itself. In order for this horizon to cater for the 
"life, health, and activity" of a people, it should be a 'limited' one (Mahon 96). 
Therefore, only a narrow perspective on history is allowed to enter this horizon. As 
can be expected, only an interpretation emanating from an ahistorical or a 
suprahistorical perspective can bring about such a limited horizon. In this respect, 
definitions are among such interpretations that provide a culture with a limited 
horizon, a framework for creative, future-oriented action.  
 
As to the definitions of design, we can conclude that these definitions render service 
to designers by providing them with frameworks for creative action. This conception 
of definition also allows us to establish power as a productive relation of force. That 
is to say, although definitions of design are constituted within relations of power, 
nevertheless, they are what enable designers to create new objects. Through 
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definitions, power distributes its productive force. Having said these, let me now 
begin to characterize the definitions of design I have compiled and tabulated 
analytically in Appendix A and Appendix B respectively.  
 
 
7.13 Definitions of Design Analyzed 
 
If there is a coherent object of a discipline, it should be detectable in the definitions 
of that discipline. Yet, the case appears not to be so. Even a quick glance at the third 
column of our table given in Appendix B would reveal the existence of multiple and 
mostly incompatible objects of design. One can object to this multiplicity by 
claiming that the difference in terminology or wording does not guarantee the 
existence of an equal number of different objects. Therefore, one may claim that 
although language expresses them differently, they are, in fact, the same objects in 
diverse appearances. Indeed, differently couched terms such as 'products for mass-
manufacture' (definition no.4), 'mass-produced products' (definition no.17), 
'manufactured products' (definition no.25), and even 'products' (definitions no.18, 23, 
and 29) designate the same object. Yet, can we expect the same relation to obtain 
between such terms as 'things' (definition no.24), 'artifacts' (definition no.32), and 
'products'? While the term 'thing' may be inclusive of both 'artifact' and 'product', 
these two are exclusive categories. While the term 'thing' designates all the physical 
objects that are either given or man-made, 'artifact' is a special term used to denote 
objects exclusively made by man such as a tool or an ornament. Artifacts, in 
addition, may not necessarily be physical objects; there are also cognitive artifacts 
such as "logic" or "techniques of memorization or representation" (Norman, Things 
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11). The term 'product', on the other hand, is generally used to refer to artifacts that 
are produced by industrial methods. These three terms, therefore, designate different 
objects that belong to different domains. At least we can conclude that, 
 
(1) There are a number of objects, which are, in the final analysis, fundamentally the 
same although different expressions are employed to designate them.  
 
(2) Yet, there are a greater number of different objects, which can not be equated or 
linked together either at the level of the signifier or at the level of the signified.   
 
We can draw still further conclusions from these observations: There is no one-to-
one correspondence between the number of definitions and the number of objects 
they constitute. Although each new definition may potentially give rise to a different 
object, actually the objects that are effectively constituted in a field are not equal in 
number to the definitions generated in the field. That is to say, although there might 
be a large number of definitions that are operative in the field, this is not a sign that 
there are plenty of objects that saturate the field. Apparently different definitions can 
give rise to the same object. The reverse is also true. That is, apparently similar 
definitions can give rise to quite different objects. Compare the definition no.7 with 
the definition no.15. Although they are motivated by similar intrinsic goals ('to 
display new physical order' and 'to impose meaningful order'), they have given rise to 
quite dissimilar objects ('form' versus 'all that we do').  
 
Though the objects they constitute differs to a great extent, these definitions still 
form a series since designers recognise each of them as belonging to their field. 
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Therefore, as our final task, we have to find out the principle(s) on the basis of which 
these diverse definitions are connected or the mechanism(s) that give rise to such 
different definitions but link them at another level. I propose two conjectures that 
would allow us to proceed. 
 
(1) The mechanisms of formation that connect these definitions are the ones 
responsible for the generation of moral statements. We should, therefore, seek these 
mechanisms in the columns no. 4, 8 and 10 of our analytic table in Appendix B. We 
should, in other words, examine the statements about,  
 
a) The objectives of designing, or the intrinsic goals of designing (column no.4), 
b) The roles that design assumes, or the ethical experience of designing (column 
no.8), 
c) The boundaries that separate design from what is not design (column no.10).   
 
(2) The principle that connects these definitions to one another is not a principle of 
identity. It is, rather, a principle of negation and difference that is responsible for 
their dispersion. It is not the common denominator of all these dispersed and 
disparate definitions, not the shared outlook that is manifested in these definitions 
that unites them. Moreover, it is not with the relation of affirmation and dependence 
that each definition is linked to the series. Rather, we should seek their regularity in 
the relation of negation and difference that connects and disperses these definitions at 
the same time. For although each new definition brings forth a different object, it is 
carried out always in opposition to, as against, or in contradistinction to a former set 
of definitions.  
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Let me start by expanding on the first conjecture. Column no.10 contains some 
borderline cases that are used to help define the boundaries of design. It seems that 
most definitions of design carry out an epistemological and ontological distinction 
between design and a number of domains that serve as its 'other', its 'limit', or its 
'threshold'. Definitions of design need these on the assumption that by so doing 
'design' can be substantiated. As Walker remarks, 
 
Like all words and concepts, 'design' gains its specific meaning 
and value not only because of what it refers to but also 
differentially, that is, via its contrast with other, neighbouring 
terms such as 'art', 'craft', 'engineering'… This is one reason why 
definitions of 'design' which purport to encapsulate an essential 
meaning tend to be so unsatisfactory (23). 
 
When we examine column no.10, we come across a number of fields (e.g. styling, 
art, science, engineering, marketing, etc.) and roles (educating public taste, problem 
solving, giving service to the enterprise, etc.) that design excludes in order to be 
itself. Since these are fields from which – and, thanks to which – design distinguishes 
itself, there must have been a structural and describable relation among them. Indeed, 
although that which serves as the negative of design changes each time in history, 
they can still be grouped into two inclusive categories: 
 
1) The domain of art and styling: stylist, dignified artist, painting, poetry, artist, 
aesthetics, educator of public taste (as artists are so), etc. 
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2) The domain of engineering and technology: science, engineering, industrial design 
(in the sense of industrial engineering), inventor, problem solver, service for 
enterprise (with reference to an instrumental position), etc. 
 
Now, I suggest that design is always defined with reference to these two extremes. 
Definitions of design negate these terms either directly (as art, style, or engineering) 
or indirectly by referring to a practice associated with these domains (e.g. invention). 
Among these domains and practices, style and engineering have always been a bone 
of contention among designers. When one is negated, the other becomes closer to 
design. Many design statements are produced by going to and fro between these 
poles. Design discourse handles these two limits in a state of ambivalence, which is 
one of the mechanisms through which diverse design statements and definitions are 
connected to each other. Let me, therefore, dwell on this point a little longer.  
 
Styling and engineering represent the two poles between which design negotiates for 
its true position and identity. The field delineated by these two extremes functions as 
a magnetic field of attraction and repulsion for design depending on its current 
circumstances. The identity of design profession has always been sought after 
between these two terms, and a resolution is sometimes tried to be achieved in the 
appropriate blends of the two. However, most of the times, these two terms are 
variously invoked as the other, the limit, or the threshold of design.       
 
At times, when the design and its outcomes are denounced as having become 
trivialized due to an excessive preoccupation with styling, designers have a recourse 
to an affiliation with engineers in their discourse in order to differentiate what they 
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do from styling. Annoyed by the views which see design as a superficial activity 
occupied with the qualities of products that appear on the ‘surface’ and designers as a 
belated group of professionals who are called in after the decisions concerning the 
function of the products have already been made, designers start to exhibit a 
sympathy with the systematic thinking and the instrumentalist rationality of 
engineers. For instance, by defining ‘form’ as “a certain arrangement of parts and an 
overall structure”, Eskild Tjalve attempts to achieve a convergence between design 
and engineering (3). Tjalve and many other scholars do not make a clear and sharp 
distinction between design and engineering, and believe that their activities overlap 
in many respects.  
 
When, however, the products, which have been designed with an engineering-
oriented approach, start to be criticized for their indifference to psychological and 
cultural characteristics of ‘human’ users, the designers begin to articulate an alliance 
with styling in their discourses on the diverse elaborations of form. Though designers 
are fascinated by technology and have a strong desire to take part in its exercise of 
power, the criticism which condemns engineering for not responding to human needs 
and values prompts designers to keep themselves at a particular distance from 
technological issues. Moreover, the prevalence of ‘heroism’ in the realm of design 
contributes to this distancing of designers from engineers who, after all, remain 
largely anonymous and are unlikely to become star personalities (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13. Designer as a star personality: Raymond Loewy on the cover of Time 
magazine. 
 
 
However, the existence of such borderline cases is a guarantee of the maintenance of 
design's identity. Although this may not be a stable identity, nevertheless the 
negative space opened up by way of these negations is large enough for design to 
move freely without renouncing its claims of identity. For example, there might be 
several epistemic ruptures that can break the continuity of the design discipline. But, 
as long as these ruptures do not cause the field of design to cross these thresholds and 
become something other than it is, there would be enough number of alternative roles 
for design to assume while still retaining the visage of its identity.   
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Definitions of design do not only constitute objects or generate statements about 
limits but also invoke other objects, which were constituted elsewhere, and establish 
a set of relations among them. For example, in the definition below, there are more 
objects or concepts than the one defined. 
 
Design is what occurs when art meets industry, when people 
begin to make decisions about what mass-produced products 
should look like (Bayley 9; Definition no.17 in Appendix A).  
 
In this definition, neither art nor industry is defined; rather, their meanings are taken 
for granted. Nevertheless, these two undefined terms are put in a certain relation 
without which the definition would be incomplete. Design is defined as that which 
takes place at the intersection of art and industry. If these objects were not invoked 
and related in this manner to one another, design could not be defined. Omit these 
two object-terms from this definition and see that whether it makes sense at all. It 
seems that there are some mechanisms through which ontologically different objects, 
entities or fields are invoked and related to one another in a certain way in order to 
define design.  Analysis of these relations would reveal the moralizing tendency of 
design definitions. This would also demonstrate how so many different definitions 
are connected to one another.  
 
Where should we seek such moral statements that relate different objects to one 
another, then? They can be found in the places where it is likeliest to come across 
moral statements, namely, column no. 4 and 8. To remind the reader, the former 
column was devoted to the objectives, or intrinsic goals of designing, while the latter 
is allocated to the analysis of the roles that design assumes (or, the ethical experience 
of design). First, let me pick out those instances where the roles and objectives of 
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design are defined by establishing relations between ontologically different objects, 
entities and fields.  
 
Column no.4: 
i) "to display new physical order, organization, form, in response to function" (form 
and function) (definition no.7), 
ii) "to give a form appropriate to its function" (form and function) (definition no.11), 
iii) "to bestow form upon an otherwise formless material" (form and material) 
(definition no.22), 
iv) "to blend form and function" (form and function) (definition no.23), 
v) "to contribute to a product's usefulness as well as to its looks" (utility and 
appearance) (definition no.29). 
 
Column no.8: 
i) "liaison linking the management, engineering, and the consumer" (management, 
engineering and the consumer) (definition no.5), 
ii) "to achieve fitness between a form and its context" (form and context) (definition 
no.7), 
iii) "to re-establish the long-lost contact between art and the public" (art and the 
public) (definition no.8), 
iv) "to reestablish contact between art and the public" (art and the public) (definition 
no.12), 
v) "to blend quality and style, art and engineering" (quality and style; art and 
engineering) (definition no.23), 
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vi) "to serve the physical needs and satisfy the psychological desires of people" (need 
and desire) (definition no.25). 
 
As can be seen, there are many kinds of entities, objects or fields that are put in 
certain relations in these definitions. Yet, in this diversity, we can observe a 
consistency at two levels. First, in 10 out of 11 definitions, the terms that are put in 
relations are in a state of binary opposition (See Table 7.12). Second, 6 out of 9 of 
these pairs can be placed within the semantic space of 'form-function' couple (See 
Table 7.12).  
 
FORM – FUNCTION FORM – CONTEXT 
APPEARANCE – UTILITY ART – PUBLIC 
ART – ENGINEERING MNG – ENG – CONSUMER 
STYLE – QUALITY  
DESIRE – NEED  
FORM – MATERIAL  
 
Table 7.1: Objects that are put in relation by design definitions. 
 
What conclusions should we draw from these observations tabulated above? What 
follows is a number of suggestions we put forward.  
 
1) Definitions of design employ binary terms usually chosen from the semantic space 
of form-function couple. 
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2) Yet, it is also design discourse that is responsible for the separation and 
distribution of objects into this binary structure of form and function in the first 
place. This is because, in order to be related, they should first be separated.  
 
3) Definitions of design receive these objects in their separation and establish their 
relation in a definite number of ways.   
 
4) Design discourse in general and definitions of design in particular re-establish 
contact between these terms, 
 a) by positing a fitness between them according to a logic of propriety (e.g. 
form and context, form and function, etc.), 
 b) by placing them into a mutual dependency (e.g. management, engineering 
and consumer),  
 c) by allowing communications to take place between them (e.g. 'form 
explains function', art and public, etc.), 
 d) by trying to achieve a synthesis of them (e.g. 'to blend form and function'), 
 e) by associating them according to a logic of translatability (e.g. function 
into form, meaning into form, laws of nature into beauty or aesthetics, beautiful into 
intelligible, etc.), 
 f) by putting them to a parts-whole relationship (remember Tjalve's definition 
of 'form' in page 40), 
 g) by positing a relation of antecedence between them (e.g. form follows 
function), 
 h) by hierarchising them (e.g. again, form follows function), 
 i) by subordinating them to a higher, unifying principle (e.g. nature), 
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 j) by confusing the substantial with insubstantial (e.g. function as a substance 
to be given form).  
 
To conclude, on the basis of such mechanisms, the historical links between the 
diversity of design statements, objects and definitions have been established. 
However, one final task remains. This time, we shall be discussing not the 
mechanisms but the principle that is responsible for their simultaneous dispersion 
and connection. To remind the reader, I proposed that the principle connecting these 
diverse statements and definitions to one another is not a principle of identity. 
Rather, it is a principle of negation and difference. So, let me, finally, discuss these.  
 
 
7.14 Definitions of Design and the Principle of Negation and Difference 
 
The fact that there are numerous and different definitions in a field of activity does 
not mean that they are different interpretations that revolve around the same object. 
That is, different definitions do not look at the same object from different angles, or 
emphasize different aspects of the same complex reality. Rather, they constitute their 
objects. Each new definition poses the implicit argument that the former definitions 
of the object were inadequate or wrong and it more adequately captures the true 
essence of the object. Definitions, in other words, do not accept their perspectival 
character. There is no definition that presents itself as another interpretation from a 
different angle. They have a truth claim. If we remember that interpretations conceal 
the fact that they are interpretations, the situation becomes clear. To sum up, 
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a) each new definition purports to define the same object in a more adequate, correct, 
essential way. Definitions assume the preexistence of their objects.  
 
b) each new definition, therefore, can be situated on a scale of negations: from a total 
negation of prior definitions to a simple correction of or an expansion upon the 
former definitions. Each definition, that is, contains an element of negation of and an 
attitude of challenge to the former definitions.  
 
Therefore, we can conclude that design arguments have always been motivated by 
the sense that 'design has gone wrong'. The perceived deterioration, degeneration, 
and demise of design have been the basis on which a new design argument is 
initiated. In other words, each new account of design starts with a negation of the 
conditions in which it is developed as well as the former state of affairs. Therefore, 
the mode of argumentation in the field of design is predominantly motivated by the 
sense of ressentiment. This is precisely what gives the predominant moral orientation 
to these arguments. This moral problematization, in turn, has authorized designers to 
pose these arguments in terms of truth. For instance, the preoccupation with 
ornament was declared first as crime. On the basis of this moral problematization of 
ornament have designers been capable of problematizing design in terms of truth. 
Hence, they raised the argument that 'form' should not violate the truth of materials 
from which it is made and should be appropriate to its function. A whole set of 
arguments that invite designers to create forms, which are spontaneously derived 
from the inner essence of materials and functions, have been raised. Yet, these 
negations based on the premise that 'design has gone wrong' do not extend to the 
origin and the entire past of design. It is, rather, thought that design has gone wrong 
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only recently, that the symptoms of decadence appeared at a certain point in the 
history of design. The critics have never agreed upon the specific time and locale of 
this demise. Yet, almost all the time, such a decline provided the necessary 
background and justification of the new arguments that are to be raised. It seems that 
each argument had a twofold understanding of a horizon. While a more or less 
limited horizon provided designers with a recent past to be negated, a wider horizon 
that included the so-called pre-history of design represented the origin to be returned. 
In other words, posing the problem from the perspective of a recent decline enabled 
designers to propose or prescribe the panacea in terms of a return to origins. Yet, no 
need to say that these origins are constructions, active interpretations. Moral 
problematization of design from a fairly narrow perspective enabled designers to 
prescribe a return to origins where the truth of design is argued to exist. As has been 
mentioned, this origin varies according to the argument in question. It can be Greek 
principles of design long abandoned, or a primitive mode of making objects, pre-
industrial techniques of production, Nature, culture, etc. It is interesting to note that 
both the idea of nature and the idea of culture have been employed – in different 
times, of course – as the origin or the substratum to which design has to turn if it is to 
be a truthful activity. At the modern period, we can see a vast number of references 
to the idea of nature to which design has to consult (Greenough). No room allowed 
for associations, symbolism, etc. The translation of rhetoric into the objects was 
declared fatal (Greenough 19). With the advent of product semantics in the 1980s, 
however, design were declared once again as having gone wrong because the 
products were universal and indifferent to the users since design did not 
acknowledge its embeddedness in culture. Surprisingly enough, the rhetoric, once 
denounced as fatal, came to be recommended.  
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8 CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
In this study, I have tried to perform a genealogical critique in the field of design. 
This critique involved three facets: 
 
1) A genealogical critique of design values such as 'the unity of form' and 'functional 
identity'. The objects of this critical analysis were individual designed products; and 
the aim was to shatter the apparent unity of the designed product together with the 
identity of the designer. For this purpose, I have proposed a method called 'Re-
Sketching', which is derived from the ethos of sketching. 
 
2) A genealogical inquiry into the historical conditions that were responsible for the 
emergence of design profession. This study revealed that design, as we know it 
today, has been historically possible as a result of an epistemic shift in the conception 
and production of objects and an organizational change in the manufacturing process 
that began with the specialization and industrialization, which were stimulated by the 
Industrial Revolution that took place in Britain around 1770.  
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3) A genealogical analysis of design discourse. For this purpose, I have, first, tried 
systematically to categorize the types of statements that constitute design discourse. 
From these elements, I have chosen 'definitions of design' as the most pertinent unit 
of analysis. Then, I have compiled an inventory of design definitions, and broken 
them into still smaller units. Through the analysis of these units, from which these 
definitions are composed, I have revealed the functioning of some mechanisms 
whereby design is given a moral identity. Moreover, I have demonstrated that these 
definitions are historically connected to one another not in accordance with a 
principle of identity but on the basis of a principle of negation and difference.  
 
Finally, by way of lengthy discussions, I have revealed design to be a material 
activity, which has multi-faceted relations to power. For this purpose, I proposed a 
framework to characterize design as 'nexus'.     
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APPENDIX A 
THE INVENTORY OF DESIGN DEFINITIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
Definition 1   Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1768: "[Design] is the invention and 
conduct of a subject, the disposition of each part, and the general 
direction of the whole." (Balcıoğlu 255) 
 
 
Definition 2 Norman Bel Geddes, 1934: "[Design is] a mental conception of 
something to be done. A visual design is the organism of an idea 
of a visual nature so that it may be executed. It is the practice of 
organising various elements to produce a desired result. Design 
deals exclusively with organization and arrangement of form." 
(Lambert 45) 
 
 
Definition 3  F. Mercer, 1947: "The industrial designer is a technical 
specialist in visual appeal . . . [he] is retained by a manufacturer 
with one object only: to increase the demand for his products 
through their increased attractiveness to the consumer. He is 
paid by the manufacturer according to his success in achieving 
that object. The industrial designer stands or falls upon his 
ability to create and maintain profitable trade. He is first and 
foremost an industrial technician and not primarily an educator 
of public taste. Under existing conditions his business must be to 
make profits for his employers." (12) 
 
 
Definition 4 Van Doren, 1954: "Industrial design is the practice of 
analyzing, creating, and developing products for mass-
manufacture. Its goal is to achieve forms which are assured of 
acceptance before extensive capital investment has ben made, 
and which can be manufactured at a price permitting wide 
distribution and reasonable profits." (Papanek 32)  
 
 
Definition 5 Henry Dreyfuss, 1955: "[Designer] is a businessman as well as 
a person who makes drawings and models. He is a keen 
observer of public taste and he has painstakingly cultivated his 
own taste. He has an understanding of merchandising, how 
things are made, packed, distributed, and displayed. He accepts 
the responsibility of his position as liaison linking the 
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management, engineering, and the consumer and cooperates 
with all three." (Lambert 47) 
 
 
Definition 6 Josef Albers, 1961: 
To Design 
"To design is 
to plan and organize,  
to order, to relate 
and to control. 
In short, it embraces 
all means opposing 
disorder and accident. 
Therefore, it signifies 
a human need 
and qualifies man's 
thinking and doing." 
 (Kelly 3) 
 
 
Definition 7 Christopher Alexander, 1964: "[Design is] the process of 
inventing physical things which display new physical order, 
organization, form, in response to function." (1) 
 
"The ultimate object of design is form." (15) 
 
". . . every design problem begins with an effort to achieve 
fitness between two entities: the form in question and its 
context. The form is the solution to the problem; the context 
defines the problem. In other words, when we speak of design, 
the real object of discussion is not the form alone, but the 
ensemble comprising the form and its context. Good fit is a 
desired property of this ensemble which relates to some 
particular division of the ensemble into form and context." (15-
16) 
 
"The form is simply that part of the ensemble over which we 
have control. It is only through the form that we can create order 
in the ensemble." (27) 
 
 
Definition 8 Bruno Munari, 1966: "the designer of today re-establishes the 
long-lost contact between art and the public, between living 
people and art as a living thing. Instead of pictures for the 
drawing-room, electric gadgets for the kitchen. There should be 
no such thing as art divorced from life, with beautiful things to 
look at and hideous things to use." (25) 
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Definition 9: Bruno Munari, 1966: "[Designer] is a planner with an aesthetic 
sense. Certain industrial products depend in large measure on 
him for their success. Nearly always the shape of a thing, be it a 
typewriter, a pair of binoculars, an armchair, a ventilator, a 
saucepan or a refrigerator, will have an important effect on 
sales: the better designed it is, the more it will sell." (29) 
 
"… the planning as objectively as possible of everything that 
goes to make up the surroundings and atmosphere in which men 
live today. This atmosphere is created by all the objects 
produced by industry, from glasses to houses and even cities. It 
is planning done without preconceived notions of style, 
attempting only to give each thing its logical structure and 
proper material, and in consequence its logical form." (35) 
 
 
Definition 10 Bruno Munari, 1966: "The industrial designer . . . thinks of the 
aesthetic side of the job as simply a matter of providing a finish, 
and although this may be most scrupulously done he avoids 
aesthetic problems that are bound up with contemporary culture 
because such things are not considered useful. . . . The designer 
works differently. He gives the right weight to each part of the 
project in hand, and he knows that the ultimate form of the 
object is psychologically vital when the potantial buyer is 
making up his mind. He therefore tries to give it a form as 
appropriate as possible to its function, a form that one might say 
arises spontaneously from the function, from the mechanical 
part (when there is one), from the most appropriate material, 
from the most up-to-date production techniques, from a 
calculation of costs, and from other psychological and aesthetic 
factors." (30) 
 
 
Definition 11 Bruno Munari, 1966: "The designer is therefore the artist of 
today, not because he is a genius but because he works in such a 
way as to reestablish contact between art and the public, because 
he has the humility and ability to respond to whatever demand is 
made of him by the society in which he lives, because he knows 
his job, and the ways and means of solving each problem of 
design. And finally because he responds to the human needs of 
his time, and helps people to solve certain problems without 
stylistic preconceptions or false notions of artistic dignity 
derived from the schism of the arts." (32) 
 
 
Definition 12 Bruno Munari, 1966: "Industrial design is concerned with 
functional objects, designed according to economic facts and the 
study of techniques and materials." (33) 
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Definition 13 Herbert Simon, 1969: "Everyone designs who devises courses 
of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred 
ones. The intellectual activity that produces material artifacts is 
no different fundamentally from the one that prescribes 
remedies for a sick patient or the one that devises a new sales 
plan for a company or a social welfare policy for a state. Design, 
so construed, is the core of all professional training: it is the 
principal mark that distinguishes the professions from the 
sciences." (Margolin, Introduction 3) 
 
 
Definition 14 Victor Papanek, 1971, 1984: "All men are designers. All that 
we do, almost all the time, is design, for design is basic to all 
human activity. The planning and patterning of any act toward a 
desired, foreseeble end constitutes the design process. Any 
attempt to separate design, to make it a thing-by-itself, works 
counter to the fact that design is the primary underlying matrix 
of life. Design is composing an epic poem, executing a mural, 
painting a masterpiece, writing a concerto. But design is also 
cleaning and reorganizing a desk drawer, pulling an impacted 
tooth, baking an apple pie, choosing sides for a backlot baseball 
game, and educating a child. Design is the conscious and 
intuitive effort to impose meaningful order." (3-4) 
 
"The ultimate job of design is to transform man's environment 
and tools and, by extension, man himself." (28) 
 
 
Definition 15 John Heskett, 1980: ". . . industrial design is a process of 
creation, invention and definition separated from the means of 
production, involving an eventual synthesis of contributory and 
often conflicting factors into a concept of three-dimensional 
form, and its material reality, capable of multiple reproduction 
by mechanical means. It is thus specifically linked to the 
development of industrialization and mechanization that began 
with the Industrial Revolution in Britain around 1770, though it 
cannot be described simply as a deterministic product of those 
events." (10-11) 
 
 
Definition 16 Stephen Bayley, 1982: "Design is what occurs when art meets 
industry, when people begin to make decisions about what 
mass-produced products should look like." (9) 
 
 
Definition 17 Dieter Rams, 1984: "Design is the effort to make products in 
such a way that they are useful to people. It is more rational than 
irrational, optimistic and projected toward the future rather than 
resigned, cynical, and indifferent. Design means being steadfast 
and proggressive rather than escaping and giving up. In a 
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historical phase in which the outer world has become less 
natural and increasingly artificial and commercial, the value of 
design increases. The work of designers can contribute more 
concretely and effectively toward a more humane existence in 
the future." (113) 
 
 
Definition 18 Richard Buchanan, 1985: "Design is what all forms of 
production for use have in common. It provides the intelligence, 
the thought or idea – of course, one of the meanings of the term 
design is a thought or plan – that organizes all levels of 
production, whether in graphic design, engineering and 
industrial design, architecture, or the largest integrated systems 
found in urban planning." (108) 
 
 
Definition 19 Abraham Moles, 1985: "The designer is a modest demiurge: 
He or she takes charge of the daily environmental pattern in a 
hedonistic context where the measure of his action is the quality 
of life." 
 
"The designer is an environmental engineer, and his fields of 
action are characterized by two things, the scale of his 
perception of the shells in which humans are enclosed, and the 
types of sensorial aspects that he vouchsafes in his action." 
 
"In consumer society design is no longer concerned with a 
particular object, but with the totality of an environment on a 
given scale." 
 
"Everyday life is the designer's subject matter. . . . " 
 
"The function of the designer is to increase the legibility of the 
world. The world is a labyrinth that must be unravelled, a text 
that must be deciphered. Each individual scrutinizes it as his life 
unfolds." (129) 
 
 
Definition 20 Richard W. Pew, 1985: "Design is the successive application 
of constraints until only a unique product is left." (Norman, 
Psychology 158)   
 
 
Definition 21 Penny Sparke, 1986: "One of a designer’s major tasks in 
whichever field he specializes – be it electrical products, 
ceramics, glass, silver or engineering structures – is to bestow 
form upon an otherwise formless material or set of materials. 
Whether the intention is to facilitate production or to seduce the 
consumer through visual sophistication, the process of form-
giving is a constant problem for the designer and has inspired 
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many and varied approaches through this and the last centuries." 
(37) 
 
 
Definition 22 Bruce Nussbaum, 1988: "[Well-designed products] stand out in 
the material landscape. The sleek, elegant lines of a liquid black 
automobile as it slips around a curve. A baby bottle carefully 
crafted to fit the tiny fingers of an infant. The hidden power of 
trim, triangular speakers as they pulsate with music. The 
difference is design, that elusive blend of form and function, 
quality and style, art and engineering." (Kotler 259) 
 
 
Definition 23 Klaus Krippendorff, 1989: "Design is making sense (of 
things)." (156) 
 
 
Definition 24 John H. Burgess, 1989: "Industrial design has been defined as 
the imaginative development of manufactured products and 
product systems that 'serve the physical needs and satisfy the 
psychological desires of people'." (xii) 
 
 
Definition 25 Ettore Sottsass, 1989: "I consider good design anything that 
transmits an idea with an historical and anthropological balance. 
It's something that fits the context of the future – not the present 
– a future built on the necessities that people hope to have." 
 
"It's a profession that involves groups of people, and it's not as 
solitary as painting or poetry. And you deal with social 
problems. A real designer always has technology and production 
in mind and that's how he differs from an artist. Anytime I 
design, I ask three questions: can it stand up, can it be produced, 
and will it stay together. So it's a very sophisticated profession, 
if you want it to be. . . . I'm not an inventor because I'm more 
interested in the method of doing things than the final result. 
And I'm not solving problems because no one solves problems – 
instead, I am discussing them." (56-57) 
 
 
Definition 26 Unknown, 1990: "Design is 'a search process in a space of 
alternative solutions, seeking one or more that satisfy certain 
design criteria'." (Pipes 76) 
 
 
Definition 27 Unknown, 1990: "Design is 'a process of recursive conjecture-
analysis operating within the framework of abduction, deduction 
and induction, proceeding on the basis of a series of paradigm 
shifts to more detailed levels as the proposal becomes more 
specific'." (Pipes 76) 
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Definition 28 Philip Kotler and Gary Armstrong, 1991: "Design is a larger 
concept than style. Style simply describes the appearance of a 
product. Styles can be eye-catching or yawn-inspiring. A 
sensational style may grab attention, but it does not necessarily 
make the product perform better. In some cases, it might even 
result in worse performance: A chair may look great yet be 
extremely uncomfortable. Unlike style, design is more than skin 
deep – it goes to the very heart of a product. Good design 
contributes to a product's usefulness as well as to its looks. A 
good designer considers appearance but also creates products 
that are easy, safe, inexpensive to use and service, and simple 
and economical to produce and distribute." (259)  
 
 
Definition 29 John Chris Jones, 1991: "Design [is] the initiation of change in 
man-made things." (xi) 
 
 
Definition 30 Odile Solomon, 1992: "Design is a whole lot of things: it's 
engineering, but it isn't, it's marketing, but it isn't, it's aesthetics, 
but it isn't, it's costs, but it isn't, it's all of these things." (Vihma 
154) 
 
 
Definition 31 Donald A. Norman, 1993: "Design should be like telling a 
story. The design team should start by considering the tasks that 
the artifact is intended to serve and the people who will use it. 
To accomplish this, the design team must include expertise in 
human cognition, in social interaction, in the task that is to be 
supported, and in the technologies that will be used. Appropriate 
design is a hard job. But without it, our tools will continue to 
frustrate, to confuse more than clarify, and to get in the way 
rather than merge with the task." (Norman, Things 105)  
 
 
Definition 32 Victor Margolin, 1995: "[Design is] the conception and 
planning of the artificial." (From "The Politics of the Artificial) 
 
 
Definition 33 Law amending ordinance, 1995: "3. Madde: 'tasarım', bir 
ürünün tümü, veya bir parçası veya üzerindeki süslemenin, 
çizgi, şekil, biçim, renk, doku, malzeme veya esneklik gibi insan 
duyuları ile algılanan çeşitli unsur veya özelliklerinin 
oluşturduğu bütünü ifade eder (Ankara Patent Bürosu 107)." 
 
 Translation: 'Design' denotes the totality that can be perceived 
by human senses, resulting from a product's features and 
characteristics such as the lines, shape, form, colors, texture, 
 203
materials, elasticity, etc. belonging either to the whole of the 
product or to its parts or ornamentation.  
 
 
Definition 34 Kaan Dericioğlu, 2001: "Bir ürünün üç boyutlu şekli ya da bu 
şeklin bir parçası ile ürün üzerindeki iki boyutlu süslemeler 
"endüstriyel tasarım" kavramı içinde değerlendirilmektedir. 
Endüstriyel tasarım, bir ürünün dış görünüşünü ifade eder. Bu 
görünüş, ürünün biçimi olabileceği gibi, çizgilerden, şekillerden, 
süslerden, renklerden ve çeşitli unsurlardan oluşan görünüşler de 
olabilir."  
 
Translation: The three-dimensional shape of a product or a part 
of this shape as well as two-dimensional decorations on the 
product is considered as belonging within the concept of 
"industrial design". Industrial design signifies the outer 
appearance of a product. This appearance can be the form of a 
product as well as expressions composed of lines, shapes, 
ornaments, colors and other various elements.   
 
 
Definition 35 Anonymous: "Design is a problem solving activity." 
 
 
Definition 36 ICSID’s Design Definition:  
Aim: Design is a creative activity whose aim is to establish the 
multi-faceted qualities of objects, processes, services in whole 
life-cycles. Therefore, design is the central factor of innovative 
humanization of technologies and the crucial factor of culture 
and economic exchange. 
 
Tasks: Design seeks to discover and assess structural, 
organizational, functional, expressive and economic 
relationships, with the task of: 
-enhancing global sustainability and environmental protection 
(global ethics); 
-giving benefits and freedom to the entire human community, 
individual and collective final users, producers and market 
protagonists (social ethics); 
-supporting cultural diversity despite the globalization of the 
world (cultural ethics); 
-giving products, services and systems, those forms that are 
expressive of (semiology) and coherent with (aesthetics) their 
proper complexity. 
 
Design concerns products, services and systems conceived with 
tools, organizations and logic introduced by industrialization – 
not just when produced by serial processes. The adjective 
“industrial” put to design must be related to the term industry or 
in its ancient meaning of “industrious activity”. 
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Thus, design is an activity involving a wide spectrum of 
professions in which products, services, graphics, interiors and 
architecture all take part. Together, these activities should 
further enhance – in a choral way with other related professions 
– the value of life. 
 
Therefore, the term designer refers to an individual who 
practices an intellectual profession, and not simply a trade or a 
service for enterprise. 
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